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By Kelly F. Bailey

The issue of regulating non-asbestiform varieties of the amphiboles actinolite, tremo1ite, and anthophyllite to the same degree as asbestos has been studied in detail by the National Stone Association. The ramifications of such a regulation, and the over simplistic regulatory definition of a fiber, are enormous not only for the aggregate industry and its users, but also for the nation. Evaluation of the health, geological, mineralogical, technical, economic and legal issues do not support an "asbestos-like" regulation of non-asbestiform minerals. The adverse consequences of regulating non-asbestiform varieties of actinolite, tremolite and anthophyllite like asbestos would be magnified many times if a similar standard for generic mineral fibers were promulgated.

Jan 1, 1988

By F. M. Doyle, J. P. Dwyer

Introduction The mining industry has a poor public image. It is often perceived as a despoiler of the landscape and a polluter of the environment, and there is little recognition of societal needs for the raw materials and fuels that this industry produces. There are many reasons for this poor image, but an important one is that a substantial number of mining operations have caused significant damage to the environment. Many of these operations, particularly those that now are abandoned, continue to have an adverse impact, principally in the form of water pollution.1 In some cases, the damage caused by this pollution extends well beyond the immediate region around the mine. Chemical contamination of ground and surface waters can, and does, occur in nature when these waters flow through or over undisturbed, mineralized rock masses. However, the problem is greatly exacerbated by mining because the mining activities increase, by several orders of magnitude, the permeability and the surface area of rock that can be contacted by percolating water. Water flowing through either the mine workings or the waste rock dumps becomes contaminated. Pollution can also arise if leachate from tailings ponds enters either groundwater or surface waters. This leachate may contain chemicals used in processing the ore. The magnitude of the threat posed by mining wastes depends on the type of minerals in the deposit, and on the chemicals used to process the ore. The magnitude of the threat also depends on two other, site-specific factors. One is the volume of water flowing into the mine and through the dumps, which depends on rainfall patterns, topography, and whether the mine workings are surface or underground. The other is the proximity of the pollution source to groundwater or surface waters, which depends on both the climate and geology. These factors influence the concentration and the quantity of polluted water forming and reaching the receiving water. Mining activities present a potential problem of enormous scale. Vast amounts of rock are mined each year2 and, as noted above, substantial problems have arisen at some mine sites. These problems are usually exceedingly costly to address, and it is imperative that these mistakes not be repeated. There are indications that we can accomplish this goal; we now better understand the processes that cause pollution and have methods to prevent or contain it. In addition, in the past few decades society has started to recognize the need for all industries to operate in a manner that maximizes the health and safety of workers and the public and minimizes adverse environmental impacts. A variety of recently enacted federal and state laws regulating public health and environmental hazards reflect the increasing concern over these issues. Many statutes, such as the federal Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, encompass activities undertaken by the mining industry. Other laws, such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, have been written to regulate specific hazards posed by this industry. At the present time, the federal government. through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and several state governments, are preparing new regulations specifically tailored to control the disposal of mining wastes. Given the magnitude of the potential environmental and health risks posed by disposal of mining wastes and the regulatory costs to the mining industry (both of which are due to the tremendous volume of waste generated), it is especially important that regulators have a good understanding of the different types of mining wastes and the risks they are likely to pose in various geographic and climatic circumstances. Only then can a regulatory program be designed with suitable procedures and substantive criteria to protect the environment and ensure compliance, while avoiding unnecessary or wasteful expenditures. California has long enjoyed a large, active mining industry. Today it produces a wide range of mineral commodities. The revenue from production of non-fuel minerals in California ($2.85 billion in 1988) greatly exceeds that of any other state. About a third of this revenue is from the production of inert sand, gravel and crushed stone. However, the remainder is from the production of a wide range of materials. These include boron minerals, rare earths, asbestos, talc and pyrophyllite, and gold. In earlier decades, an even broader range of minerals was produced, including mercury, copper, lead, zinc, and barite. There are acute environmental problems at some of these early mine sites. Because in 1987 the state of California was engaged in a revision of its regulations for mining waste disposal, the legislature commissioned a study by researchers at the University of California at Berkeley to investigate and review: the magnitude of the problem posed by these wastes, • the best feasible control measures available for waste management and disposal, • the problems of abatement and cleanup at so-called "problem" mine sites, • the current regulations imposed on mining waste disposal by various federal, state, and local agencies and the effectiveness of these regulations. This paper summarizes the principal findings from this study (Mining Waste Study, 1988). The lessons from this investigation are likely to be of general interest because of the diversity of mineral products produced, and the wide range of geographic and climatic conditions encountered. The acute problems seen at some of the older mines are typical of the western United States, and teach useful lessons on strategies that should be implemented at new mines to prevent recurrences of these problems.

