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By H. M. Wolflin

SOMEWHAT more than a year ago the writer collected some extensive notes on metal-mine fires and a paper on metal-mine fire prevention and fighting, a summary of these notes, was hastily pre-pared, with the assistance of G. Chester Brown, chief mining engineer, Industrial Accident Commission for the National Safety Council meeting. This summary, which is admittedly incomplete, is submitted in the hope that it will evoke some discussion that may result in a reduction in metal-mine fire hazard along the line. To accomplish such a reduction does not require the application of complicated scien-tific data. The use of just a little care, a small amount of thoughtfulness and a bit of common sense will work wonders. UNDERGROUND FIRE FIGHTING There may be some interest in a short list of con-clusions of a rather general nature that were reached in connection with some recent mine-fire fighting opera-tions. No effort has been made to cover the field; the items have been jotted down loosely, and very hastily, in the order in which they occurred to the writer. Originality is claimed for, only a few of them. 1. Temperature readings and analyses of mine-air samples, systematically taken, are invaluable aids to effective metal-mine fire fighting and recovery opera-tions. The analysis of the return-air samples fre-quently gives a surprisingly accurate indication of conditions existing underground. 2. Employees must be thoroughly trained in the use, of mine rescue apparatus, because a relatively slight difference in the amount of training makes a vast difference in the amount of work they can per-form under oxygen. In general, slender, wiry men make better apparatus men than those of heavy, more muscular physique, although there are frequent excep-tions to any such general statement. 3: Surprisingly high temperatures, up to 165° F. or 170° F. pan be endured for short periods by wearers of mine rescue apparatus if the air is dry, but lower temperatures, 135° to 140° F. are almost unbearable if the air is very moist.

Jan 2, 1922

By T. Glenn Pobanz

For more than fifty years Walter Kidde & Company, Inc. has engaged in the development and manufacturing of both fire suppression and detection equipment. Our initial work for the mining industry centered around dry chemical extinguish-ing equipment for mine haulage cars. To fulfill this need, Kidde engineered and developed a manually activated dry chemical system to provide protection for the wheel wells, cable reels, and motor compartments on various pieces of underground mining equipment. The next phase of mining operation fire protection for Kidde was the area of detection and automatic fire suppression for conveyor belt heads. Early in 1970, a field evaluation program and belt head demonstration unit was taken to 10 areas throughout West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. This extensive field program was a joint effort with National Mine Service Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The objectives of this program were to study mine hazard problems and to determine further requirements of mine operators. The resulting belt head detection system centered around our Continuous Strip Thermistor Core heat detector in conjunction with a Kidde stored pressure dry chemical extinguishing system. Continuous Strip detection has been in use for a number of years in aerospace applications. It has proven flexible and reliable for the rapid detection of overheat conditions and fires in engines of over half the aircraft flying today. The use of Continuous Strip gave us flexibility to protect surface areas over and around the actual conveyor belt head equipment. The nature of Continuous Strip allows us to bend, wrap, and attach the 20 foot long thermistor element over the desired protected points of the belt head. An integral part of the conveyor belt head protection system is the control panel utilizing our comprehensive knowledge of fire alarm control logic. This panel contains supervision circuits which sound trouble signals upon detecting a break in the Continuous Strip; breaks in the wiring to the remote electrical extinguishing activators or to the alarm bell; or loss of primary power. A separate control module provides the adjustable alarm temperature setting of the

Jan 1, 1971

Provide reasonably priced, reliable fire protection for blasthole drills. Approach An automatic fire sensing and suppression system using both dry and gaseous chemicals was developed, and is more shock and vibration resistant than similar industrial fire protection systems. How It Works Temperature sensors mounted in the drill's machinery house, hydraulic room, operator cab, and transformer area detect the heat from a fire, and trigger a sequence of actions. The same fire fighting sequence can be initiated from manual alarm boxes in the cab, hydraulic room, or machinery house. Electrical power to the drill Is immediately cut off, and a horn sounds to warn the drilling crew. After a 40-second, built-in, delay to allow time for drill's ventilating fan to stop, gaseous and dry chemical fire extinguishing agents are piped to and released in various rooms of the drill. The gaseous extinguishing agent (Halon 1301) is released in the machinery house, hydraulic room, and operator cab where dry chemical clean-up from electrical panels and machinery would be difficult and costly. Dry chemical is piped to the transformer room at the rear of the machine. Location of the principal components of the system are shown in the drawing.

