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By Michel Aubertin

Les digues de retenue de résidus miniers devraient être conçues de façon à supporter les charges les plus défavorables qui puissent être anticipées. Les nombreux incidents survenus au cours des dernières années à travers le monde montrent toutefois que la stabilité de ces ouvrages reste encore problématique. Les cas de rupture les plus courants sont reliés aux glissements le long des pentes, à la liquéfaction des rejets, au débordement des bassins, ainsi qu?à l'érosion régressive et de surface. Après avoir rappelé la nature et l?importance des certains incidents récents, l?origine de ces problèmes est brièvement présentée. On aborde ensuite le lien entre les critères à adopter pour la conception des ouvrages et les risques associés à leur rupture. De nouvelles avenues pour aider à contrôler certains problèmes sont enfin discutées, en mettant l?emphase sur la codisposition des roches stériles dans le parc à résidus miniers.

Nov 1, 2002

By Ljiljana Solujic

The need for the removal of mercury from the precious metals extraction circuits may be influenced by process, environmental, as well as by occupational hazard reasons. In these circuits mercury is mainly present as cyanide complexes. The effectiveness of any stabilization method will be influenced by the high thermodynamic stability mercury-cyano species exhibit in an aqueous solution. In this study, we have investigated the utility of the trisodium salt of trimmercapto-s-triazine (TMT) for precipitation of mercury from the corresponding cyano-complexes. The influence of pH molar ratio of TMT to Hg, coagulant and flocculant additions, excess of free cyanide, as well as the presence of other metal-cyano species on the effectiveness of mercury precipitation were investigated in detail. Also, a "teal world" precious metals mill effluent initially containing ~7 ug/mL (ppm) of Hg was treated and A was found that greater than 99.8% of the mercury was removed from the solution as am insoluble Hg/TMT complex.

Jan 1, 1996

By Eugene A. Stephenson

The writer apologizes for presenting this very elementary analysis of one aspect of proration, but a search of the literature failed to disclose any concrete illustrations of the effect of various proration formulas upon the allowable oil produced by tracts of different sizes. Many engineers have doubtless made somewhat similar calculations and are fully acquainted with the results. The various allocation formulas that are in use are based on one or more of the following factors: (1) wide-open well potential, (2) potential through an orifice, (3) uniform well allowable, (4) acreage, (5) sand thickness, (6) bottom-hole pressure, (7) productivity index, and (8) volumetric displacement. Of these, the unrestricted potential formula, or open-flow test, and the uniform well allowable are commonly regarded by engineers as those least likely to give each producer his proportionate share of the oil or gas, as represented either by acreage or by sand thickness, or both, except when the wells are located on tracts of large size. Unless the mechanical equipment that may be used during the potential test and the method of taking the test are both specified, the net result of the potential formula is to practically force the operators to use special equipment and adopt special procedures prior to and during the potential test, so as to secure the largest possible allowables. Much ingenuity and skill have been devoted to this,problem, but the general effect is to permit excessive allowables for very small tracts, and stimulate unnecessary drilling. It is interesting to compare some of the high yields from the Wilcox horizon at Oklahoma City with each other, as an illustration of the effect of an allocation factor based solely on potential (Table 5). One of the glaring instances is a well on a ½-acre lease, which had produced, as of September 1936, at the rate of almost 3,000,000 bbl. per acre. This is at least twice as many barrels as could have been present under the property if the reservoir had consisted of a tank of oil 200 ft, deep and 56 acre in area. Numerous combinations of acreage, potential, bottom-hole pressure, sand thickness, etc., have been proposed and are in use in various fields.