Jan 1, 1992

By R. Callaway

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (?CERCLA?), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA?) establishes a comprehensive Federal regulatory program for addressing environmental and public health risks posed by releases of hazardous substances into the environment from a wide variety of industrial and other sources. The statute is primarily administered by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The applicability of CERCLA to the mining, milling, and smelting industries (hereinafter referred to as the ?mining industry?) has been upheld by the courts and recently affirmed by Congress. The purpose of this article is to briefly outline the scope of CERCLA as it applies to the mining industry, the scope of EPA's activities pertaining to the mining industry under CERCLA, the types of remedies which may be pursued by EPA, and the liability scheme of CERCLA as it applies to corporate entities, managers, and shareholders involved with the mining industry. Natural resource damage claims, State cooperative agreements, and other State-related issues will not be discussed.

Jan 1, 1988

By Steve Meador

West Virginia's basic coal mining regulatory programs are not unique when compared to Federally approved programs implemented by other coal producing states. In fact, the language in The West Virginia Energy Act governing subsidence mirrors that written in the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act as well as other states' statutes. Certain legal and administrative issues, how¬ever, combine to make West Virginia's regulation of surface subsidence a singular approach.

Jan 1, 1986

By R. Fields

Nevada is primarily known today for its nation-leading production of gold and silver. However, industrial mineral production continues to play an important role in providing construction materials to help make the state the fastest growing in the United States. Aggregate production in Nevada was about 20 million tons in 1991. Most of that was used in construction in the fast-growing Las Vegas area. The state leads the nation in the production of barite and mined magnesite and has significant production of lithium carbonate, diatomite and gypsum. Other industrial minerals produced in the state include specialty clays, silica, lime and dolomite and relatively small production in salt, perlite and dimension stone. Industrial minerals operations are subject to state and federal permitting requirements, especially in the areas of air and water quality and mined land reclamation. As in all segments of the mineral producing industries throughout the nation, the amount and complexity of regulations affecting industrial minerals has increased significantly in recent years. Nevada is no exception.

Jan 1, 1993

By Richard S. Ghent, Daniel G. Warnock

JOHN HAMRIC: Our next speakers are Richard Ghent, manager of environmental health and safety for CF Industries, Hardee Phosphate Complex, in Wauchula, Florida. Richard has 20 years' experience with environmental health and safety affairs. He has a bachelor of science degree from the University of South Carolina. With him is Daniel Warnock, who is supervisor of safety and training also at the Hardee Phosphate Complex. Daniel's experience is in safety programs and electrical training. Their presentation is "Regulations Versus Management Practice." RICHARD GHENT: Written procedures give structure to safety programs. At their best, they are brief and understandable to facility personnel and clearly identify roles and responsibilities. At worst, they attempt to recite the entire regulation they are intended to address. Some regulations, such as OHSA's Hazard Communication Standard, require employers to develop, implement, and maintain a written program. As written programs and procedures are developed, some basic questions arise: Is the program designed to achieve compliance with regulatory requirements or does management expect the program to go beyond compliance to some higher level of performance? Management may have difficulty in measuring and communicating performance expectations in safety. A facility with 4 million safe work hours does not suddenly become unsafe the day their safety record is broken. Generally, management expects safety programs to meet regulatory requirements and to protect the employer from enforcement actions and fines from regulatory agencies. Management also expects that safety programs will result in a safer work environment with fewer incidents, accidents, and near misses. But it is difficult to know when a safety program has succeeded. If the program is expected to go beyond compliance, what other standards should be included (e.g., ANSI standards, company management practices, lessons learned from inspections and audits, recommendations from safety committees, etc.) in the

Jan 1, 1998

By J. P. Stone

The Mining Regulatory Affairs review arrived in time for the May issue. The Managing Editor inadvertently buried it in one of his paper piles. Regulatory developments at the federal level involving the minerals industry solid waste disposal under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) remained at the forefront of concern. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received public comments on two major documents. One was a strawman draft rule covering wastes from mining and beneficiation. The other was a report to congress covering selected mineral processing wastes. The regulation of minerals industry waste management is moving forward on parallel paths. Mining and beneficiation waste is somewhat further advanced.

