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By Richard L. Gordon

THE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS Toward the end of the 19th century, American industry began a drastic reorganization. The many, small, often-regional firms were supplanted by large national corporations-often produced by mergers among the existing firms. Giant companies appeared throughout American industry and many of them were engaged in the mineral industries.a The largest combines, by far, to emerge during the period were United States Steel and Standard Oil. Long before the restructuring had run its course, widespread concern arose over the process of concentration. Efforts were made to control, if not stop, the transformation. The concern produced the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the first of many federal regulatory agencies-the Interstate Commerce Commission (see Refs. 24, 31, 42). The basic objectives of these policies remain unclear to this day. The crucial issue is whether the goal is primarily to insure development of a more competitive economy or to preserve a social structure leaving more scope for small businesses. Complications arise from difficulties in agreeing upon the meaning of these terms. Studies of the early years of the antitrust movement suggest that it involved no particular concern over the mineral industries. Objections were directed at big companies in general. To be sure, the conservation movement arose in roughly the same period and did stress the evils of monopoly control of minerals. However, direct, continuing influence of conservation policy on antitrust is not apparent. Many of the most important antitrust cases, nevertheless, involved minerals. This, of course, may be sheer coincidence; the choice of cases has never followed any obvious pattern. Certainly, no simple hypothesis can explain the interest consistently. Once it may have been true that mineral industries were more likely than other sectors to be dominated by a few large companies. Yet, often sharp reversals of such tendencies -e.g., in oil and aluminum-have not removed antitrust interest. The importance of minerals to the economy cannot satisfactorily rationalize antitrust interest. The equally

Jan 1, 1976

I have spent most of the past 35 years working as an economic geologist in the area of exploration and development of base and precious metals. Most of this period has been as an employee of Trans-National-Corporations (TNC's). I presently act as a consulting geologist to a joint venture company, bringing together two such TNC's: Anglo American Corporation and affiliated companies De Beers (Diamonds) and Minorco (Metals mining outside of Southern Africa), and Normandy Mining Limited ofAustralia. Normandy is presently through its gold arm PosGold, Australia's largest gold miner and Anglo American can claim to be the world's largest gold company producing over 280 tonnes of gold a year, more than twice its nearest rival Gold Fields of South Africa. In addressing this topic, the role that Government can, and should play in mineral development, I will be drawing heavily on some examples from these and other TNC's experience in recent offshore mining investment.

Jan 1, 1995

I have spent most of the past thirty-five years working as an economic geologist in the area of exploration and development of base and precious metals. Most of this period has been as an employee of Trans-National-Corporations (TNC's). I presently act as a consulting geologist to a joint venture company, bringing together two such TNC's: Anglo American' Corporation and affiliated companies De Beers (Diamonds) and Minorco (Metals mining outside of Southern Africa), and Normandy Mining Limited of Australia. Normandy is presently through its gold arm PosGold, Australia's largest gold miner and Anglo American can claim to be the world's largest gold company producing over 280 tonnes of gold a year, more than twice its nearest rival Gold Fields of South Africa. In addressing this topic, the role that Government can, and should play in mineral development, I will be drawing heavily on some examples from these and other TNC's experience in recent offshore mining Investment.

Jan 1, 1995

By Van Dusen M

The involvement of concerned parties in all aspects of the Lihir Project from an early stage has promoted good relations between all groups. Activities involving landowners, the Lihir community, the New Ireland Provincial Government (NIPG) and the prospective developer include the Lihir Liaison Committee, Lihir Working Group, Environmental Planning Committee, Provincial Mining Task Force and the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association (LMALA). With modifications, the Lihir Liaison model may be of use in promoting good relationships among parties in other mineral developments.

