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By Andrew E. Nevin

The government of India convened a precedent-setting meeting in New Delhi on Nov. 12, 2001.The meeting brought together regulators and the mining industry in an attempt to fix the industry’s mine development problems in that country. More than 150people attended the all-day session. Ram Vilas Paswan, Minister of Coal and Mines, chaired the meeting. Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister of State for Coal and Mines, was also present. The secretary of the Department of Mines and the Joint Secretaries and Additional Secretary also participated. The Department of Mines’ mandate is for economic growth: to get new mine development going and to make investment in mining attractive for both domestic and foreign-owned companies.

Jan 1, 2002

By AIME AIME

ENGINEERS in the past have been largely associated with private enterprise and there has been a considerable tendency on the part of some members of our profession to depreciate government service for engineers. We engineers must change our mental attitude about employment in government service, particularly in view of the present most friendly attitude of the U. S. Civil Service Commission toward engineers for major posts in our Government. We must also take a much more active interest in public affairs. It must be realized that the national-defense program, which we are now organizing, will require for its effectiveness large numbers of engineers skilled in a wide range of technical and administrative services. In fact, the success of this undertaking will depend largely upon the extent to which our Government can command expert engineering talent to serve during the emergency. There is an acute shortage of technical and supervisory engineering personnel not only in the industries concerned with national defense but also in the Army, Navy, and other defense agencies of the Government. By an Act of Congress, approved on Oct. 9. 1940. $9,000.- 000 was turned over to the U. S. Office of Education, the regular defense agency of the Government which has co-operated with higher education for

Jan 1, 1941

By Allan F. Lawrence

"I AM SURE you do not expect from me any learned dissertation on the problems and opportunities of the mining industry. Y our program committee must have recognized my limitations when issuing the invitation to speak to you, because they very thoughtfully left the subject wide open.With the leeway thus granted, I hope that you will bear with me for a few minutes while I try to clarify the impressions of the mining industry that I have gained in the very short time I have held the Mines portfolio and some of the parts that government bas or should have in furthering its development.As I see it, it is the duty of the Mines Department, as an arm of the provincial government, to balance the proprietary rights of all the people against the interests to whom the privilege of developing our resources are, in a s e n s e, leased. To strike a fair balance is not always easy, nor is it possible always to satisfy both sides. Still, under the free enterprise democratie form of government to which I think we al! subscribe, no better way of handling the problem has yet been discovered."

Jan 1, 1968

Throughout history, many of the world's achievements, conflicts and problems can be traced to the demand for minerals. With the rapid expansion of our industrialised society in recent years the demand for minerals has grown to such an extent that uncertainties about availability and cost have arisen, especially in the case of energy minerals.Minerals have acquired a new dimension for governments as the availability of these resources is interwoven with the ability of governments to achieve their developmental goals on national and international levels. Accordingly, the supply of minerals will increasingly be affected by social and political factors.

Jan 1, 1986

I have spent most of the past 35 years working as an economic geologist in the area of exploration and development of base and precious metals. Most of this period has been as an employee of Trans-National-Corporations (TNC's). I presently act as a consulting geologist to a joint venture company, bringing together two such TNC's: Anglo American Corporation and affiliated companies De Beers (Diamonds) and Minorco (Metals mining outside of Southern Africa), and Normandy Mining Limited ofAustralia. Normandy is presently through its gold arm PosGold, Australia's largest gold miner and Anglo American can claim to be the world's largest gold company producing over 280 tonnes of gold a year, more than twice its nearest rival Gold Fields of South Africa. In addressing this topic, the role that Government can, and should play in mineral development, I will be drawing heavily on some examples from these and other TNC's experience in recent offshore mining investment.

Jan 1, 1995

By Van Dusen M

The involvement of concerned parties in all aspects of the Lihir Project from an early stage has promoted good relations between all groups. Activities involving landowners, the Lihir community, the New Ireland Provincial Government (NIPG) and the prospective developer include the Lihir Liaison Committee, Lihir Working Group, Environmental Planning Committee, Provincial Mining Task Force and the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association (LMALA). With modifications, the Lihir Liaison model may be of use in promoting good relationships among parties in other mineral developments.

Jan 1, 1991

By Richard W. Smith

Why are we losing our liberties? (1) . . . because our local chambers of commerce come to the National Chamber's annual meeting, vote for a policy on federal economy, and then go to Capitol Hill and ask for a federal project for their area. (2) ... because our mining men ask for a subsidy to mine submarginal deposits that can't be economically mined in a free economy. (3) . . . because 18,000 men and organizations all over the country recently wired or wrote a Congressional committee asking that the Army Engineers be exempt from the President's power to reorganize the Executive Branch of the government under the recommendations of the Hoover Commission.