Jan 1, 1991

By E. L. Reed

This paper addresses the state and federal permit- ting requirements and regulatory constraints associated with the development of new "grass roots" surface coal mines in the Western United States. Since a major portion of new coal development in the West will be on federally leased coal in Wyoming, my comments are directed towards that geographical area. This will give the reader some insight into the current regulatory framework within which western mining companies must operate-i.e., the major applicable state and federal laws and regulations, the more important state and federal regulatory agencies, and the major construction and operating permits that are required. Before discussing the impact of the regulations on our business, I would like to tell you something of my company and then briefly discuss Exxon's forecast of the long range outlook for coal. Carter Mining is an Won affiliated surface coal mining company. Exxon became interested in the coal business in the mid 1960's with the recognition of the future need for alternative fuel sources. Since that time, it has acquired coal reserves located in Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, Arkansas, Texas, Illinois and West Virginia. Carter's first surface mine, the Rawhide Mine, located north of Gillette, Wyoming began production in August, 1977. Our second surface mine, Caballo, located just south of Gillette, began operating last October. We have a third block of federally leased coal just east of Gillette. By 1985 we anticipate Carter's western surface mines will be producing at an annual rate of 30 million tons, subject, of course, to successful market development efforts and regulatory considerations. Rawhide will ultimately have a permitted capacity of 24 MM tons per year. The coal at Rawhide is in two seams; one 80 feet in thickness and the other 20 feet (including a 6 to 10 foot parting). A large shovel is used to remove the overburden, and a similar shovel and dragline are used to mine the coal. Caballo has a 75 foot seam; otherwise it is similar in design and operation to the Rawhide Mine.

Jan 1, 1979

By Debra W. Struhsacker, Jean Kiel, Jeffrey Thatcher

3.1 INTRODUCTION As heap leach precious metal projects become increasingly common in the United States, federal, state and local regulatory agencies are beginning to take a closer look at the short- and long-term environmental consequences of this recovery technology. From an operator's point of view, there is seemingly a confusing regulatory maze to be navigated and a plethora of permits and approvals to be obtained prior to commissioning a heap leach operation. The degree of difficulty associated with obtaining permits for a heap leach project depends largely upon the state in which the project is located. Permit acquisition is generally easiest in those states most familiar with heap leaching technology. For example, heap leaching is well understood in Nevada, and heap leach operations are relatively easy to permit, although permitting conditions in Nevada have recently become more stringent. However, many states are just beginning to become familiar with heap leach operations. Many of these states such as Idaho, Colorado, South Dakota, Oregon, Montana, Washington and South Carolina are in the process of drafting regulations and establishing guidelines for heap leach projects. In most cases, these regulations specify design and operating criteria as well as reclamation and decommissioning procedures. This chapter provides an overview of the regulatory and permitting aspects of heap leach operations. Permitting requirements for projects developed on federal land are discussed in detail. 'The state and local regulatory atmosphere and permitting requirements for various states are also presented. The chapter concludes with a generic permitting strategy. 3.2 KEY ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS The primary concern of most local, state, and federal regulatory agencies is the use, storage and transport of sodium cyanide (NaCn), and potential cyanide contamination of surface and groundwater resources. The toxicity of cyanide to people, fish and wildlife is also an important issue. Unfortunately, in the public eye, cyanide heap leaching has some emotional impacts similar to those associated with radioactivity and uranium mining. This perception and the general lack of understanding of cyanide can lead to unnecessary concern about cyanide contamination, further complicating the regulatory environment.

Jan 1, 1988

By Dermot M. Winters, Brent T. Wahlquist, C. Y. Chen

The enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) in August 1977 addressed subsidence resulting from underground mines, in addition to creating the requirements for reclamation of surface coal mines. Subsidence control regulations pursuant to SMCRA were initially promulgated in March 1979. Several revisions have since been made. In addition, due to court challenges some regulations have been remanded and others are still on appeal. In the meantime the Secretary has agreed to initiate rulemaking on some issues. It is yet to be determined how the prohibition of certain areas from surface coal mining operations under Section 522(e) of the Act applies to subsidence. This presentation discusses the status of the regulations and issues related to or affecting the subsidence regulations.

