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By Steve Dillingham

The horrific events surrounding September 11th left Americans with a feeling of sudden helplessness...the shock of being unprepared and powerless. From this tragedy, we can understand the need to prepare for the unexpected, and can apply this hard lesson into operational planning for those involved in the commercical explosives industry.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

Change occurs all of the time. In fact, it’s fair to say that change is a constant. Sometimes the change is inconsequential, but sometimes the change impacts us d i rectly and severely. Take regulations, for instance. Complying with regulatory requirements is just part of the job for those involved with explosives. But in recent years, it seems as if new or revised regulations in areas such as hazardous materials training, drug and alcohol testing, security issues, or local licensing/permitting standards are changing the way we operate on a recurring basis. Simply keeping track of all of these regulations has become a full-time job.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

In every aspect of conduct, on the blast site or off, the issue of credibility is raised. Promises are made, commitments are satisfied, safe practices are obeyed, communication is maintained, and proven procedures followed. Only by fulfilling these objectives, are we deemed trustworthy and reliable - in other words - credible. Unfortunately, at times, we fall short of achieving our goals. Whether intentionally or accidentally, everything is not completed according to plan or accuracy. On the blast site, falling short of achieving such goals may contribute significantly to a chain of events that can potentially produce accidents. At the very least, a blaster’s credibility will be jeopardized. The fact remains that the blaster that continuously conducts business in a professional manner will less likely find him or herself as a defendant in future claims.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

The explosives business by nature is providing a specialized, valued service and associated products to a variety of customers whether mine, quarry or construction related. The level of performance demanded by the customer will typically coincide with his or her individual needs. Some will seek out the skills and knowledge of a blasting expert, while the focus of others is simply on production amounts.

Jan 1, 2003

By Steve Dillingham

Whenever misfired holes or portions of misfired holes remain after a blast is fired, a hazardous situation exists until the unfired explosive materials have been disposed of properly. Yet, there are so many factors that can contribute to misfires that it is impossible to give blanket instructions on how to handle them. To complicate matters, misfires today are rare due to reliable blasting products. As such, it isn’t very surprising that many blasters have never had to deal with a misf i re condition. While the likelihood of a misfire occurrence is minimal, you should always be pre p a red to handle a misfire should you be involved in such an event. To begin, every blaster and blasting org a n i z a t i o n should develop a misfire policy which contains the company’s safe operating pro c e d u res, emergency contact list, as well as any regulatory compliance re q u i re m e n t s . Tailgate and/or company-wide safety meetings should communicate the company’s contingent misfire pro c ed u res and any special site-specific precautions BEFORE the start of any project.

Jan 1, 2004

By Dale Preece, Stephen Chung

Blasting induced rock fragmentation is an art that has been developed and refined for hundred’s of years through blasting and recording the results. Good blasting fragmentation practices were thus developed through experience. However, this method requires a history that is typically developed in a mine over a number of years and sometimes at considerable expense. Quantification of fragmentation as a function of rock-mass characteristics and blast design is attractive. Developments towards this end have included semi-empirical methods as well as computer codes that explicitly treat shock wave transmission and the subsequent rock breakage. This paper will present predictions of fragmentation resulting from rock blasting using the computer code AUTODYN and a new state-of-the-art material model for brittle rock and concrete.

Jan 1, 2003

By D. K. Ingram, G. L. Mowrey, T. R. Rehak

Problem: Blasting is a hazardous component of surface mining. Serious injuries and fatalities result from improper judgement or practice during rock blasting. This paper describes several fatal injury case studies, analyzes causative factors, and emphasizes preventive measures. Method: This study examines publications by MSHA, USGS, and other authors. The primary source of information was MSHA’s injury-related publications. Results: During the 21-yearperiod from 1978 to 1998, the mean yearly explosive-related injuries (fatal and nonfatal) for surface coal mines was 8.86 (95% CI: 6.38 -11.33), and for surface metal/nonmetal mines 10.76(95% CI: 8.39 - 13.14). Flyrock and lack of blast area security accounted for 68.2% of these injuries. This paper reviews several case studies of fatal injuries. Case studies indicate that the causative factors for fatal injuries are primarily personal and task-related and to some extent environmental. A reduction in the annual injuries in surface coal mines was observed during the ten-year period of 1989 - 1998 [5.80 (95% CI: 2.71 - 8.89) compared to the previous ten-year period of 1979 - 1988 [10.90 (95% CI: 7.77 - 14.14)]. However, such reduction was not noticed in the metal/nonmetal sector, i.e., 9.30 (95% CI: 6.84 - 11.76) for the period 1989-1998compared with 11.00 (95% CI: 7.11 - 14.89) for the period 1979-1988. Discussion: A multifaceted injury prevention approach consisting of behavioral/educational, administrative/regulatory, and engineering interventions merits consideration. Impact on industry: The mining community, especially the blasters, will find useful information on causative factors and preventive measures to mitigate injuries due to flyrock and lack of blast area security in surface blasting. Discussion of case studies during safety meetings will help to mitigate fatal injuries and derive important payoffs in terms of lower risks and costs of injuries.