Jan 1, 1949

"Lax, misguided, and dangerous" is Rep. James Santini's description of the official US position on strategic nonfuel minerals. Santini (D-NV), chairman of the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee, criticized the Interior Department for "its long record of benign neglect" regarding the domestic minerals crisis. Santini made his remarks at a news conference at the American Mining Congress convention in San Francisco, where he released his subcommittee report "US Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications." The report-said to be the first major congressional study of the minerals issue by a committee of jurisdiction is the result of a two-year inquiry. The investigation was undertaken, according to the chairman, "because no person or agency in the executive branch of government fully grasps the critical importance of nonfuel minerals to the nation's economy, defense, and quality of life." The report also urges a larger role for the Department of Defense, which has "stood passively by for many years as a consuming by-stander," according to the report. President Carter's incomplete Non-fuel Minerals Policy Review also drew the committee's ire; Santini calls it "a tragic waste that cost tax-payers $3.5 million and the loss of some 13,000 person-days." The subcommittee examined the following issues for its report: • The US minerals industry's inability to meet national raw material needs under a "hodgepodge of contradictory, restrictive, and irrational" federal regulations; • Dependency on foreign sources of strategic minerals in times of "increasing resource nationalism" and "Soviet mineral expansionism;" • National security needs for foreign mineral resources that do not have effective substitutes; • The US government's approach to national minerals policy "amid a growing realization that such a policy does not exist." The subcommittee report includes an analysis of public and private studies on nonfuel minerals and discusses a series of policy problem areas that negatively affect domestic production. Capital formation disincentives, tax policies, antitrust enforcement, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, technical problems, and restricted access to federally-controlled public lands contribute to what Santini calls a "tragic irony." "The irony is that we are a nation vastly rich in mineral resources yet our own government chooses to stifle development of these critical raw materials and thereby increase offshore reliance. The tragedy is that we also are ensuring US vulnerability to severe economic dislocations and a weakening of our national security." In just six years, from 1973-1978, the US trade deficit in nonfuel minerals rose from $2 billion per year to $8 billion, according to the report. The country imports more than 50% of 23 critical minerals, including 100% of its manganese, chromium, cobalt and platinum. The US is promoting its dependence on foreign mineral sources at the very time the security of many of those sources is becoming less certain, the report notes. Santini said the subcommittee investigation revealed a vulnerability that may be more serious and pervasive than that of foreign oil. The US may be able to develop alternate energy resources, but there are no effective substitutes for many nonfuel minerals. The report also discloses that US stockpiles of critical and strategic minerals are of inadequate supply and quality. Holdings of some vital minerals are far below present objectives, and for some there are no holdings at all, according to Santini. To resolve the current crisis, the report makes the following recommendations: • Complete immediately President Carter's Interagency Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review; • Implement (throught the Interior Department) the 1970 Mining and Minerals Policy Act; • Create an Office of Energy and Minerals with the same stature, power, and oversight responsibilities as the Council on Environmental Quality; • Ease federal restrictions on mineral exploration and development on public lands and implement a complete review of public land use policies; •Fund for and fulfill US nonfuel minerals stockpiling objectives; •Increase federal funding for non-

Jan 11, 1980

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

The potash industry in Saskatchewan has recently been the focus of much new legislation at the provincial level and, along with other mining industries in Canada, also subject to changes in tax legislation at the federal level. As a result, the industry presently operates under (a) provincial production controls, a prorationing scheme; (b) a new provincial reserve tax on potash only and; (c) a new federal income tax applicable to all mineral industries. The prorating scheme dates back to 1970 and emerged as public policy because of the excess supply situation faced by the international potash industry towards the end of the sixties. This caused special problems for new mines in Saskatchewan and the provincial government decided to intervene. The new tax legislation at provincial and federal levels, both introduced within the last four years, reflects a belief that insufficient revenues accrue to the public sector from natural resources. All mining industries in Canada, including the potash industry, have had their tax positions completely reversed during these four years. Traditionally the mining sector in Canada has been a recipient of substantial tax incentives and has enjoyed low tax rates. This has changed and the mining sector is now one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the economy. In addition, the mining sector has moved from a situation where its rapid development was favoured by governments to a situation where this is no longer the case.