Jan 1, 1991

By Thomas R. J

Following asmallnumberofpollutionincidents involving the death of cattle from ingestion of cyanide that had escaped from gold processing plants, the Queensland Government undertook to develop competent guidelines addressing this problem. These guidelines, "Queensland Government Guidelines on Prevention of Water Pollution from Cyanide Use in Gold Ore Processing", issued by the Department of Environment and Heritage, Department of Resource Industries and Water Resources Commission, cover hydrology and general house-keeping intended to reduce the likelihood of significant impact from a spill or unintentional dis- charge of contaminated material. There are three major advances for Queensland embodied in this Guideline: ò the use of a design approach that gives site specific standards rather than trying to give a multitude of standards broad enough to cover all situations, ò the use of hazard assessment and a "critical period" hydrologi- cal design technique, and ò new monitoring and reporting requirements. The guideline is presented here in a summary form:

Jan 1, 1991

By Richard W. Smith

Why are we losing our liberties? (1) . . . because our local chambers of commerce come to the National Chamber's annual meeting, vote for a policy on federal economy, and then go to Capitol Hill and ask for a federal project for their area. (2) ... because our mining men ask for a subsidy to mine submarginal deposits that can't be economically mined in a free economy. (3) . . . because 18,000 men and organizations all over the country recently wired or wrote a Congressional committee asking that the Army Engineers be exempt from the President's power to reorganize the Executive Branch of the government under the recommendations of the Hoover Commission.

Jan 1, 1949

The Secretary of the Treasury, in a recent ruling, allows 18 months from date of discharge within which former service men may reinstate their Government insurance policies lapsed f or non-payment of premiums. The point just now confronting the Bureau of War Risk Insurance and all those who are interested in the immediate and the future welfare of the young men who offered their lives for the flag and the country is that they be kept mindful that the provisions of the War Risk Act were not solely war measures, but that the framers of the Act provided insurance protection for all time to come for the boys in uniform and all dear to them. Under this ruling those making application for reinstatement will be required to pay only the premium on the amount of insurance to be reinstated for the month of grace during which they were protected, and for the current month. When the men are mustered out of the service, the insurance continues in force for one month and they are fully protected during that period even if their premium has remained unpaid. In reinstating, that month's premium will be required as well as the premium for the month in which reinstatement is effected. The ruling also stipulates that when applying for reinstatement the man must be in as good health as at the date of discharge, and so state in his application. After complying with these simple requirements, a Government insurance policy may be made as sound as on the day it was written. The Bureau of War Risk Insurance is now searching out its delinquent policy holders and offering them this renewal of Government protection. It needs the assistance of public spirited, patriotic, business and professional men everywhere, for the sake of our former service men, who must be given the information about its privileges to which they are entitled.

Jan 9, 1919

By Michael Robert Hodson

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do no necessarily reflect those of CRU. The Extent of Government Involvement In 1982 national governments in the Non-Socialist world owned at least some equity share in an estimated 49 percent of the bauxite mining capacity located in their own countries.* By comparison, as Figure 1 shows, in the same year governments owned at least part of an estimated 33 per cent of primary aluminium smelting capacity. In other industries, national, or state governments in 1982 held at least part ownership of mining capacity in 42 per cent in the copper industry, 34 per cent in the tin industry, 23 per cent of the zinc industry, 15 per cent of the lead industry and 11 per cent in the nickel industry. Thus while within the aluminium industry attention has focussed on the share of government ownership in the primary aluminium sector, national government involvement through ownership is larger in the bauxite sector. Moreover, ownership by government is more widespread in the mining of bauxite than in the mining of all other principal non-ferrous base metals. Yet while the equity participation of governments in the bauxite sector is widespread, it is but one of many forms of government involvement. In addition to direct ownership or equity participation domestic government involvement has taken the form of legislation to protect the environment, controls on the level of production, insistence on the export of ore, pressure to maintain levels of employment, controls on the type of fuel used, foreign exchange *Capacity which is owned in whole or in part is included within the state sector, but capacity in one country which is owned by a wholly or partly owned government company in another company is not included in the state sector; e.g. the capacity of the Trombetas mine is included in the state sector but the capacity of Delphi bauxite would not be included.

Jan 1, 1984

The subject of government involvement in industry is, to say the least, a touchy one. For many it conjures up thoughts of socialisation or nationalisation. For others it is a desirable objective and is seen as a means of social reform by giving government a greater say in the control and distribution of human, financial and natural resources for the betterment of the community. Whatever your point of view, it is difficult to deny that government involvement exists to lesser or greater degrees in all industries. The mining industry is no exception and the degree of government involvement is probably greater than it is in other industries. I think it is important to remember when talking about government involvement in industry to recognise that there are different types of involvement and that all governments have a right, if they so desire, to become involved in whatever way they choose. The decision of a government to increase its direct or indirect involvement must, of course, be taken in the national interest. Governments, if we are still old fashioned enough to believe in ministerial and electoral responsibility, must make up their own minds about whether their actions are in the national interest and they must be prepared to accept the consequences of that action, good or bad. For instance, they must decide