In March 2003, Rio Tinto Coal AustraliaÆs (RTCA) new Hail Creek open cut coal mine commenced operations in the Bowen Basin. Hail Creek is a two-seam strip mining operation utilising two 90 m3 draglines and a fleet of excavators and trucks to remove the overburden. All overburden at Hail Creek is blasted prior to excavation. The mine conducts its own drill and blast operations while engaging Dyno Nobel for the provision of explosives supply and loading truck (bulk explosives vehicle û BEV) services. This arrangement was favoured over outsourcing the entire blasting function to a contractor. Subsequent to a value engineering review, the mine set about developing and implementing a blasting operation that did not rely on the need to store bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate on site. There were advantages identified in doing this, in particular the reduction of capital expenditure required and reduced exposure to a number of recently introduced security requirements. This approach also makes sense operationally. The establishment of reload facilities for the BEV close to the blasting location, where turnaround times are kept to a minimum, increases the productivity of the BEV. For this strategy to be successful the logistics of ammonium nitrate supply into the blasting operations has to be well planned and thoroughly executed. This means a robust planning and forecasting arrangement needs to be established with the supplier and transporters of the ammonium nitrate. To date, 80 million bcm of overburden has been blasted at Hail Creek and each year the quantity of overburden requiring blasting is increasing. The purpose of this paper is to present the findings of a study: evaluating the effectiveness to date of the strategy to conduct blasting operations without ammonium nitrate storage on site, and identifying whether there is a limit to which this strategy can operate after which the introduction of bulk ammonium nitrate storage facilities are necessary.

Jan 1, 2007

By L. Donovan Clark

The term "powder factor" is almost universally accepted as the measure of the efficiency of a blasting program. It represents the economics of blasting since it designates quantity of explosive (thereby providing quality control in rock fragmentation) in terms of the associated volume broken. It is the wide use of this concept that explains the interest shown in an approach to rock blasting preferred by A. W. and Z. W. Daw* in a treatise on 3 blasting (1) substantiating its use in the form, Q = CVW3 for single shot hole, where Q = quantity of explosive lb Cv = blasting coefficient W3 = unit volume of rock It is obvious that the term Cv could also be called the apparent powder factor should the equation be written in the form, Cv = Q/W3 (lb per cubic unit). However, while the approach was ingenious** and the practical applications straightforward, their original, rather limited experimental work, along with certain assumptions, was questioned.

Jan 1, 1970

By Jean-Sébastien Lambert, Joseph Kabuya, Richard Simon

Managing a highwall failure risk in an open pit mine by controlling and mitigating the impact of vibrations produced by blasting operations is key to achieving safe and cost-effective operations. The impetus behind this study was the risk of multiple bench failures in an open pit mine that was detected by Slope Stability Radar (SSR) following blasting at the foot of a highwall. The unstable high wall was over 140 meters(459.3 ft)high and 200 meters(656.2 ft)wide. The quantity of associated material was estimated at 3,000,000 metric tons(3,306,934 US tons). The overall slope angle was 44 degrees. In order to continue mining without causing the highwall to fail, this study was initiated as part of a risk management plan to mitigate this major risk by identifying mitigation measures related to blasting operations and assessing the response of the rock mass to each blast. Identifying blasting mitigation measures consisted of optimizing blasting parameters to avoid failure of the highwall. First, a signature hole operation was carried out to obtain seismic records that were georeferenced and associated with known single charges. The method used made it possible to determine the propagation velocity of the P-waves associated with the various lithologies studied and to calculate, from the geomechanical properties of the rock masses, the maximum peak particle velocities to be respected. Subsequently, the targeted area of operation was modelled with the I-Blast software in order to optimize the firing sequences to be used according to the different lithologies present. The model also made it possible to optimally predict the particle velocities associated with each blast and ensure compliance with the previously determined peak particle velocity limits. The assessment of the rock mass’s response using SSR consisted of defining alarm thresholds and an intervention plan for various possible alarms as well as quantifying the damage to the highwall from blasting. Controlling the impact of blast vibrations on the highwall’s stability was successful, as the mitigation measures used during mining did not accelerate the highwall’s movement. No upward trend in the stabilization time of the rock mass was observed by the SSR after each blast. Post-blast geotechnical inspections and analysis of post-blast deformations in the highwall also did not reveal significant damage to the highwall as a direct consequence of the blasting.

