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By Lon D. Santis

This paper reports on an evaluation of the safety characteristics of short lead, 5 centimeter (cm), Magnadet1 detonators. The Magnadet initiation system uses magnetic induction principles to transfer electric energy from the firing line to the detonator without a physical connection. This study was initiated because the Magnadet initiation system represents a new technology and the Bureau is interested in ensuring that no potential safety hazards are introduced into the nation's mining environment. The Magnadet system and its proper use are described along with a discussion of how it works. The potential hazards examined are: stray current from mine service power, lightning, DC current, static electricity, and radio frequency transmissions. Tip strength is also evaluated. Experiments were conducted to evaluate some hazards and theoretical methods were used to evaluate others. The results showed that the Magnadet short lead initiation system does not exhibit any unusual safety hazards. The new system is at least six times as resistant to common hazards as currently used electric initiation systems, so long as the insulation is intact.

Jan 1, 1992

By Chelsea Woodward

The Spokane Research Laboratory of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has demonstrated a prototype hydrogen-fueled mining vehicle as an alternative to diesel equipment in underground mines. Safety and control systems were added to allow a 70-kW rubber-tired hydrogen vehicle, originally developed by the U. S. Bureau of Mines and Hydrogen Consultants, Inc. (now Hydrogen Components, Inc., of Littleton, CO), to be tested. This work began in late 2000 and culminated with a Mine Safety and Health Administration fire safety review and field tests at the Stillwater Mine in Nye, MT, in 2004.

Jan 1, 2006

By Grant Goddard

Cameco?s ?Double U? Strategy ? Double existing production ? To 40 million lbs U3O8 annually ? By 2018 ? Existing operations ? Saskatchewan ? United States ? Kazakhstan ? Projects under evaluation ? McArthur River expansion ? Kintyre (Australia) ? Inkai Block 3 (Kazakhstan) ? Development properties ? Cigar Lake project Measures of Success ? Safe, healthy and rewarding workplace ? Supportive communities ? Clean environment ? Outstanding financial performance

Nov 1, 2011

Contemporary approaches to safety management appear to be failing short of meeting its mark in improving mine safety. This is evidenced by the high workers compensation, high incidence rates and fatalities. Evidence from high-risk and complex organisations points towards safety culture as being important in improving site safety. In more recent years resilience engineering has been touted as a new and innovative way of managing safety. This paper reviews and synthesises previous literature on safety culture and resilience engineering. It then highlights methods that can be used to measure safety culture and resilience engineering, and explores similarities and differences between complex organisations and gold mining to identify opportunities for more innovative approaches to improving safety in gold mining operations through safety culture and resilience engineering.

Aug 1, 2010

The Sago Mine Disaster, on January 2, 2006, placed renewed focus on several different aspects of safety in the underground coal mining industry. One area which received increased attention since Sago and other underground coal mining events is the concept of Safety Culture. This report describes the results of a pilot Safety Culture Assessment implemented at a small Appalachian underground coal mine, hereafter referred to as the Mine. The purposes of this pilot assessment were to (a) evaluate the feasibility and usefulness of a methodology for assessing safety culture that had previously been developed for use within other industries, (b) to initiate an investigation into the understanding and defining of the existing safety culture of the underground coal mining industry, and (c) provide meaningful and useful recommendations for the participating mine for their consideration in their ongoing quest to enhance their existing safety culture. This pilot assessment was conducted in July 2007. The report provides information regarding the presence or absence of safety culture characteristics within the Mine. Observations regarding the characteristics of the Mine?s safety culture that should be sustained are presented. Areas in need of attention and management focus to improve the Mine?s safety culture are presented as well as recommendations for moving forward. Safety culture characteristics that are important for the existence of a positive safety culture have been identified to include: - Safety is a clearly recognized value in the organization. - Accountability for safety in the organization is clear. - Safety is integrated into all activities in the organization. - A safety leadership process exists in the organization. - Safety culture is learning driven in the organization. - A process for establishing a strong and effective Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) is in place. Performance objectives are associated with each of the safety culture characteristics and particular behaviors and attitudes have been identified that can be measured to evaluate these objectives. Using a methodology originally developed with the support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an assessment of selected organizational behaviors and attitudes was conducted to evaluate the Mine in terms of these safety culture characteristics and their associated performance objectives. The methodology involves obtaining a variety of quantitative and qualitative information, using multiple data-gathering methods. The information collected is largely based upon the perceptions of the individuals in the organization. The evaluation is a ?point in time? snapshot of the Mine, but cultural beliefs and assumptions do not change quickly. The feasibility and usefulness of the methodology was successfully demonstrated during this pilot assessment. All aspects of the methodology including functional analysis, structured interviews with accompanying behavioral scales, work observations, and the paper and pencil