Jan 1, 1975

"Lax, misguided, and dangerous" is Rep. James Santini's description of the official US position on strategic nonfuel minerals. Santini (D-NV), chairman of the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee, criticized the Interior Department for "its long record of benign neglect" regarding the domestic minerals crisis. Santini made his remarks at a news conference at the American Mining Congress convention in San Francisco, where he released his subcommittee report "US Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications." The report-said to be the first major congressional study of the minerals issue by a committee of jurisdiction is the result of a two-year inquiry. The investigation was undertaken, according to the chairman, "because no person or agency in the executive branch of government fully grasps the critical importance of nonfuel minerals to the nation's economy, defense, and quality of life." The report also urges a larger role for the Department of Defense, which has "stood passively by for many years as a consuming by-stander," according to the report. President Carter's incomplete Non-fuel Minerals Policy Review also drew the committee's ire; Santini calls it "a tragic waste that cost tax-payers $3.5 million and the loss of some 13,000 person-days." The subcommittee examined the following issues for its report: • The US minerals industry's inability to meet national raw material needs under a "hodgepodge of contradictory, restrictive, and irrational" federal regulations; • Dependency on foreign sources of strategic minerals in times of "increasing resource nationalism" and "Soviet mineral expansionism;" • National security needs for foreign mineral resources that do not have effective substitutes; • The US government's approach to national minerals policy "amid a growing realization that such a policy does not exist." The subcommittee report includes an analysis of public and private studies on nonfuel minerals and discusses a series of policy problem areas that negatively affect domestic production. Capital formation disincentives, tax policies, antitrust enforcement, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, technical problems, and restricted access to federally-controlled public lands contribute to what Santini calls a "tragic irony." "The irony is that we are a nation vastly rich in mineral resources yet our own government chooses to stifle development of these critical raw materials and thereby increase offshore reliance. The tragedy is that we also are ensuring US vulnerability to severe economic dislocations and a weakening of our national security." In just six years, from 1973-1978, the US trade deficit in nonfuel minerals rose from $2 billion per year to $8 billion, according to the report. The country imports more than 50% of 23 critical minerals, including 100% of its manganese, chromium, cobalt and platinum. The US is promoting its dependence on foreign mineral sources at the very time the security of many of those sources is becoming less certain, the report notes. Santini said the subcommittee investigation revealed a vulnerability that may be more serious and pervasive than that of foreign oil. The US may be able to develop alternate energy resources, but there are no effective substitutes for many nonfuel minerals. The report also discloses that US stockpiles of critical and strategic minerals are of inadequate supply and quality. Holdings of some vital minerals are far below present objectives, and for some there are no holdings at all, according to Santini. To resolve the current crisis, the report makes the following recommendations: • Complete immediately President Carter's Interagency Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review; • Implement (throught the Interior Department) the 1970 Mining and Minerals Policy Act; • Create an Office of Energy and Minerals with the same stature, power, and oversight responsibilities as the Council on Environmental Quality; • Ease federal restrictions on mineral exploration and development on public lands and implement a complete review of public land use policies; •Fund for and fulfill US nonfuel minerals stockpiling objectives; •Increase federal funding for non-

Jan 11, 1980

Important chemical and other technical engineering work necessary, for the prosecution of this war is being carried on by the Bureau of Mines Experiment Station, at Washington, D. C. The services of trained men of the following classifications are urgently needed Bacteriologists Instrument makers Biologists Laboratory Assistants Chemists, Inorganic Laborers Chemists, Organic Machinists Chemists, Physical Physiologists Chemists, Electro- Plumbers Chemical Engineers Steamfitters Draftsmen Stenographers. Electrical Engineers Skilled labor of various kinds If your training fits you for any of these occupations, send to the Bureau of Mines, American University Experiment Station, . Washington, D. C. for blank forms. When properly executed and returned by you, these forms will be placed on file, and when a vacancy occurs you will be considered for it and will be notified if your services are desired. If you are a registrant in the draft, and have not yet been- ordered to camp, it may be possible to have you immediately inducted into the service for work here. If you are not in the draft, but feel that you wish to serve your country in the present crisis, you can enlist, or serve as a civilian. Serve your country where you can serve it best. VAN H. MANNING, Director.