Jan 1, 1937

By Earl Oliver

Page A.I.M.E. Stabilization Committee Activity................. 133 Definition of Capture Rule: Robert E. Hardwicke.......................... 134 Westmoreland Natural Gas Co. vs. DeWitt................ 135 Kelly vs. Ohio Oil Co......................... 135 Bernard vs. Monongahela Gas Co.................... 136 Definition of Ownership in Place..................... 137 Prospective Stabilization Remedies.................... 137 Dean Roscoe Pound's Four Teats of Practicability.............. 137 I. Mechanically Feasible....................... 138 Capture Rule.......................... 138 Ownership in Place....................... 140 Mechanical Separatio.7 Method................. 140 Engineering Appraisal Method................. 141 II. Economically Advisable...................... 143 Capture Rule.......................... 144 Ownership in Place....................... 144 III. Politically Wise.......................... 144 Capture Rule..........................144 Ownership in Place.......................147 IV. Legally Sound..........................148 Capture Rule..........................148 Ownership in Place.......................149 Dean Henry M. Bates' Analysis......................149 Raumé................................152 The A.I.M.E. Stabilization Committee was named in 1932 to ascertain whether some practical substitute could be devised for the Rule of Capture, which was generally credited with being the major cause of instability in the Petroleum Industry. After considerable intercommittee correspondence a letter was received from E. DeGolyer under date of Jan. 25. 1935. in which he discussed the possibility of modifying rather than discarding the Rule of Capture. He summarized his proposal as follows:

Jan 1, 1937

By J. B. Umpleby

The function of gas in the development and production of oil has far-reaching consequences that should be emphasized. The technical aspects of the subject have recently had a great deal of attention but less thought has been given to fundamental concepts underlying oil and gas law and the many customs and practices that have grown up in the industry. I shall review briefly the advance in knowledge of the subject and attempt to relate these concepts to legislative, judicial and operating problems. Early writers on oil and gas in Pennsylvania noted their close association in oil pools and their contemporaneous decline in output; also, that as gas pressure decreases so does production, that new offset wells reduce the output of existing wells, and even that tubing a well lengthens its flowing life. Expanding gas was deduced as the principal expulsive force. These fundamental observations had been made at least as early as 1880.1 They were treated, however, as academic considerations and did not greatly influence law or practice for many years except to instill into all operators an urgent desire to hasten offset drilling in order to obtain as much of the flush as possible. The most noteworthy later advance in knowledge came in 1926 when Beecher and Parkhurst published their paper on Effects of Dissolved Gas upon the Viscosity and Surface Tension of OiL.² This paper added to the old idea of an expelling force the concept of a modifying agent that actually changes the physical characteristics of the oil and facilitates its movement through the pore spaces of the reservoir rock. Largely since the publication of this paper, intensive study and concerted effort have been given to means of using to a maximum, in producing oil, these combined properties of gas. This is shown clearly by the number of papers dealing with the subject, and the new and revived terms now widely used to express thought, such as the expressions gas energy, reservoir pressure, reservoir energy, gas-oil ratio, bottom-hole pressure, beaning, tapered tubing and back-pressure. These terms, some of which are

Jan 1, 1932

By C. M. Nickerson

The possibility of deeper production in the Buena Vista Hills was first considered in 1933. At that time, however, the heavy state curtailment program served to deter any operator from drilling test wells, which, if successful, might upset the proration schedules. Because most of the acreage was held by several major operators and the remainder by substantial independents, the adoption of a plan of cooperative development was considered desirable. Such a plan was formulated for the development of any deeper oil and gas horizons that may be found to exist. This plan, which was signed by the Secretaries of the Navy and of the Interior on behalf of the United States on July 9,1936, is now effective for the development of lands within the area shown on Fig. 1. Unlike most unit plans, the present cooperative development plan permits each operator to drill and produce his own wells. For the purpose of this plan the Buena Vista Hills field is divided into two pools. The present production is classed as the " old pool,"' while any future production below a certain marker which roughly coincides with the bottom of the Santa Margarita formation is included in the "pool" to which the provisions particularly apply. Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 2 lies within the area and constitutes the major portion of the Federal leases subject to the plan. There are 39,040 acres and 27 operators within the area. Twenty-six operators controlling 99.5 per cent of the acreage have signed the agreement. Geology oF the Buena Vista Hills The Buena Vista Hills consist of a low range in the southern portion of the San Joaquin Valley, and are roughly parallel to the adjacent Temblor range to the south. The Elk Hills oil field parallels the Buena Vista Hills a few miles to the north. The subsurface structure is a re-entrant anticline upon the major Midway-Sunset monocline. This anticline is divided into two minor