Aug 1, 2007

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Jan 1, 1938

By Rudolf Kudlich

THE problem of eliminating the hazards of hoisting in mines has been with us since the industry passed its earliest stages, when coal and ore could be won from surface working and tunnels. At first, safety devices were introduced as means of decreasing the amount of labor necessary, to produce the mineral, or to increase the amount that could be obtained from a certain opening. For example, crude, ladders replaced winding footpaths or steps cut into the walls of the pit or shaft, decreasing the distance it was necessary to carry the product to the surface and eliminating, to some extent, the hazard introduced by the precarious footing afforded by such paths and steps. Later, instead of being carried from the pit on the backs of men, the product was hoisted in buckets or baskets on a rope passing over a pulley or around a windlass. Thus the capacity of the pit was considerably increased, and the hazard due to making many trips up and down the shaft was eliminated. From such beginnings accident prevention in mine hoisting advanced with the importance of the industry, until at present hoisting compares favorably with other branches of the mining industry with reference to safe practices. As in the other branches, this progress has been accomplished along two general lines-by legislation, rules, and education, and by the installation of safety devices. Though due credit must be given the former, it is not so satisfactory as the latter. Legislation, to be effective, requires a policing and inspection system to guarantee enforcement, such as we cannot hope to inaugurate. Rules may be satisfactory so long as the employer controls the labor market, and dismissal or some other form of discipline is an effective means of insuring obedience to the rules; but where labor demand is in excess of the supply, or where labor organizations are in control, such measures are not effective. An educational campaign will draw attention to hazards and may awaken a desire to avoid accidents by exercising the proper care.

Jan 2, 1922

MR. TESCHER (Disaster at Dawson) : I move that you appoint a committee of nine members of this Institute to draft a set of resolutions that we can send out to all members of this Institute, to the mine officials in all four states, that might go towards preventing these disasters; that we reach all men, all mining men, mine officials of all kinds. I think we have enough brains to carry out a few suggestions of that kind. I think you are fully familiar or know men who are fully qualified to act on this committee. The only qualification that I have is to ask that Mr. Harrington be appointed a member of this committee. PRESIDENT WHITESIDE: You have heard the motion, and I believe it was seconded. Is there any discussion? That is a subject that really needs a great deal of thought. MR. LAMB: Things like that can't be handled in a minute. What Mr. Tescher suggested is all right, but to my mind, going into a great many of these different properties, seeing the conditions, such things hit pretty close to home. I would suggest that you put this off; lay it over until such time as the people who had the disaster have some time to think these things over. It is too soon to offer even a suggestion. Suggestions are all right, but there are no nine living men in the United States who can stand up or sit down and talk it over and give you any reasonable answer, in one hour or six months. First, you would naturally have to go down there and converse with the men who were at the camp at the time. You are all operators; all you operators would -like to talk it over today. You realize that anything that is good for the camp is always acceptable in disasters of this kind. I say, do it gracefully and not by publication. MR. TESCHER: I feel that the men present know these suggestions by heart and they don't have to discuss them. They know them instinctively and they know they will apply to any mine. It must be understood that if these suggestions are not carried out, they ought to be; and there is a motion before the house. PRESIDENT WHITESIDE: Mr. Murphy, you started to rise to your feet a moment ago. Have you anything to say on the subject? MR. MURPHY: I have just returned from a visit to Mr. Brennan. Mr. Brennan and I have worked together for twenty years. The manager of our company asked me to go down there and express his sympathy. Those things come to all men if they live long enough, in the coal business, and he wanted me to express to Mr. Brennan personally his sympathy and deep regret. What I had in mind when I started to rise, was to suggest that the Institute as a whole express its sympathy to Mr. Brennan. I don't think there is a man in Utah, Wyoming, Colorado or New Mexico who has done more in safety' lines than Mr. Brennan, and it just seems bad luck that he had this disaster, and I am in hearty sympathy with the gentleman who spoke about not appointing this committee. I believe a resolution to Mr. Brennan would be very much better. JAMES DALRYMPLE: I am in sympathy with this gentleman here. I think it is going to hurt the feelings of those connected with the mines in which this disaster occurred. If you will give me the privilege for a few minutes, I will gladly express myself and the action that has been taken in the past by this Institute, and my opinion combined with a great many other opinions. And what I am going to say is going to be said by the-well, I am going to say it as I see it. I am going to say it not in an unfriendly spirit, but from a spirit of not undue criticism. I happen to be one of the original members who organized this Institute. I did what I could to obtain memberships. I remember very well when we had our first meeting that we had a very large membership. I think I have a photograph of the members which was taken on the steps of the Capitol building at that time. Our membership at that time was composed largely of underground officials. I mean by "underground" officials, the superintendents to some extent, the mine foremen, their assistants,