Jan 1, 1979

Provide reasonably priced, reliable fire protection for front-end loaders. Approach Automatic fire sensing and suppression systems were developed and ruggedized for use on front-end loaders operating in harsh mine environments. How It Works Temperature sensors mounted in the loader's engine, transmission, and articulation areas detect the heat from a fire while it is still small and controllable. This triggers the release of the ABC class dry chemical extinguishing agent through a fixed piping system onto the fire. The system can also be manually activated from either the cab or ground level. Locations of the principal components of the system are shown in the drawing. Two control subsystems were designed to respond to varying fire protection needs and mine conditions. One subsystem only initiates discharge of the extinguishing agent. The other subsystem initiates visual and audible operator alarms if there is a fire sensed or if there is a fault in the control circuit.

Jan 1, 1979

Develop rugged, cost-effective fire protection for hydraulic shovels and backhoes. Approach Automatic fire sensing and suppression systems were designed and built for use on hydraulic shovels and backhoes. How It Works A line-type temperature sensor is mounted in the machine's engine and hydraulic pump areas to detect the heat from a fire while it is still small and easy to control. Two systems were tested. In one, the inside of the sensor consists of two conductors separated by a ceramic material whose electrical resistance decreases with increases in temperature. When heated to a predetermined temperature) the control circuit responds to the resistance drop. In the second system, the detection element of the sensor is comprised of a thin metal tube containing a hydrogen charged metal hydride wire. The tube is sealed at one end and is connected to a sensitive pressure switch at the other end. When exposed to the heat from a fire, hydrogen gas released from the metal hydride wire actuates the pressure switch.

Jan 1, 1980

By T. G. Carter

"During the early part of the 1980s, four new surface coal mines commenced operation in the Province of British Columbia. Each represented a major investment in both persons and materials in order to protect this investment in one significant area-the fixed portion of the surface coal handling system-a substantial amount of work was undertaken to ensure that the system was well protected from an outbreak of fire. A great deal of effort in this field had already been made by those coal mines which had been in operation for a number of years and experience gained at these operations was utilized in determining the level and extent of fire protection for the new mines.This paper summarizes the major problems, and suggests some of the methods of solution, in providing an adequate degree of fire protection for surface coal handling systems. It will also discuss the potential for gas and dust explosions together with ways to minimize this potential.The Fixed Coal Handling SystemNote: The word ""fixed"" has been used in its present context to denote that part of the coal handling system where the coal is moved via fixed installations such as a conveyor. It differentiates from that part of the system where coal is moved by mobile equipment.The raw coal delivered to the truck dump will undergo two major processes on its way to the rail load out. The first will be at the coal preparation plant where coal of specified quality will be extracted from the raw feed to the plant. If this coal is of metallurgical quality, and sometimes if it is of thermal quality, it will pass through a thermal dryer where part of the moisture acquired during coal preparation will be removed, i.e. the second process. As the complexity of both the coal preparation plant and the thermal dryer is such as to warrant separate considerations they will not form part of this paper. Each of the processes, however, is generally, housed in its own building, thus, containment of any hazards is usually more attainable than those existing or caused in the rest of the system."