Jan 1, 1937

By William E. Hubbard

During the last decade the known reserves of petroleum in the United States have increased from about five billion to over thirteen billion barrels. From the standpoint of public welfare the existence of these known reserves presents an undeniably favorable picture, but viewed from the position of many a harassed operator the blessing has not always been considered an unmixed one. Along with this increase in excess reserves, curtailment of production has come into being as a matter of necessity and the principle of proration as a matter of equity. As a practical matter it has been considered necessary to curtail the production of old wells as well as that of new wells in a pool. The right of new pools to produce has been recognized, and the allowable for them has come partly from increased market demand and largely from the allowables already enjoyed by the developed pools. The natural result—a downward trend in daily per-well allowables—has been especially felt by Texas operators. This trend may be illustrated by Table 1, which comprises the five active areas in Texas, and from which may be noted the following: 1. The average daily allowable per well has decreased about 53 per cent in three years. 2. Of the 184,000-bbl. increase in total allowable for the five areas, 29,000 bbl. came from the increase in state demand and 165,000 from the combined allowables of the remaining pools in the state.

Jan 1, 1937

By Northcutt Ely

The subject of this paper implies three questions: whether regulation is necessary; if so, what sort of regulation is wise; and, finally, by what government the power to regulate is to be exercised. In the year 1937 emphasis falls on the third of those questions. This contrasts with the situation prevailing a dozen years ago, when the question was whether regulation was necessary at all; and with the situation a few months ago, when the third question seemed answered by the Supreme Court decisions on the National Recovery Act, Agricultural Adjustment Act and Guffey Coal Control Act, and by the ratification of the Interstate Oil Compact. It then appeared settled that the State and not the Federal Government possessed the regulatory powers and, granting that conservation measures are a recognized necessity, the problem seemed to be to develop the wisest kind of regulation that the Constitution would permit. Today, by virtue of developments during the first months of 1937, the oil industry is faced again by the question of whether the Federal Government is to have power to control its operations, along with those of the other basic industries. Developments in Governmental Control There have been three recent developments. The dominating one is the President's proposal that he be authorized to increase the size of the Supreme Court to 15 members. The implications of that plan ought to be perfectly plain to the oil industry. This suggestion is made in lieu of offering an amendment to the Constitution, to reverse the Supreme Court decisions mentioned. In those decisions the Court held that production does not constitute commerce, and hence that the Federal power to regulate interstate commerce does not extend to the regulation of production. These holdings were contrary to the Government's contention that the stream of commerce begins in the factory and ends with the consumer and may be regulated at any point from beginning to end. That position was urged in the Government briefs in Amazon Petroleum Co. v. Ryan, defending the petroleum code, and repeated as late as Feb. 10, 1937, in the case of National Labor Relations

Jan 1, 1937

By Earl Oliver

Superficial observation of the petroleum stabilization movement in 1932 is disappointing. Threatened overproduction persisted; waste continued; proration was violated; gasoline taxes were evaded; and, as a consequence, chaos threatened the industry as the year drew to a close. However, comparison of the movement in 1932 with its beginning a few years ago, and analyses of those influences that promote its growth as well as those which retard it, disclose some reasons for encouragement. Stabilization, as we see it, is not merely a mechanical engineering problem. It involves social engineering. By which we do not mean it is possible, or even desirable, to change the nature of men, but rather that it is possible to set up procedure that will avoid causing them to clash. It comprehends consideration of physical objects that is clearly within the field of the engineer, but it considers them only in relation to their distribution, utilization and control in harmony with philosophies that motivate men and shape current conceptions of right and wrong, or of justice and injustice if those terms be deemed more acceptable. Stabilization cannot be effected without utilizing the knowledge of the engineer, but neither can it be effected without utilizing more than comes within his traditional field of activity. In discussing the problem herein we shall endeavor to treat it briefly from that consolidated viewpoint. Rapid fluctuations in supply have characterized the oil industry from its beginning; yet only within the past ten years has an understanding begun to develop regarding the extent of waste—the degree of dissipation of natural resources—that attends the operation of the industry under the practices and laws which control it in the United States. The extent and regrettable consequences of those wastes, their underlying causes and the ease with which they could be prevented are not yet generally understood even within the industry. Producing TomoRRow' s Oil Today The interests detrimentally affected by these economic evils are vastly greater than the mere welfare of the oil industry. The problem involves the nation's supply of gasoline and other petroleum products at