Jan 1, 1986

By J. J. Peshel

As per the current conceptual design presented by the Department of Energy, the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) becomes a part of the repository if the Yucca Mountain site is found suitable for repository development. Therefore, the design of the ESF should be compatible with the performance requirements for the repository. The construction methods selected should limit to the extent practical, the degree and the extent of damage to the surrounding rock mass. The ESF construction and operation should be compatible with the site data gathering activities, such as geological, thermomechanical, hydrological and geochemical testing.

Jan 1, 1991

By Steven C. Borell

For more than a decade, changes have occurred each year that have improved the regulatory and business climate for mining in Alaska. These changes have taken place during Republican and Democratic governorships as well as when the state House of Representatives and Senate were controlled by either party. During some years, the changes have been relatively minor. In others, including the 2003 legislative session, the changes could only be characterized as massive. These improvements have encouraged exploration. This, in turn, has resulted in some major new discoveries. But Alaska is essentially unexplored and tremendous opportunities remain.

Jan 1, 2004

By Kenneth M. Reim

In 1971, United States Borax & Chemical Corporation (U.S.Borax) initiated a mineral exploration program on federal lands in Southeast Alaska, with the commitment that any possible development would be done with great care for the environment. This program resulted in the discovery of a molybdenum deposit and the location of mining claims in 1974, in an area 45 miles east of Ketchikan, now called the Quartz Hill Molybdenum Project (Figure 1). At the time of this mineral discovery, the area was part of the Tongass National Forest, managed by the Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture, and open to mineral entry and multiple use. In late 1978, the area was designated Misty Fjords National Monument and closed to mineral entry, and in late 1980 the area surrounding Quartz Hill was classified as Wilderness. These new laws and regulations, as well as the special interest environmental groups which oppose resource development, have significantly delayed and increased the costs of developing Quartz Hill.

Jan 1, 1983

By Ken Fucik, Jorge Briceno, Bjorn Bjorkman

In 1993, a lawsuit was filed on behalf ofnative groups in Ecuador against Texaco for environmental damage resulting from petrole­um production activities which had occurred many years earlier. The basis of the lawsuit at the time was that Texaco had failed to perform its foreign activities in the same manner that it operated in the U.S. No environmental regulations were in existence in Ecuador at the time of Texaco's operations. Also in 1993, a lawsuit for over $3 billion Australian was filed on behalf of native New Guineans for alleged environ­mental damages and health impacts that occurred as a result of BHP's operations at its Ok Tedi Mine. Since then, Royal Dutch Shell has been subjected to major criticism for environmental damage caused by its operations in Nigeria. A more recent report has criticized Shell for groundwater contamination of an aquifer in Turkey. Southern Peru Copper is now defending against a lawsuit filed by citizens exposed to air emissions from smelter operations in Peru. In all of these cases, much of the alleged damages occurred many years previous. A defense com­monly made by the companies has been that operations were conducted according to the standards in place at the time. This has not limited the lawsuits nor minimized the international publicity which has followed. While such lawsuits have been common in the U.S. for many years, their appearance in other nations have pointed out a growing sense of worldwide concern with regard to the impacts of industrial operations. Of particular concern is the fact that lawsuits have been filed in countries that have up to now had few, if any, environmental regulations. The regulatory environment has been a part of most U.S. business operations since the early 1970's. Now, however, envi­ronmental regulations are starting to be implemented in many less developed nations. This has led to the formulation of a myriad of standards and approaches to environmental regulation around the world. For multinational companies, the challenge becomes one of anticipating the level of compliance that will be required to minimize liabilities not only for the present but also in the future. The purpose of this paper is to provide some guid­ance with regards to choosing a level of compliance, particular­ly as it applies to water quality.

Jan 1, 1996

By Peri Mehling, Allister Brown

Environmental regulations concerning the processing of gold ores and the treatment and disposal of spent process solutions range from rigid standards in some locations to site specific options in several other jurisdictions. This paper examines the regulations and policies in two North American jurisdictions. Emphasis will be placed on the mill process and waste stream treatment and disposal, and implications for environmental impacts. Case examples of mine licence requirements will be discussed, with brief descriptions of individual treatment and disposal systems. Policies and environ- mental regulations within each jurisdiction will be examined in terms of potential environmental protection.