Jan 1, 1988

By Lon D. Santis

The Code of Federal Regulations Title 30, Parts 56, 57, 75, and 77 require that detonators and explosives be separated by four inches of hardwood or equivalents when transported together in mines. This standard was developed to protect the explosives from initiation by the more sensitive detonators. The research reported here is an attempt to quantify the fire protection offered by four inches of red oak and other materials. Boxes with a volume of 6.75 cubic feet were made from four-inch thick rough green oak (RGO), two-inch thick RGO plied, two-inch thick #1 common (dried) red oak plied, and a metal/plywood composite. These and boxes meeting the Institute of Makers of Explosives' (IME) Safety Library Publication No. 22 were tested in bonfires. The boxes were instrumented with thermocouples, filled with detonators, and placed over a kerosene fire imparting about 16 kilowatts per square meter heat flux for up to 3 hours.

Jan 1, 1997

By Lon D. Santis

The Code of Federal Regulations Title 30, Parts 56, 57, 75, and 77 require that detonators and explosives be separated by four inches of hardwood or equivalents when transported together in mines. This standard was developed to protect the explosives from initiation by the more sensitive detonators. The research reported here is an attempt to quantify the fire protection offered by four inches of red oak and other materials. Boxes with a volume of 6.75 cubic feet were made from four-inch thick rough green oak (RGO), two-inch thick RGO plied, two-inch thick #1 common (dried) red oak plied, and a metal/plywood composite. These and boxes meeting the Institute of Makers of Explosives' (IME) Safety Library Publication No. 22 were tested in bonfires. The boxes were instrumented with thermocouples, filled with detonators, and placed over a kerosene fire imparting about 16 kilowatts per square meter heat flux for up to 3 hours. Tests showed that the wood boxes protected the detonators for over an hour with variations between the different trials. In the IME 22 container tests, detonators began exploding in as little as 17 minutes in one test and not for 2-/12 hours in another test. Detonators in the metal/plywood boxes began to explode in about 15 minutes but with minor alterations, were able to contain the detonators. The test results show that the exterior of an IME 22 container significantly affects its thermal properties. Defects in the form of cracks and the manner in which the container is closed have a significant effect on the performance of a detonator container in a fire.

By U .. C. Rojas, J .. C. Gomez

"Fire Refined Copper (EI Teniente Three Stars) has been produced at Caletones Smelter of Codelco Chile since almost the beginning of its operations.Due to changing features of the copper market, together with the targets on technical efficiency and productivity, it has become more and more relevant for copper industry to reach both, good final product quality and a proper environmental control.At present, copper refining process at Caletones Smelter takes place in two cylindrical tilting furnaces, where solid fluxes are injected through horizontal tuyeres into the molten bath. (Fig. N2 1)Solid reagents are pneumatically conveyed and injected into the liquid copper bath attaining excellent solid - liquid contact, so the impurities removal efficiencies are found to be high. Same injection tuyeres are used to introduce both oxidising agent (normal air) and reducing agent (reformed gas) into the molten bath. Air or nitrogen is used as conveying gas for solid reagents, depending on the process stage.This pap~r gives a fundamental description of the process and industrial results related to the injection of blend of sodium and calcium carbonates to remove arsenic and antimony, silica and granulated reverberatory slag to remove lead and a mixture of calcium carbonate and mineral coal to reduce the selenium content of the fire refined copper."

Jan 1, 1996

By Linda L. Chasko, Charles P. Lazzara, Ronald S. (deceased) Conti, William J. Wiehagen

Fire has long been a concern for underground mine workers. A mine fire can occur at any time and can result in a partial or total evacuation of mine personnel and the loss of lives. Fires can grow rapidly. Time is the critical element. Prompt detection, timely and accurate warnings to those potentially affected, and a proficient response by underground miners can have a tremendous impact on the social and economic consequence of a small underground fire. Fire preparedness and response have components of technology and people. These components can work synergistically to reduce the time it takes to bring the system back in balance. This report deals with the preparedness of miners to respond to underground mine fires. It is intended to aid the mining industry in understanding the various roles of emergency responders and the training techniques used to increase their skill levels. The report also presents a technology overview to assist in effective response to mine fires.