Jan 1, 1933

By L. C. Snider

All important industries have certain basic principles in common which govern them and give them a family resemblance. In addition, each industry has a certain individuality due to some principle or principles which govern, or are accepted as governing, that industry and which is not effective in others. The customs and practices of an industry depend on these basic principles much as the corollaries follow a proposition in geometry. After the proposition is proved or is accepted as proved, the corollaries are seen to be true almost without additional evidence or proof. In many cases, the corollaries are more important in practical affairs than the proposition on which they depend. By continued application the corollaries may come to be accepted as law and the fact that their truth depends on the correctness of the fundamental proposition is forgotten or ignored. If it is discovered that an error was made in demonstrating the proposition and that the proposition is untrue, the corollaries are, in most cases at least, equally untrue. Considerable time may be required, however, to realize the fact that the corollaries have failed, particularly if they have been embodied in custom and law. For example, in the business of government the proposition that women are intellectually inferior to men was formerly considered, by most men at least, to be duly proved if not axiomatic. This propositiot was never embodied in law, but its corollaries—that the rights of the wife in property and even in her own children were inferior to the rights of the husband, and that women had no place in governmental affairs—were duly incorporated in law or so completely approved by custom that they had the effect of law. Developments of the past few decades have proved, to the satisfaction of the majority, that woman's intellectual inferiority to man had not been satisfactorily demonstrated, and that the proposition that she was inferior, although accepted for many generations, was untrue. It was not so great a shock to men to discover that this proposition was wrong as it was to find out that its corollaries were also untrue and that the laws embodying them were not good laws and were subject to repeal. The adjustments which give women equal rights with men

Jan 1, 1932

By E. Baker, David Donoghue

Legal and legislative matters constituted the outstanding features of proration in Texas in 1932. From East Texas emanated most of the political, legal, technical and industrial activity. Conroe and Thompson developed into fields of major importance. Proration orders were issued by the Railroad Commission on many of the producing fields of the Gulf Coast and West Texas not covered in previous years. In Yates, Penn Pool, Winkler, Van, the Panhandle, North Texas and West Central Texas there were 110 changes of importance, except in allowables. New proration schemes were introduced in East Texas, Conroe, Thompson, Saranosa, Government Wells, Tuleta and Howard-Glasscock. Little progress was made in administration or technical development. Legal and Legislative Matters Proration first began in Texas in 1927 as a voluntary attempt to divide the market outlet of a field on an equitable basis. The statutes then in existence were considered somewhat archaic and the Railroad Commission's authority was limited. Subsequent efforts to strengthen the laws were not wholly successful. The 1929 Conservation Act made no mention of market demand but declared that the term "waste" did not mean " economic waste." With the passage of the Pipc Line Act of 1930, providing for ratable purchasing, it was the opinion of many lawyere that a legal means of proration had been found. The 1931 law had ths same provision as that of 1929 with respect to economic waste but specifically prohibited limiting of production to market demand. The law passed Nov. 12, 1932, omitted reference to economic waste and specifically provided for limitation of production to reasonable market demand. Vigorous attacks were being made in State and Federal Courts on the constitutionality of the laws and the validity of the Commission's orders. In Peoples Petroleum Producers, Inc. et al. vs. Lon A. Smith et al., which had been heard before a three-judge U. S. District Court in Houston on May 28, 1932 and again on Sept. 19, the Court's decision for plaintiffs, released Oct. 2, influenced in a large measure the calling of the Legislature and the passage of the Market Demand Law on Nov. 12.