By Scott G. Giltner, Alex Schwenk

Blasting within 250 ft of a crusher was successfully executed through the application of electronic detonators, 3-D imagery, signature hole analysis, custom loading of blast holes. The blast was well contained, the vibrations were minimal, and there was no flyrock.

Feb 1, 2020

By L. Muñoz, L. Steffen, J. Alarcón, W. Vilas

Today, mining operations close to communities face increasing challenges, especially in their drilling and blasting operations. Proper management of environmental impacts is important to guarantee their license to operate and to provide sustainability to the mining business in the long term. Blasting is an event that generates impacts such as vibrations, noise (airblast), projections (flyrocks), ejection of dust and fumes (when there is a deficient detonation of the explosive). If any of these variables exceed the established regulations, sanctions can be generated and even lead to stop mining operations. The goal of this work is to present a review of different techniques, concepts, technologies, simulation software and monitoring / control tools to minimize the environmental impact generated by blasting. For which, a case study of a big scale open pit mine in Brazil with operations close to a community will be presented. An adequate management model, combined with good operational practices, the use of new technologies, enable a safe operation without incidents with the communities. In this way, building trust with neighbours, maintaining the license to operate, and helping mining industry to mobilize resources essential for progress in a sustainable way

Jan 1, 2024

By A J. Moore

Blasting operations in open cut mines results in airblast, ground vibration and rock movement with the potential for wild flyrock. In some mines there is a trend towards blasting closer to established infrastructure as extraction boundaries alter with increased resource prices and changed economic circumstances. Mine infrastructure in close proximity to blasting has the potential to be damaged by ground vibration and wild flyrock especially. To provide guidance for the determination of appropriate buffer distances and blast specifications, this paper describes methodologies that may be used to determine the potential for damage to infrastructure by predicting:dynamic blast;near field ground vibration levels;dynamic blast strains induced in infrastructure by consideration of ground vibration,ground strain and response amplification;potential for damage by comparing induced strains with allowable working strainsfrom structure design codes and serviceability requirements; andflyrock throw distances based on models developed from flyrock investigations.This report demonstrates the use of strain prediction methodologies developed during Australian Coal Association Research Programme (ACARP) Project C14057 for infrastructure such as conveyor belts, transmission poles and towers, buildings and bridges.

Nov 8, 2011

By Tony Rorke, Sydney Thabethe

A large overburden blast was carried out at Douglas Colliery, Middelburg Mine Services, close to a national road in South Africa. The road is a busy route between Witbank and Bethal and damage to the road could not be risked. The section of road next to the blast was particularly prone to damage, because it had been mined out on its eastern flank, and the large blast was to take place on its western flank. There were thus three potential damage risks: 1. Fly rock damage to the road surface 2. Vibration damage to the road substrate 3. Damage caused by bulk displacement of the block supporting the road into the void on the mined out side. This paper presents the design and blasting methods used to control the blast and avoid these three risks. Electronic delay detonators were used in multi-decked holes. Signature data were used to determine the blast timing to make sure that delays were used that would provide destructive interference. The timing direction and sequence was decided using wave interference patterns to direct repeated shocks away from the road. The precise detonators and the odelling capability allowed effective control of the blast vibration result. Each hole was charged with two explosive decks separated by a deck of aggregate to limit the charge mass fired per delay and thus limit the reaction forces acting towards the unsupported road. The vibration and blast results are presented in the paper, together with the design that was applied. Details are provided on how the blast was charged and primed. The detonators that were used are described and the timing design is presented.Copyright © 2004 International Society of Explosives Engineers 2004G Volume 1 - Blasting Next to an Unsupported Road Using Electronic Detonators 1 of 13 It is concluded that damage risk to nearby structures can be effectively controlled using electronic delay detonators, provided the appropriate modelling is applied to obtain the most effective delay periods.

Jan 1, 2004

By James A. Bachmann, Christopher J. Gray

On December 26, 1994, at 1:00 am, Santa Fe Pacific Gold's Twin Creeks Mine experienced a major highwall failure involving over 2.5 million tons. The resulting effects of this slide were thousands of ounces of gold that were now deferred and an unstable wall above which made mining the slough material unsafe.