Jan 12, 2005

By Linda L. Chasko, Charles P. Lazzara, Ronald S. Conti, William J. Wiehagen

Fire has long been a concern for underground mine workers. A mine fire can occur at any time and can result in a partial or total evacuation of mine personnel and the loss of lives. Fires can grow rapidly. Time is the critical element. Prompt detection, timely and accurate warnings to those potentially affected, and a proficient response by underground miners can have a tremendous impact on the social and economic consequence of a small underground fire. Fire preparedness and response have components of technology and people. These components can work synergistically to reduce the time it takes to bring the system back in balance. This report deals with the preparedness of miners to respond to underground mine fires. It is intended to aid the mining industry in understanding the various roles of emergency responders and the training techniques used to increase their skill levels. The report also presents a technology overview to assist in effective response to mine fires.

By J. Greg Sanchez

The New South Ferry Terminal in the New York City Transit system represents an important milestone for the city. This is the first station designed and built in the 21st century. The design of the fire safety system included relying on Computational Fluid Dynamics to analyze the dispersion of heat and smoke, and modelling of people egress to determine the egress requirements. The project also looked into how to protect the structure from the heat exposure in order to meet the fire rating requirements. This paper provides an overview of the fire safety design approach taken to design the new South Ferry Terminal station in lower Manhattan and looks into fire modelling, structural fire protection, and station evacuation.

Jan 1, 2008

By Brian Y. Lattimer, Kray D. Luxbacher, Jonathan L. Hodges, Manuel J. Barros-Daza

The abstract discusses the importance of predicting fire response time (the time before conditions become untenable for firefighters) in underground coal mines. It introduces a data-driven approach using artificial neural networks (ANNs) to predict response time and fire size based on measurable parameters like CO concentration, mine geometry, air velocity, and time since fire detection. The approach was tested using simulations from fire models (FDS and FSSIM), showing promising results for real-time predictions during mine fires.

Mar 6, 2022

By A Dix

Fire suppression systems are but one of the many technologies currently available to manage operational tunnel risks. However, the actual reasons for their use are often shrouded in mischievous discussions of the marketing variety.The international tunnelling community still stands divided on the merits (or otherwise) of fire suppression systems. For some the debate focuses on their cost compared to the theoretical benefits they bring to human safety.Long standing concerns about their potential adverse effects in an emergency are often at odds with the experience from tunnels which use them. High installation and operational costs are cited as reasons not to use them, yet toll road operators and insurers increasingly use them as a risk mitigation strategy for toll revenue protection.Fact or fiction, myth or reality, should such systems be seriously entertained or are they just another expensive gadget in the escalating array of expensive toys for modern tunnels? Ultimately this presentation argues that they have their place as a risk mitigation measure to achieve a range of objectives. The exact circumstances for their use ultimately fashioning their design and operational characteristics. This is an abstract only. No paper was prepared for this abstract.

Mar 8, 2011

By T. E. Newkirk

In the past few years there has been considerable controversy on the most suitable material to be used in ventilation doors which will have to serve also as fire doors. For this reason it was thought useful at Mclntyre to find out to what extent our zinc chloride treated spruce doors were fire resistant and what protection we could expect in case of an underground fire. The doors to be tested were constructed of the same material as that used in our regular ventilation doors underground, namely, 2-inch tongue-and-groove well seasoned spuce. It is to be noted, however, that whereas the dimensions of the ventilation doors are 5 ft. by 6 ft., those of the test doors were only 14 in. by 17½ in. The treated doors were made up from lumber that l1ad been treated with chromated zinc chloride, as described in Mr. Keeley's paper. Two kinds of tests were carried out: a heat test and a flame test. An electric muffle furnace for assaying, equipped with a pyrometer, was used for the beat test, the furnace door being replaced by the wooden door to be tested. In the flame test, the door to be tested formed one end of a rectangular steel box in which was placed a large blow-torch. Air was admitted at the rear of the box. A pyrometer recorded the temperature at the inside surface of the door where flame impinged. The results of the tests are presented in the accompanying table, in which the word 'failed' is to be interpreted as meaning that the door had been damaged to the extent that smoke, but not necessarily flame, issued from its outside surface.