Jan 1, 1923

By E. A. Holbrook

AS A whole, engineering schools have not awakened A to the fact that the workmen compensation laws passed in most of our states between 1914 and 1917 effected a quiet but none the less real revolution in. the relations between labor and management; no longer are industrial accidents unfortunate or careless happenings over which we feel a humanitarian interest and sorrow, they are a cost of the process and the finished product, as vital as improved design and increased efficiency. Last year the writer and others made a committee report to. the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers on the cost of accidents in the coal industry of Pennsylvania. Comparatively the accident record in Pennsylvania coal industry is not high, yet the direct compensation cost plus the interference with operation cost of accidents was over 5 per cent. of the total cost of producing the coal. This stands out more vividly -if you realize that about 70 per cent. of the' cost of producing the coal is for payment of labor, wages that are fixed and over which engineering efficiency and management skill have little or no direct effect. This leaves 30 per cent. of the cost chargeable .to hoisting, haulage, overhead 'and other items subject to engineering control. One sixth of this is due to cost of accidents. Surely a direct place 'for an engineering attack.

Jan 1, 1925

By Lawrence Henderson

TO increase tonnage in the early days of coal mining it was necessary only to hire more men. The job now is to increase the tons per man, but other troubles arise because this has been accomplished. With the introduction of continuous miners, newer and faster loading machines, and faster belt conveyors the safety engineer has been faced with new difficulties. Use of larger equipment created roof control problems, which were thoroughly studied by the safety engineers of various companies. With the assistance of the U. S. Bureau of Mines, safety engineers in Alabama conducted roof bolting experiments wherever they appeared to be applicable. Accident records before and after the method was adopted showed results more than justifying the efforts and funds expended. The larger mining companies responded enthusiastically to the program because roof bolting not only prevented accidents but also increased production efficiency, in many cases rep- resenting the margin between profit and loss. In Alabama today there are miles of roof supported by bolts.

Jan 8, 1957

By David Hoadley, Kenneth R. Maser, Ashok B. Boghani, James E. Billar, D. Randolph Berry, Mackenzie Burnett, Robert H. Trent

C.5 Safety Equipment and Control Devices Safety equipment and control devices serve two principal functions in mine escape hoists. First, they can be used to provide important safety features such as protection against overspeed, over¬travel and undertravel. Second they can be used to automate or partially automate the operation of the escape hoist. Typical equipment available is described in the following section. 1. Simplex and Lilly Hoist Controllers Manufacturers: Logan Actuator Co. 4956 No. Elston Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60630 312-736-7500 The Simplex and Lilly Controllers provide a means for electrically shutting off the power to the hoist and the energy to physically set the brakes in the event of overspeed, overtravel, undertravel and failure to begin deceleration within sufficient distance

Jan 1, 1976

By Shreya Vivek Hokam, Dr. A. I. Dhatrak, S. W. Thakare, Dr. Vivek S. Hokam

Construction in congested urban areas has necessitated tall and massive structures. In urban areas, it is common to construct underground structure nearby existing buildings. Selection of an appropriate support structure system to be implemented in the excavation in an urban area is heavily dependent upon the geotechnical conditions and safety of the surroundings and neighbouring structures. Urban Rail, popularly referred to as Metro Rail, has seen substantial growth in India in the recent years. More cities are experiencing the need for metro rail to meet their day-today mobility requirements. The metro structures involved deep excavation for foundations which induces the stresses and thereby alters the existing equilibrium and thus may affect stability of neighbouring structures considering safety point of view. Hence, design and execution of deep excavations become one of the important challenging tasks of any geotechnical engineer in the modern era. Further, it is important to control the ground movement in order to prevent the failure of excavations. This involves specialized foundation technologies, usage of sophisticated equipment and new methods in underground construction, safety and monitoring systems. In this paper the methodology used for protecting adjoining structures due to deep excavation for Nagpur Metro station is studied.