Jan 6, 1918

By Richard L. Gordon

Minerals long have been important commodities in international trade. As an inevitable result, the governments of the world have employed a wide variety of programs that affect the flow of trade. Roughly speaking, we may distinguish between the desire of more developed countries (MDCs) like the United States, western Europe, and Japan to control imports of minerals and the concern of less developed countries (LDCs), like India, about exploiting and exporting their minerals. The terminology used to describe different countries and the classification of specific countries into groups is unsettled and often changing. The poorest countries have been characterized as backward, undeveloped, underdeveloped, and developing. The problem seems to be in selecting a term that is both accurate and polite. Less developed seems, for reasons outlined by Hagen [pp. 51-57], the most convenient term. The borderline between an LDC and an MDC is always open to dispute. Objective measures are difficult to develop because of deficiencies in basic data, and enormous conceptual problems arise in making valid comparisons from even good data [see Hagen, pp. 7-28]. Thus, policies of the MDCs can be evaluated chiefly by using a few basic arguments for protectionist attitudes towards international trade. In dealing with the LDCs, a more far-ranging evaluation that covers general economic policy goals, the role of foreign investment, and the indirect effects of trade is required. This duality breaks down when trying to deal with the depressed areas in an MDC; here the issues are more akin to those associated with problems in an LDC. Similarly, variants of arguments used in LDCs appear in debates about foreign investments in MDCs. The whole discussion of minerals in LDCs, moreover, has obvious implications for MDCs like Canada and Australia. They, too, must face problems about the best utilization of their resources. THE RESTRICTION OF MINERAL TRADE BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES[a] At least to some extent, the world's leading industrial nations have intervened to control the inflow of minerals. Such regulation is particularly pronounced for energy. Both the United States and western Europe employ

Jan 1, 1976

By Thomas V. Falkie

Of the various critics of federal energy and minerals policy we are hearing these days--and they are legion--few make their points more vividly than our fellow SME member and eloquent spokesman for the mineral industry. Mr. Eugene Guccione. In a moment of comparative mellowness. Mr. Guccione recently characterized Washington's time-honored legislative and bureaucratic machinery as a case of "...scientific illiterates asking the incompetents to do the unnecessary." I hope the prevailing industry view of government is not quite that harsh, and yet one cannot deny that government intervention is indeed pressing in on the mineral industry with increasing force. What is happening today in Washington and in state capitols will have enormous impact--both short and long term--on the future of coal and mineral production in the United States. Symptoms of this trend are everywhere. In the first place, there is a sentiment, widely held and still spreading, that the government must become involved-- that no matter what the problem, the solution lies in more government intervention. Free enterprise versus statist, reflex reaction organizations. When it cones to regulation in the resource field, there is too often a tendency to start out by assuming guilt on the part of the mineral industry. This can lead to laws governing mineral recovery that are more punitive than constructive...laws drawn up with little research into the scientific or economic considerations involved.

Jan 1, 1975

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

Some aspects of the policies developed by Saskatchewan with respect to the provincial potash industry are discussed. The provincial potash policy was developed initially to deal with problems associated with an excess supply and consisted of output restrictions and floor prices. Changing market conditions led to a situation of rapidly increasing prices and revenues for the potash producers, and the nature of the policy problem switched from one of stabilizing the industry to one of levying increased taxes to enable the government to capture a portion of the revenues. The first part of the paper explains why a provincial potash policy was developed, the problems it attempted to deal with and how. The second part is an attempt to examine, from a public policy point of view, the impact of these policies on the potash industry.

Jan 1, 1977

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

The potash industry in Saskatchewan has recently been the focus of much new legislation at the provincial level and, along with other mining industries in Canada, also subject to changes in tax legislation at the federal level. As a result, the industry presently operates under (a) provincial production controls, a prorationing scheme; (b) a new provincial reserve tax on potash only and; (c) a new federal income tax applicable to all mineral industries. The prorating scheme dates back to 1970 and emerged as public policy because of the excess supply situation faced by the international potash industry towards the end of the sixties. This caused special problems for new mines in Saskatchewan and the provincial government decided to intervene. The new tax legislation at provincial and federal levels, both introduced within the last four years, reflects a belief that insufficient revenues accrue to the public sector from natural resources. All mining industries in Canada, including the potash industry, have had their tax positions completely reversed during these four years. Traditionally the mining sector in Canada has been a recipient of substantial tax incentives and has enjoyed low tax rates. This has changed and the mining sector is now one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the economy. In addition, the mining sector has moved from a situation where its rapid development was favoured by governments to a situation where this is no longer the case.