Jan 1, 1949

By William H. Pomroy, Kenneth E. Hjelmstad

An underground mine fire can seriously threaten the lives of all personnel in the mine. This fact makes fire emergency planning a high priority in the mining industry. A fire emergency plan includes a means of warning miners of the existence of a fire, and the need to evacuate or retreat to a place of refuge. The warning alarm must be fast and must reach all miners, regardless of their location or work activity. Means of fire warning are varied, and include such methods as stench, flashing lights, telephones, and word-of-mouth (messengers). Unfortunately, none of these methods are entirely satisfactory. Stench can be slow and seldom achieves total mine coverage, especially in high-back room-and-pillar mines with low ventilation velocity. Telephones are effective only where personnel are close enough to hear the phone ring. A novel fire warning alarm system has been developed by the U.S. Bureau of Mines which enables instantaneous warning of all underground personnel. The warning alarm is sent by an electromagnetic signal which penetrates through mine rock from a transmitter to small person-wearable receivers. Each miner's cap lamp battery could be equipped with a small receiver and when a fire or other emergency occurs the miner could be alerted to the danger by a blinking of the cap lamp. Testing of prototype equipment has demonstrated that the transmitted signal is capable of penetrating through over a mile of mine rock and activating the receiver. This paper describes the theoretical basis for through-the-rock ultra-low frequency electromagnetic transmission, design of the prototype transmitter and receiver, test results, and status of commercial development of systems utilizing this technology.

Jan 1, 1994

The first steps in the process of mine evacuation are the recognition of a problem and an attempt to communicate the problem to miners who may be affected. This chapter will focus on the way that a problem, fire, came to the attention of mine personnel and the messages that were sent to miners in the affected areas. The concept of information uncertainty, which was introduced in chapter 4, will be discussed as it influences problem perception and diagnosis. Sociotechnical and interpersonal communications will be explored and suggestions for improving these systems will be offered. It might seem that the first indication of a dangerous fire would motivate individuals to take self-protective action, to evacuate the affected area or structure, and to provide clear warning to others who are in danger. Research has actually shown that in most situations this does not occur. Instead, time is taken to gather more information, confirm information that is provided, and consider possible alternative explanations that could account for the given circumstances [Canter 1990; Scanlon 1979; Bickman et al. 1977]. This process of confirmation can lead to the loss of critical time. Canter [1990] summarizes the problem in his book, which reports studies of a number of fire events: "As discussed throughout this book, ambiguity and confusion, incoherent instructions and time-wasting actions, lack of appropriate instructions and misunderstanding of the nature of the event that is unfolding, are all hallmarks of fires and emergencies that kill people." In this chapter, the detection of each mine fire and the communication of warning to endangered miners will be reviewed with an emphasis on how those processes were affected by the availability and use of information. Information can become available through a variety of mechanisms during an emergency situation. First, cues may be taken directly from the environment. Smoke is an obvious example. Secondly, mechanical devices, such as smoke detectors, may provide warning messages. A third source of information is interpersonal communications. These can occur face-to-face or through some mechanical device such as a telephone. With all three methods there is a possibility of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation. All of these means of communication were used with varying degrees of success in the three mine fires analyzed here. A fire, like any nonroutine situation, engenders uncertainty about a diagnosis and understanding of the problem [Mead 1938]. This uncertainty leads to delays in realization of the seriousness of the situation and therefore in the proper response to it. Delay in action is an important concern in any fire setting, but is even more at issue in underground coal mine fires. Mine fires are qualitatively different from structural blazes: workers' escapeways may be miles long; the seam height at many operations is so low that it is impossible to walk upright; access to underground workings is always limited to a few (sometimes only two)