Jan 1, 1933

By E. H. Griswold

The many complexities arising from our present oil pool proration systems emphasize the need for a suitable standard of property rights. Attempts at conservation and unitization agreements have frequently failed because of the lack of such a standard. The necessity of reducing production to consumption has caused umpires, committees, commissions and other governing bodies to allocate the production of flush fields among the respective owners. The methods of allocation vary widely and conservation of underground reserves is frequently neglected or misused. Critical economic conditions increase, rather than modify, competitive methods. In some fields we have irregular and uneconomically close well spacing. Many operators drill unreasonably large holes, take excessive sand penetrations or leave their wells untubed in order to secure higher potential open-flow tests than their offsets. All of these practices result in economic waste and frequently damage to the pool. Regardless of our agreement with the fundamental principles of proration or unitization, both are actual necessities in many of our present economic situations, and we are in urgent need of a suitable standard of rights to facilitate and simplify their operation. The problems pertinent to unit management are simple and of daily use in many partnership enterprises, but the problems of fair and proper division of production under either proration or unitization are, as yet, subject to controversy. The rights of respective owners must be ascertained and standardized before we can eliminate wasteful practices and still preserve constructive competition in our industry. Valuation of Tracts In a recent unitization conference it was found that each participant had a different basis for calculating the relative values of tracts. Some of these assumptions were as follows: 1. Unrestricted open-flow operation to abandonment. 2. Current proration system to abandonment.

Jan 1, 1933

By Joseph B. Umpleby

The oil industry is at the parting of the ways in relating fundamental engineering concepts to legal interpretations and field practices. The old concept, based on an erroneous analogy to wild game, that oil and gas are migratory substances and belong to him who reduces them to possession regardless of their point of origin in the reservoir, has come to be quite generally recognized as the basis of many of the serious ills and extravagances of the industry. The chain of consequences resulting from this erroneous conception has been traced elsewhere and need not be recounted here. The important problem at this stage in the development of the industry, when laws are being revised by legislative action and modified by court decisions; when added powers are being exercised by voluntary committees and official regulatory bodies; and when the need for control of output has forced itself to the forefront, is to see to it that new law and action are based on sound engineering concepts. Reservoir Energy Common Property Since the study of gas instituted by the Marland committee of the American Petroleum Institute in 1927, a great mass of information has accumulated concerning the function of gas in the development and production of oil. This wealth of data leads to the conclusion that every oil pool contains three resources: Oil, gas and reservoir energy. I take it that the central problem of this symposium is the ownership of these three resources and that "source" and "utilization" are involved because of their bearing on ownership through the demands of equity and conservation. In order to facilitate the discussion, permit me to state categorically, that: The oil and gas in a particular tract should belong to the owners of the mineral rights in that particular tract, but the reservoir energy should be common property of all owners of mineral rights in the pool I take it that apportionment of oil and gas among owners according to the relative amounts that exist in place in their respective tracts is

Jan 1, 1933

By C. P. Watson, R. E. Collom

Various chapters already written in the history of development of the North Dome of Kettleman Hills are monotonoysly identical in the one underlying' theme of conservation of oil and gas. Discovered on Oct. 4, 1928, by Milham Exploration Co. with its wildcat Elliot No. 1, the field has been subjected to practically every modern form of production restraint in the name of conservation. The record thus far developed shows that conservation was had for a time, at a price; and that unitiza-tion must be blessed by single ownership or 100 per cent participation to be effective. In fact, incomplete unitization places a heavy handicap upon its participants in the competitive development that follows. Shut-in Agreement of July 25, 1929 Not long after discovery at Kettleman but after the Continental Oil Co. and the Standard Oil Co. had completed several producing wells in the discovery group, came the so-called Shut-in Agreement negotiated at the instance of the Department of the Interior. This agreement became effective July 25, 1929. The fundamental purpose of the agreement was to prevent bringing on production of some 30 wells then being drilled and forestall a flood of Kettleman oil on the market. A cooperative scheme was developed whereby wells in the discovery group would continue to produce. Two of them could not be shut in. Drilling wells would be completed to a water shutoff in top of Temblor and operations suspended. Producing wells would contribute the value of 10 to 25 per cent of their production to the owners of suspended qualifying wells. The percentage rate of drainage contribution was left to a committee or umpire. Some acreage was not placed under the agreement. This same acreage later did not come into the Kettleman Unit Agreement. Several wells on this acreage did not contribute to the drainage fund. The total amount of oil produced during the 17 months of the shut-in agreement, by Milham, Continental and Standard from wells in the discovery group, was 5,297,262.22 bbl. The total amount paid out in "drainage" contributions was $2,046,048.18, representing sales value of 1,266,044.06 bbl. of oil.