Sep 1, 2022

By Robert S. Setren, Jeffrey L. Ambs

The disposable diesel exhaust filter (DDEF) system developed by the U.S. Bureau of Mines and Industry cooperators for heavy-duty permissible, diesel-powered haulage vehicles, effectively reduces in-mine diesel particulate matter concentrations up to 95%. However, there are concerns about the hazards that exist when the filter is used in situations for which it was not designed. This work investigates the exhaust gas temperature limits to which the filter elements can be exposed without posing a safety or health hazard, such as 6re or off-gassing toxic compounds. A filter approved by the Mine Safety and Health administration and after-market filters were evaluated under varying engine exhaust conditions to determine if after-market filters pose an unacceptable hazard when used in a DDEF system. Filters were laboratory tested at engine exhaust temperatures ranging from 77°C to 290°C. Of the seven filter types tested, six appeared suitable for use on water scrubber-based cooling systems and two appeared suitable for use on dry heat exchanger type exhaust cooling systems with exhaust temperatures up to 150°C. Any filter elements used as exhaust filters on permissible diesel machines must be approved by MSHA for that application. Mine operators who wish to use an after-market filter element should request an MSHA field modification. MSHA will work with the mine and filter manufacturer to ensure its use in this exhaust system application does not pose a health or safety hazard.

Jan 1, 1995

By W. A. Boyer

HOISTS for metal mines are seldom designed for H one particular depth. They are intended for an ultimate load and depth with a given speed but are first used to hoist from a shallower depth, gradually working to the ultimate as development progresses. Sometimes the mine is not worked on the upper levels because of the kind and grade of ore, the mining of which depends on market conditions. In this case the hoist may be used in the same working shift to lift ore, for example, from the 1200 and the 4400-ft level. This means that the safety factor of the rope should be considered not only when it hoists from the greatest depth, but also when it hoists from the upper levels. According to present safety factor standards, a hoisting rope can have ample safety margin when hoisting from the lower or lowest level and still be shy of sufficient safety margin when hoisting from the upper levels. This will be shown by curves presented in this paper.

Jan 10, 1954

By W. A. Boyer

Mine hoisting ropes can be loaded to capacity only when the strength of each component is exactly known. Characteristic curves provide this information. When load and rate of acceleration are specified for an individual rope, the characteristic curve assumes a predetermined shape. The factor of safety is the value derived by dividing the breaking strength of the rope by the total stress on the rope where it goes over the sheave wheel. Total stress is made up of the weight of skip and cage, weight of ore, weight of rope between sheave and rope clevise or attachment, friction load, and acceleration force. Bending stresses are neglected in this discussion, as sheaves and drum diameters are assumed to be large enough to reduce these stresses to a negligible value.

Mar 1, 1956

By L. Sandbak

"CURRENT BASIS OF GROUND SUPPORT DESIGN ANALYSIS The current strategy used in determining what kinds of support are needed is based on empirical design charts (Grimstad and Barton, 1993). Figure 1 is an example of the topcut analysis used for a 14 foot wide (4.3 meter) drift, which is the current design width used for topcuts at TRJV mine. The majority of our topcuts are situated in ore of the Type IV and Type III weak rock class categories that necessitate the use of bolts, mesh and 2”-4” of shotcrete. This type of empirical chart gives excellent guidelines for the kinds of support, and it is based on case histories of civil tunneling and mining properties. It is a good starting point for determining the kinds of support needed, but not to the detail needed to optimize the number of bolts, type of mesh, or combination of types or strengths of shotcrete. This report is an attempt to help quantify the safety factor and optimum design parameters to include mesh and shotcrete as part of the design criteria and subsequent safety factor.SAFETY FACTOR ANALYSIS: BOLTS ONLY One type of safety factor analysis used at TRJV for the past 7 years is described as the “dead weight” method, developed by Pakalnis (2008). It involves the support of a conservative “dead weight” of rock held in place by bolts in which the depth of failure is approximated as a wedge whose height is one-half of the span. The failure or dead weight wedge resembles a triangular wedge that must be supported by the remainder of the bolts going through the wedge (see Figure 2).The support capacity of the system is determined by the bond strength of the bolts holding up the wedge, which is in turn based on the RMR. The method assumes the total support capacity is the sum of the individual bolt values defined by either the breaking strength or the bond strength of the bolts (whichever is lower) passing through the failure surface."