Jan 1, 2000

By C. L. Berrien

MANY fires have occurred in the mines of Butte in recent years, and while all have been of a serious nature, simply because they were mine fires, six of them have been especially dangerous in respect to loss of life and property, and the expense of extinguishing or controlling them. It is not my intention to discuss the relative merits of methods used in fighting these different fires because the conditions under which they occurred varied in each case, and it was not always advisable to expend the large sum of money necessary to actually extinguish them if they could he bulk-headed off from the rest of the mine. It is needless to say that everything possible has been done to check all fires at the beginning, but without success in some cases; and it has then become necessary to bulkhead all connections to them, in which state several now exist. The mine fires of Butte, or fires in any mine, may be divided into two classes, namely: Those occurring in accessible workings, and those occurring in inaccessible workings; because these two conditions govern to the greatest extent the methods of fighting fires. Accessibility and in-accessibility in the case of mine fires concern not only new open workings and old closed workings, respectively, but also the condition of the ventilation in and about those places. When a fire is accessible at the start it should not be difficult to confine it to a small area and extinguish it in a relatively short time, but when it is impossible to actually reach a fire in old filled, abandoned workings, or there is no opening by which the gases may be conducted away from the fire zone, then the time consumed in changing those conditions permits the fire to increase to such an extent that it is a long, hard fight to overcome it.

Jan 6, 1915

By R. A. Franks, G. F. Friel, J. C. Edwards, L. Yuan

Two mine-fire experiments were conducted in the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's (NIOSH) Safety Research Coal Mine (SRCM) at the Pittsburgh Research Laboratory (PRL) which demonstrated that smoke from diesel-fuel fires of 500 kW and 660 kW heat-release rates in a return airway can develop, without causing a complete air flow reversal, into a roof layer that can migrate upwind forming a counter flow to the primary airflow in a crosscut. Subsequently, smoke can penetrate into an intake airway and create a hazardous atmosphere in the intake airway upwind from the fire. Visibility conditions less than 13 m were created by the smoke in the intake airway downwind from the crosscut. Modeling of the event with a three-dimensional, time-dependent, computational fluid dynamics (CFD) program correctly represented the smoke movement.

By J. W. Reynolds

"The use of approved fire-resistant hydraulic fluids in equipment operating underground was made mandatory in British Columbia by amendment to the Provincial Mines Regulation Act effective January 1, 1975. This paper covers the action taken to achieve this, in the largest underground metal mine in British Columbia. Some evaluation of costs and effects based on experience to date is included.BackgroundAn amendment to the Mines Regulation Act of the Province of British Columbia was passed in July 1974 as follow s: "" Rule 111 (b) Hydraulic Fluids. After the first day of January 1975, all hydraulic fluids used in equipment operating underground shall be of a fire-resistant type accept able to the chief inspector.""Unquestionably, its intent was justified as a safety improvement measure. The list of fires in mines involving machinery where hydraulic fluid was a factor in the fires is long and sobering. In British Columbia, in a 22-month period from 1972 to 1974, there were six fires in metal mines resulting in extensive equipment damage and injury to four workmen. Nevertheless, no provision was made for research or development of systems modifications compatible with conditions encountered in B.C. and, as late as June 1977, the Mining Association of British Columbia continued to argue that fire suppression systems should be considered sufficient until a universal suitable hydraulic fluid could be developed. The sole concession was to issue permits for continued use of mineral oil in equipment bought prior to 1975 in order to allow producing operations to continue. The burden of developing the necessary technology was laid on the industry.The Sullivan Mine at Kimberley, the largest and longest established underground mine in the province, and Cominco's most important source of ore s for its smelter at Trail, B.C., was at the outset of a conversion from conventional to trackless mechanized mining methods in pillar recovery operation s. Introduction of fire-resistant hydraulic fluid s had to be done in a period of change, in many instances on equipment for which no data existed, and called for research which had to be done while retraining the work force.The introductory phase is complete. All equipment is on FRF, the requirements of Rule 111(b) are being satisfied, and a number of research and development programs continue."

Jan 1, 1980