Jan 1, 1996

By Raymond Chenier

British Columbia (BC) is Canada’s most western province. The landscape in BC is amongst the most beautiful and pristine in the world. Along with its beauty come vast mountain ranges, coastal rain forests, swamplands, deep river valleys, and almost every type of landscape imaginable. These all have, or at one time had, logging roads constructed. Some of these areas should never have had roads constructed due to poor drainage and unstable slopes, but some of the roads could be considered engineering masterpieces. To navigate a vehicle the size of an off-road logging truck down the side of a mountain with an 80°h side slope or greater can be a hair-raising experience. Not to mention coastal rains and/or high elevation blizzards. These factors collectively make logging BC’s most hazardous occupation. People are seriously hurt, sometimes even killed everyday.

Jan 1, 2001

By M V. Van Bers, A L. McAnuff, A Curic

During the Summer of 1997, rock excavation was carried out for construction of the Centre Block Underground Services building (CBUS) abutting the most historically significant structural complex in Canada, the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. Controlled blasting was required for the removal of 25,000 cubic metres of limestone bedrock within the ten week time window of Parliamentary recess. A test blast program carried out in 1996 had established that close blasting was viable even within the very restrictive limits considered necessary to preserve the structural and cosmetic integrity of these historic structures. In total 300 blasting operations were required to complete the excavation, including the 20 test blasts conducted in 1996. Based on attenuation characteristics established for the site during the trial blast phase, the blasting contractor proposed excavating the CBUS site in three zones. Each zone contained differing drill patterns, depths and explosive loads. Vibration intensities, air concussion levels and displacements across representative existing cracks were measured and recorded at numerous observation points within and around the Centre Block and the Library of Parliament, as well as on the grounds of the Parliamentary Precinct. The blasting portion of the excavation was completed within budget in less than eight weeks, well within the tune window available. Comparison of very extensive pre and post-blast condition surveys revealed no damage to the existing structures on Parliament Hill as a result of these operations.

Jan 1, 1999

By D. M. Dunbar, H. C. SCHLILTZ

HE Chile Exploration Co.'s mine and reduction plant are at Chuquicamata, Chile, on the eastern edge of the Atacama Desert, 163 miles northeast of Antofagasta, 80 miles from the Pacific Ocean, and 70 miles from the Bolivian border and at an altitude of 10,000 ft. Guggenheim Brothers started prospecting in -4pri1, 1912, and purchased the main property, in October of that year; the property is now controlled by the Anaconda Copper Mining Co., which acquired it in January, 1923. The orebody strikes north 10" east, and has a dip of about 64" west. The length, as far as developed, is approximately 1% miles; the width averages sightless than mile.

Jan 1, 1925

By Joe Atalla, Jesse Desrochers, Rodrigo Hayashida, Joseph Mukendi Kabuya

The Mont-Wright mine stands as a prominent open-pit operation in Canada, renowned for its vast iron-ore reserves. However, the efficacy of its blasting operations, crucial for efficient production, has encountered challenges due to the diverse lithological compositions across multiple pits. This study presents a comprehensive approach to optimize blasting practices at Mont-Wright mine, tailored to the specific lithological characteristics of each rock domain. Through systematic analysis and experimentation, blasting guidelines were meticulously developed, aiming to enhance grindability and equipment productivity. The implementation of these guidelines promises significant improvements in operational efficiency and resource utilization, positioning Mont-Wright mine at the forefront of sustainable iron-ore extraction.

Jan 21, 2025

By R. Franfield

This paper describes a situation that many drilling and blasting contractors have found themselves in – a client?s fear of the use of explosives. In the summer of 2007 Blasting Services Ltd was asked to undertake some drilling and blasting work in an abandoned quarry that was being restored for a housing development. Previous quarrying operations had left a series of overhangs that were considered unsafe and required removing. The site contractor considered that the best and safest way to carry out this work was by drilling and blasting. Blasting Services Ltd, with the technical assistance of Exchem Explosives, designed a drilling and blasting regime to accomplish this work with a series of trim blasts. The design took into account the close proximity of a structure in very poor condition and the imposed vibration limit of 6.0 mm/s (0.24 i.p.s.). The faces were profiled, holes drilled and explosives ordered. A few days before the first blast was due to be carried out the client decided that the poor condition of the nearby structure meant that the use of explosives could not be permitted. This decision was made despite the blast design indicating that the vibration level would be well below the 6.0 mm/s (0.24 i.p.s.) limit.

Jan 1, 2009