Jan 1, 2017

The Second Annual Safety First Dinner to the Liberty Bell Mine Crew was held on Apr. 7, 1916, in recognition of the second year without fatal accident and with few serious accidents. The address of the evening was given by the Rev. Edward Burns Martin, on "Safety and Citizenship," and was followed by informal talks on safety, health and citizenship.

Jan 6, 1916

By G. P. van Greunen

"The rehabilitation of underground excavations has been undertaken as long as mining has existed. The conventional methods have proven to be dangerous, time consuming and expensive. During the construction of Styldrift Mine at Royal Bafokeng Platinum several vertical and horizontal excavations had to be rehabilitated. With a zero tolerance attitude towards working in unsafe conditions, together with a non-negotiable timeline to construct and ramp up the mine, the project team could not rehabilitate these excavations using conventional methods. This paper details the approach used to rehabilitate excavations using remote methods and how it was adapted to suit varying operating conditions and requirements - ensuring that no person ever entered an unsafe excavation before it was fully rehabilitated and safe. INTRODUCTION Styldrift Mine is an expansion project of the Royal Bafokeng Platinum group. It is located in South Africa in the North West Province some 10 km south of the Sun City resort (Figure 1). The mine consists of a twin shaft system (Main Shaft and Services Shaft). Capital construction of the shaft and associated infrastructure started in 2009 and is projected to be completed during 2020. The designed steady state production capacity of the shaft is 230 ktpm of Merensky ore. Production ramp-up commenced in 2017 with steady state production set to be achieved 36 months later in the fourth quarter 2020.Merensky Reef was intersected at a depth of 600 m below surface and the shaft design has a mean mining depth of 630 m. The project was approved for execution in 2008 on the basis of a suitable mine design and bankable feasibility study. One of the main excavations that required rehabilitation was an underground reef silo, Silo 4. It is a key piece of infrastructure on the critical path to allow steady state production at Styldrift Mine to be achieved. During construction excessive scaling within the silo along its 64m length necessitated urgent rehabilitation to be able to meet the ramp-up schedule. The criticality and urgency of these excavations prompted the project team to reduce the risk of failure while ensuring safe and cost-effective rehabilitation. This paper will focus on the rehabilitation of Silo 4 while capturing the essence of the learnings of all the excavations that were rehabilitated remotely."

Jan 1, 2019

By Dirk Claessens

The term ?cost? is too small when describing the destructive power of safety incidents for mining companies. Breaches in employee or environmental safety are felt way beyond the bottom-line: human life can be taken; ecosystems tarnished; the ire of peoples, media and government inflamed; significant halting of production; and high levels of legal and financial challenges. According to a recent survey of Mining executivesi, ?ensuring workforce safety? was the most important issues identified above any other, with a plurality of 31 percent, reigning above capital projects, product efficiency, and equipment reliability. We accept that safety is a most paramount issue, yet for many reasons we keep approaching the problem the same way we have in the past. We need to stop doing the same things decade over decade and try something new. New innovations are significantly changing the fundamentals of how mining companies explore, excavate, produce, refine and distribute their valuable commodities. Technologies such as visualization, analytics, location awareness, and gaming simulation are making these enterprises smarter. Now, attention turns to an area we?ve long held as integral to our business: safety. By using the same breakthrough technologies that are changing our business, we can now boldly imagine ? and credibly strive for ? a world of zero incidents.

Aug 1, 2013

By John J. Sammarco

Mining has one of the highest annual average fatality rates among major US industries. Health and safety dangers have been inherent to mining since the early days of picks and shovels. Even though miners' health and safety has improved over the years, mining is still one of the most dangerous occupations. Mining was traditionally a low tech industry. It is now driven by competitive pressures to go high-tech by using programmable electronics (PE) for machine control, atmospheric monitoring and material processing. The industry's experience with the functional safety of PE is limited compared with other industries. Thus, PE is an emerging technology for mining that can potentially create or worsen hazards. The US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Pittsburgh Research Laboratory in Pittsburgh, PA is addressing the safety of this new technology. NIOSH has a proactive project to generate recommendations for addressing the functional safety of PE-based mining systems before the technology proliferates. The recommendations take the form of a safety framework encompassing the entire life cycle for a PE-based mining system.