Jan 1, 1937

By Earl Oliver

This paper is based on the formula that the petroleum industry is sick—find the cause, eliminate it, and the industry will get well. There is perhaps no difference of opinion that the cause is overproduction, actual or potential. But that, again, is a result rather than a cause. The problem is to study the influences that serve to keep production and consumption out of balance. Production control is a popular theme and a natural one at this time when the whole world is unstable; but production control in its popular sense means little more than the application of emergency measures while danger threatens. Economists differ as to the effectiveness of these, most of which are designed to alleviate and not to cure, but we assume there are none who question the wisdom of promoting conditions under which economic forces are permitted to operate freely in bringing about stable conditions. The petroleum industry suffers from two classes of economic ills that serve to promote overproduction; namely, those which are common to all industries and those which are peculiar to this industry. It is of the latter I wish to speak. Strange to say, government is responsible in large part for this latter class of ills that affect the petroleum industry and we are coming to recognize that only through the assistance of government can they be corrected. Instability of the petroleunl industry, in so far as human agency was involved, had its inception in 1875 when a Pennsylvania jurist, called upon to make a decision for which there was no precedent and fancying he noted some resemblance between the so-called fugitive nature of oil and gas and that of wild game, made mention of that resemblance. Other courts being impressed by the analogy enlarged upon it, and gradually fixed upon oil and gas a legal status in certain important respects similar to that of wild game. Although later the courts abandoned this analogy, certain practices that developed out of that early concept have continued to this day and are largely responsible for the industry's present plight. Thus, instead of ownership in place that is characteristic of private property generally, the law of capture was applied to oil and gas. Now, the rapid and wasteful depletion of game

Jan 1, 1932

By Amos L. Beaty

The oil industry can prosper only if crude production is not excessive. This is true for several reasons. In the first place, the marketing branch of the business is so highly competitive that there is little room for profits in it. There are too many service stations, too many middle men or jobbers, too many refiners eager to press their products upon the market. And the battle is between the strong. If any money is being made in oil today it is by small marketers who buy products from the refining companies and sell on guaranteed margins. In the second place, refineries are overbuilt. There is a large surplus refining capacity. If refined stocks were drawn down they could and would be replenished in short time on short notice. This excessive refining capacity is not serious, however, if the supply of crude is limited to trade requirements. True, it may reflect upon the intelligence of the industry, but if there were a shortage of crude for a few years refining capacities would be readjusted. In the meantime no great harm could result from some idle capacity. It requires no computation to see that refiners could not produce surplus stocks of products from a short supply of crude. I have in mind, of course, the increased yields from cracking. Allowance must be made for that. Still, the picture is the same; less crude is required. I think we can have prosperity in the oil business if too much crude is not produced. A proper limit at this point would be felt all the way down the line. It would slow the refiner and slow the marketer inevitably. Once this constant pressure to make more and sell more is off, operations will be normal and there will be some return on investments. Peices in Relation to Production Potential production at this time is very large, and this condition has existed for many months. As a result the price of crude is low. It is below the average cost of production. Nevertheless, if restraints were withdrawn actual production would immediately increase and the situation would become even worse than it is now. Eventually, of course, the

Jan 1, 1932

By C. K. Leith

1 apologize for attempting to talk in a field in which 1 am by no means a specialist, but some of the problems brought up have much in common with other minerals. It touches the field in which we are all interested and it is a field in which our Mineral Inquiry has been giving special attention during the last two years. While it is the primary business, of course, of this Institute to consider the physical facts and technology of minerals, we now face the necessity of considering the minerd industry in its broader economic, social, and political relationships. We have run into a traffic jam—as though a load of hay had been spilled on the road. It makes no difference whether we are drivers or passengers, technical or nontechnical men, we have to get the load off the road before we can go farther. We are conscious of very many difficulties which are outside of the ordinary range of cost accounting or methods of mining or the usual thing with which we concern ourselves. We have extensive readjustments to make in our social and economic and political contacts. It is up to us to find out what is the matter. As a matter of fact, we do not know what is the matter in any comprehensive way. We have many suggestions as to difficulties here and there. Many people are working on the problem, but when the mineral industry as a whole is asked what is a reasonable course of procedure, what is its program, what would be a reasonable state or national policy, I think you will agree with me that we have no spokesman able to outline even a semblance of such a general policy. We sit back and criticize when somebody else steps in, as Governor Murray stepped in, and as many others of our state governors and legislators are stepping in, to do things which we do not think are reasonable. When they say, "What is a reasonable program? " we find ourselves caught napping. We have not agreed on a program. The other day in talking with one of the leaders of the western radical movement, I was twitting him on having no sound and comprehensive conservation program. He said, "What is yours, and what is the program of the mineral