Jan 1, 1987

By Deborah McCombe

-Canadian Regulators -Qualified Person -Professional Association -Resources & Reserves -Foreign Codes -Disclosure of Historical Resources -Issues in Application of Resources & Reserves -Industry Best Practices developed by CIM -Technical Report and Reserves and Resources -Summary

Jan 1, 2003

By Aladar B. Dory

INTRODUCTION Anyone familiar with the problems of hardrock mining will agree that the majority of the serious dangers present in mining are quite visible and obvious to any person reasonably familiar with the profession. Having unsecured, unscaled back over ones head, gives one a very good chance of ending up under a caved in mass of rock. Staying too close to a blast gives one almost a certainty of being hit by a flying rock. Too little oxygen in the air will very quickly lead to loss of consciousness and death. One walks only so much over deep, unsecured openings before he falls into them. It is because of this clear visibility of the conventional health and safety hazards that mining regulations in almost all jurisdictions world-wide are a more or less comprehensive collection of "shalls" and "must nots" of good common sense. When basic rules of common sense safe working practices are at stake, there is little room for dialogue and compromise. The mine inspector is then observing, during his inspection, how well the mine follows these common sense rules. RADIATION AS A HIDDEN DANGER Radiation in mines is a risk, the impact of which does not demonstrate itself immediately. It is first of all a potential risk. Two individuals exposed to identical radiation will almost certainly be effected differently, if at all. This is certainly true of exposures and doses one might encounter in the mines today. We hear very often the phrase: "there is very little known about the effects of radiation". It is one of the most misused and misunderstood half-true statements. I would doubt that there is any other carcinogen whose effects have been studied as extensively as the health effects of radiation. Where the statement is correct is regarding the knowledge of the quantitative assessment of the risk of low level radiation exposures. The reason for this uncertainty is that the magnitude of their health effect is very close to the health effects of natural radiation, cosmic radiation and the effects of other carcinogens such as industrial pollution, hydrocarbons from cars and other chemicals we have grown accustomed to using. As far as lung cancer is concerned, the effects of wide use of tobacco probably outperforms any other single substance. All this having been said, the bottom line is still unchanged. Radiation exposure, in most cases mainly radon daughter exposure, was and still is one of the health hazards of uranium mining and as such has to be controlled to the best of our ability. Various jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to the control of radiation exposures of uranium minemill workers. The following sections of this presentation will attempt to explain the regulatory approach taken in Canada. THE CANADIAN REGULATORY PHILOSOPHY As indicated earlier, the health effects of low level radiation are quantitatively not yet defined and no proven threshold of radiation exposure exists. The Atomic Energy Control Board's (the Board's) regulatory system is based on the basic assumption that there is no absolutely safe limit of radiation exposure below which there are no health effects. Theoretically we should therefore strive to reach zero exposure. It is obvious that this objective cannot be reached in real life. The objective of the regulatory process therefore has to be to achieve radiation exposures of the workers that are as low as reasonably achievable, social and economic factors taken into account. This, of course, is the internationally acclaimed ALARA principle put forward by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). To avoid any misunderstanding it is worth emphasizing that the ALARA principle is applied to achieve exposures below the regulatory limits which must not be exceeded in normal operation of any nuclear facility including uranium mines and mills. The present regulatory limits for radiation exposures of atomic radiation workers are based on the recommendations of the ICRP and they are almost universally accepted. They should ensure that the risk from radiation exposure is not greater than the risk associated with working in a comparatively safe industry. Basically, there could be two extreme approaches to the regulation of uranium mining and milling. One extreme approach is to develop very extensive and detailed regulations and requirements covering all aspects of radiation protection. This is a somewhat autocratic approach to the regulatory process. This approach has two very serious shortcomings. If detailed requirements are set in regulations, due to the great variations of actual conditions at various mine-mill facilities, they have to be set as a compromise between the desirable requirements and those which could be met by practically all facilities. This approach takes away from the management of the facilities the initiative to strive for improved conditions. Requirements are spelled out in clear, understandable targets and the only worry of the management is to comply with these targets. One of the basic duties of management is to manage the operations in the most effective way with the maximum health and safety of the workers in mind.