Jan 1, 1976

By Edmund E. Getzin

Of all the developments in the post-war history of Western Europe, none has been more remarkable in its aims and in the progress it has achieved than the movement toward European integration. It is not an exaggeration to say that this movement marks a virtual revolution, an about-face, in the long and complicated history of European states over the past three centuries. Although sporadic efforts to achieve European integration can be traced back for at least a 100 years, it remained for the breakdown of the European economies as a result of World War II and the subsequent Russian threat to give new impetus to the concept of broader economic and political integration. In fact, the economic integration of Europe following the end of the war was considered so essential that, in 1949, the administrator of the European Cooperation Administration, Paul Hoffman, spoke of the economic integration of Western Europe as an objective of American policy embodied in the Marshall Plan.

Jan 6, 1963

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration for potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief pre¬liminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliffside near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration f or potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and-the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief preliminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliff side near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to `secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By P. V. Roundy

PUBLIC lands in Florida were first withdrawn from entry by President Taft on July 2, 1910, as a conservation measure because of their possible phosphate content. The reserve thus established was subsequently modified by further withdrawals and by restorations, so that on Jan. 1, 1934,' it contained 66,796 acres, of which only a small part had been defi-nitely classified. The reserved land was in scattered parcels, ranging from less than 40 acres to 320 or more, distributed in many counties. For administrative purposes and for final disposal of any of the numerous parcels, mineral classification of the land is legally necessary. In 1934 and 1935 the United States Geological Survey, under two successive grants from the Public Works Administration, prospected some 83 tracts of these lands in Polk County, comprising in all about 3300 acres, and six tracts comprising 240 acres in Citrus and Marion Counties. The tracts in Polk County were all in the so-called land-pebble field and the others in the hard-rock field. The Survey field party was under the direction of P. V. Roundy, from whose unpublished report the material in this paper is largely taken. The foreman of the prospecting crew was J. H. Wingate of Zephyrhills, Fla. The individual tracts were identified through the cooperation of the General Land Office, by transitman Hugh B. Crawford. This prospecting work fitted well the classification adopted for Public Works projects in general: it could not he done on any considerable scale under the Survey's usual appropriations; it gave employment to unem-ployed labor; and it may be expected ultimately to repay the Government in royalties more than the cost of the exploration.

Jan 1, 1937

By P. V. Roundy, G. R. Mansfield

PUBLIC lands in Florida were first withdrawn from entry by President Taft on July 2, 1910, as a conservation measure because of their possible phosphate content. The reserve thus established was subsequently modified by further withdrawals and by restorations, so that on Jan. 1, 1934, it contained 66,796 acres, of which only a small part had been definitely classified. The reserved land was in scattered parcels, ranging from less than 40 acres to 320 or more, distributed in many counties. For administrative purposes and for final disposal of any of the numerous parcels, mineral classification of the land is legally necessary. In 1934 and 1935 the United States Geological Survey, under two successive grants from the Public Works Administration, prospected some 83 tracts of these lands in Polk County, comprising in all about 3300 acres, and six tracts comprising 240 acres in Citrus and Marion Counties. The tracts in Polk County were all in the so-called land-pebble field and the others in the hard-rock field. The Survey field party was under the direction of P. V. Roundy, from whose unpublished report the material in this paper is largely taken. The foreman of the prospecting crew was J. H. Wingate of Zephyrhills, Fla. The individual tracts were identified through the cooperation of the General Land Office, by transitman Hugh B. Crawford. This prospecting work fitted well the classification adopted for Public Works projects in general: it could not be done on any considerable scale under the Survey's usual appropriations; it gave employment to unemployed labor; and it may be expected ultimately to repay the Government in royalties more than the cost of the exploration. COMMERCIAL PROSPECTING METHODS Commercial methods of prospecting for phosphate in Florida have been briefly described by Mansfield.1 In the hard-rock field, where the floor of the phosphate deposit is extremely irregular, it is customary to drill as

Jan 1, 1937