Jan 1, 1976

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration f or potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and-the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief preliminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliff side near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to `secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By David E. Jones, Dean K. Hunt, C. Y. Chen

INTRODUCTION Of all the numerous geological hazards that threaten the well-being of urban areas in the United States, probably none is so widespread, persistent, and diversified as surface subsidence (HRB-Singer, Inc., 1977). Simply defined, subsidence is the vertical displacement or sinking of the ground surface caused by either natural phenomena or man's activities. The downward movement, however, can be accompanied by horizontal movement, strain, tilt and even by a locally upward movement. Damage to structures and the environment can result from any of these movements. Extracting subsurface materials, fluids and solids, accounts for most man-induced subsidence in the United States. Among all the mining-related subsidences, the collapse of voids created by underground coal mining has been the major cause in inflicting surface damage (Comptroller General of the United States, 1979). Subsidence from coal mining may occur within a few weeks or be delayed for years, depending upon the mineral layer's depth below the surface, the overlying rock strata's characteristics, the extent and methods of mining that were employed, and the time deterioration of pillar and mine structure. Unless underground resources are not mined or control measures are implemented to prevent or minimize damage, some degree of surface subsidence and its accompanied deleterious effects are often inevitable. The ways to control the subsidence and minimize surface damage may include: 1. Precautionary measures built into new structures or surface features. 2. Preventive works applied to existing structures or surface features. 3. Mine design incorporating special underground layouts. 4. Any combination of the above measures. Upon the enactment of Public Law 95-87, the Secretary of the Interior, through the recently created Office of Surface Mining (OSM), was authorized to promulgate rules to regulate mining reclamation including subsidence control. Proposed on September 18, 1978, these rules were finalized, following public comment and hearings, on March 13, 1979, as part of the permanent regulatory program for the regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations which include the surface effects of underground mining. On January 28, 1981, Secretary Watt of the Department of the Interior issued an order to re- quire all agencies to identify with recommendations all regulations which are believed to be excessive, burdensome or counterproductive. Also on February 17, 1981. President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12291 requiring all Federal agencies to conduct a regulatory review to make a determination that each promulgation of a regulation is clearly within the authority delegated by law and consistent with Congressional intent (Federal Register, 1981). As a result, OSM initiated the regulatory reform to revise the permanent regulatory program. Following a brief discussion of the technical aspects and the effects of subsidence on man and his environment, this paper presents a historical overview of how rules and regulations are used to govern the subsidence related problems. The development of the regulation of subsidence under Public Law 95-87, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA or the Act) are also discussed, including the new regulations being developed under the regulatory reform program. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS Am EFFECTS OF FINE SUBSIDENCE An extensive historical review of mining subsidence is given by Zwartendyk (1971) and Shadbolt (1978). Comprehensive technical presentations have been given by Henry (1956), King and Whetton (1957), Hall and Orchard (1963). Muller, et al. (1968). Grard (1969), Voight and Pariseau (1970). Kapp and Williams (1972), Cummins and Given (1973), Brauner (1973) , and NCB (1975). A theory of surface subsidence due to underground mining was perhaps first fundamentally stated by a French engineer, Toillez, in 1838, and formulated by a Belgian engineer, Gonot, in 1839 (Goldreich, 1913, cited by Zwartendyk, 1971). Since that time,

Jan 1, 1982

By Rajesh K. Mishra

The person in charge of Environmental Affairs in a small business has many higher priority projects (such as making money to meet the employee? payroll etc.) than filling out and filing the regulatory forms. It is but. natural to think that these affairs can be managed? by playing ignorant until audited by the regulatory -state and federal agencies. Truth is to. the contrary; generally, it is too late by then. The fines and legal costs even for failing to file the regulatory forms could deliver a serious blow to the financial well-being of a small business. Forms and reports under SARA Title III are not hard to complete., but they are time consuming. In this paper we will discuss the information and data compilation procedures, simplification of some legal terminology into simple technical language, and tips that help in filling out the forms?. Some actual case 'histories of EPA fines will also be reviewed.

Jan 1, 1992

By Thomas V. Falkie

In bygone days, the mineral engineer spent most of his/her time on the technical aspects of designing, building, and managing mineral operations. In the last few decades, mostly since the 1960s, increasing amounts of engineering man power and time are spent dealing with federal, state, and local government agencies, laws, and regulations. It is not possible to plan, design, build, or operate mines, mills, smelters, or even office buildings without detailed consideration of government regulations and permitting requirements dealing with environment, worker health and safety, etc. The four chapters of this section provide an overview of the social, legal, political, environmental, and health and safety aspects of mineral enterprise. The section sets the stage for the working engineer/geologist in industry, government, consulting, or academe and points the direction for more detailed study in each of these areas.