Jan 1, 1981

By Stephen H. Partney

Waste clay ponds are a necessary part of phosphate rock beneficiation. They are large, averaging 2.6 km2 (1 sq mile). They are unsightly in that they protrude 6 to 15 m (20 to 50 ft) above natural grade. Stabilization and reclamation is slow and they have had a history of catastrophic failure. Florida has never published a specific rule regarding the configuration or height of these ponds. But it has enforced several policies along these lines. The phosphate industry has been forced to make major monetary decisions that affect mine economics for decades. The Florida Bureau of Mine Reclamation believes that the direction of regulation has been solidified but changes are still anticipated. Phosphate rock has been mined in Florida since 1890 (Fig. 1). Three notable technological changes occurred in the industry that led to major shifts in mining technique and volume. By about 1915, hydraulic mining had been replaced by centralized washers. Hydraulic mines usually started at an outcrop in or adjacent to a stream of the pebble zone. Water was pumped out of the stream through high-pressure monitors and sand and clay were washed away from the pebble. Mobile grizzlies and screens were used in conjunction with animal and human labor to concentrate the pebble and haul it away. Populations were sparse and the clays washed into the stream were considered an acceptable price for the commerce. The clays were not voluminous because the pebble zone typically contained relatively small amounts of them. Machines largely replaced animals by 1910 and provided greater efficiency of production. Centralized washers replaced mobile trommels. They allowed greater ease of access to shipping routes by rail. Some clays were placed in mine cuts from 1915 to 1930. Some were dammed off to increase the capacity of a given site. Some of these also failed, leading to clay plumes that were visible all the way to the Gulf of Mexico. By concentrating the waste clays (slimes) in impoundments, the solids concentration had increased, making plumes persistent for long distances. There were complaints. But there was no litigation against the companies during that time. In 1930, flotation technology allowed the recovery of the phosphate from deeper zones. This was because the "concentrate" size phosphate rock was in the sand-size range and could not be screened out. Centralized beneficiation plants grew into a three-step process - washing and screening, feed preparation and flotation (Fig. 2). Reagent storage, safety and the flotation cell complex made the plants into large capital installations. Larger draglines were required to dig deeper into the matrix. These had dramatically larger production capacities, which were then figured into the overall material balance for a given plant. The number of operators shrank and the production per operator grew. Larger areas were being bermed off for waste clay storage. An economic incentive became apparent for storing as much waste clay as possible in each settling area. At the same time, the population was steadily growing and more eyes were watching the activities of the phosphate mines. Phosphate mining, focused on production and profit, was earning a bad name from its neighbors. When the subject of phosphate mining

Jan 1, 1998

This international symposium was convened to assess the current state of knowledge concerning the health hazards that might be associated with the ingestion and inhalation of fibrous particles produced from the processing of taconite ore. Concern about fibrous particles in taconite arose from their similarities to amphibole asbestos minerals that are known to be human carcinogens. The mineralogical characteristics of asbestos fibers are reviewed and compared with the fibrous particles known to be present in taconite ore from the eastern end of the Iron Range. The epidemiological and experimental animal studies for asbestos-related disease (including gastrointestinal cancer from asbestos in dinking water)were critically evaluated andcompared to those of the fibrous minerals in the taconite. The focus was on the amphiboles in the cummingtonite?grunerite and tremolite?ferroactinolite series and other fibrous particles in both the Iron Range and the Duluth Complex. This included examination of the reported occurrence of any asbestiform ferroactinolite, crocidolite asbestos, chrysotile asbestos, etc. In addition, an effort was made to provide a scientific framework to address fibrous minerals, which may be associated with nonferrous mineral deposits in the Duluth Complex. State-of-the-art risk assessment models for asbestos were presented. Risk assessment scenarios were developed for taconite-derived fibers at environmental exposure levels related to the operation of the Silver Bay taconite processing facility. These calculated risks were found to be trivial even after it was assumed that all mineral fibers were as carcinogenic as amphibole asbestos.

Jan 1, 2008

The central question concerning the health risks associated with mining and processing of taconite ores in the Eastern Mesabi Range is ??does asbestos, of any variety, occur within the gangue mineral population?? Free silica in the form of quartz does exist in the taconite, but silicosis has been relegated to a secondary issue. The focus has shifted to the asbestos minerals and the malignancies that might occur following low-level exposure to dust. Although mineral fibers do exist in the Mesabi taconite ores, Ross, Nolan and Nord conclude ??no asbestos?, as explained in their contribution ??The Search for Asbestos within the Peter Mitchell Taconite Iron Ore Mine, near Babbitt, Minnesota?. Their area of study is located in the eastern Mesabi Range. It is here that the tectonic and metamorphic effects associated with the intrusion of the Duluth Gabbro have been profound. A variety of amphibole minerals have developed as a result of these geological events, some with names recognized within the US Asbestos Standard. The issue tackled by the authors is whether or not these amphiboles are present in the mine and if so whether or not they are asbestiform in habit.

Jan 1, 2008