Jan 1, 1932

By T. Stuczynski

In the past ten years about 3000 wastewater treatment plants have been built in Poland. The result of this development has been a massive increase in overall sludge production. According to data supplied by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 400,000 dry tons of sludge are generated every year in Poland (Koblak-Kalinska 1996). Still it is difficult to estimate the amount of sludge, which is used in agriculture or for reclamation purposes. However, it can be assumed that this comes to no more than 10 percent of all sludge produced in Poland on a yearly basis. Thus it became obvious that an urgent solution to this problem was needed. Local authorities in Silesia realized in the early 90?s that a demonstration was necessary to encourage the proper utilization of sludge. This was the basis for establishing the Biosolids Subpart of the Silesia Project, which addressed the use of biosolids in the reclamation of mining and smelting dumps (Stuczynski et al. 1996). Metal waste sites themselves are known to contain more than 87 million tons of waste (Pistelok et al. 1995). Each year this amount increases by approximately 400,000 tons. We realized that a simple solution for stabilizing these sites would be to cover them with vegetation in order to reduce leaching of toxic elements, as well as to keep metallic fugitive dust from entering the environment. The reclamation of smelter waste sites, which was carried out within the framework of the Silesia Project was a joint effort of local government, industry and international research institutions/agencies, including the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Center for Research and Control of the Environment (OBIKS), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and IUNG. One of the goals was to evaluate the possibility of adapting the rules of sludge management currently used in the United States to conditions commonly found here in industrial regions of Poland. However, the main objective of the Silesia Project was the development of guidelines concerning all aspects of sludge use for the reclamation of degraded lands and waste sites. Biological aspects related to reclamation of metal waste with the use of biosolids will be discussed in this paper.

Jan 1, 2002

By R. M. S. Häggblad

The article deals with stabilisation and regeneration of Ce02 and Ce02/Zr02 based Pt water gas shift catalysts, subject to high initial deactivation. The reaction gas species effect on the catalyst deactivation was investigated by H2-TPR. Activity measurements enabled the effect of different promoters, some added to the Ce02 based catalysts and some to the Ce02/Zr02 based Pt catalysts, to be investigated. The catalysts were also characterised by BET and CO-TPR. Deactivated catalysts activity was restored by using various regeneration methods. Of the two selected carriers the Ce02/Zr02 based Pt catalyst showed the highest resilience to deactivation. For the two different carriers, Ce02 and Ce02/Zr02, Wand Re were the best promoters when the catalyst was subject to deactivation. Experiments with Hr TPR indicate a fast initial change in the platinum oxides concentration and composition. The CO-TPR was used to make conclusions about the various regeneration effects of water and oxygen on the catalyst. Finally it is suggested that not one deactivation mechanism is possible and which mechanism that dominates is dependant on the catalyst and the reaction gas composition.

Jan 1, 2005

By Susana Caballero, Lourdes Yurramendi

Air Pollution Control (APC) ashes from Municipal Solid Waste Incineration (MSWI) plants need to be treated prior to landfilling due mainly to their heavy metals content. This research evaluates the capacity of the APC residues to sequester carbon dioxide, while the ash becomes stabilized for storage. It has the benefit of using two wastes, with no addition of any raw material. APC samples from different MSWI plants were treated by gas/solid accelerated carbonation at different temperatures and carbon dioxide concentrations to evaluate the residue behaviour to the process. The extent of carbonation was evaluated by means of weight gain upon carbonation and by the measurement of the final carbonate content. The APC residues were analyzed before and after the treatment in order to know their composition and their leaching behaviour according to the criteria for the acceptance of wastes at landfills established by the European Council Decision 2003/33/EC.

Jan 1, 2008