Jan 1, 2008

By A. Eftimie, M. Stanley

The World Bank Group (WBG) believes that extractive industries can make significant contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction, providing that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues are properly managed. The WBG recognizes that stakeholders have legitimate concerns about the impact of extractive industries, and management proposals are built around the central theme that investments and policy advice in the extractive industries should lead to poverty reduction. To help governments create appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks, this paper focuses on the linkages between overarching policies and laws and the management / governance of extractive industries at the local communities. It encourages the use of new instruments designed to help ensure that local communities benefit from extractive industries.

Jan 1, 2005

The administration came on as a strong supporter of the mining industry in April of 1982 when President Reagan delivered his long-awaited minerals policy statement. He promised to reduce America's minerals vulnerability, and called for spending billions on meeting stockpile goals for strategic minerals, opening up federal lands for mineral exploration, elimination of barriers to deep sea mining, and regulatory relief. He defended the favorable tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act as a stimulus to private research and development that would ensure the availability of materials essential to the nation's economy and national defense. But the administration just didn't seem to get anywhere. Congress, environmentalists, and even foreign governments fought White House-proposed legislation on all fronts, delivering the ultimate coup in forcing Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford's resignation and the subsequent EPA staff house cleaning in early 1983. Anti-Reaganites scored victory after victory against Reagan's efforts to stimulate the minerals industry. Congress was stalemated on so many mining-related issues that not much was done either for or against the industry. And the US was not to get its way on the issue of sea mining either. Most of Reagan's mineral policy objectives failed to be met. Three months after the National Materials and Minerals Program Plan was presented and the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment was made its coordinator, the head of the Cabinet Council James Watt blamed lack of progress in reviving the mining industry and creating a better strategic stockpile on the weak economy and the House of Representatives, which repeatedly thwarted efforts to open wilderness lands to mining. Congress The 97th Congress spent much of its time saying no in 1982-to the Reagan administration's deep cuts in energy and environment programs, to major changes in clean air and water laws, to oil and gas leasing in wilderness, and to killing the Department of Energy. Most of 1982 (and 1981) was spent in heated budget disputes. Some things that did not happen: • The administration and industry failed to get changes in controls of hazardous air pollutants and sulfur dioxide emissions that are implicated in the phenomenon known as acid rain. Industry had wanted to relax requirements for new industries building in clean air regions where the air act demands prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality, and to relax requirements tightening up the regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The air battle is expected to continue on five major fronts-acid rain, hazardous air pollutants, PSD, automobile pollution, and nonattainment. • Regulatory reform legislation to overhaul the way government carries out the law died a slow death last year. Business groups and the administration said federal agencies should be required to consider cost-effective measures of reaching regulatory objectives of protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Opponents, including environmentalists, feared such action would delay, weaken, or scuttle important regulations. • Congress turned thumbs down several times on proposals for oil and gas leasing in wilderness but could not agree on any new wilderness recommendations (see The Wilderness Battle). • Congress refused to open the door to the Reagan administration's plan to raise up to $4 billion a year from sales of federal lands. The administration identified surplus and excess federal lands, mostly obsolete buildings or isolated tracts of land, that could be sold by the General Services Administration (GSA) to help out the federal budget deficit. Congress took no action. Some things that did happen: • Congress extended the Defense Production Act (DPA) for six months through March 1983 without changing the 32-year-old law. That came after it failed to resolve sharp differences over proposals for critical minerals programs. Differences concerned both the amount of funds and the scope of programs that would be authorized under the DPA's Title III. Some proponents pressed for $5 billion in funding for loan guarantees or purchase commitments to spur domestic production of minerals such as cobalt. Other members of Congress wanted smaller amounts of funding, and the Reagan administration, until about November, had opposed any use of federal funds for strategic mineral programs. These measures were certain to come up again before the DPA extension expired in March. • House supporters of the Critical Materials Act of 1982 were unable to come up with the twothirds majority needed to pass the bill, so it died on the House floor in December. The bill proposed that a council be established with responsibility for coordinating federal materials research and development. The administration opposed the council creation contending that the Cabinet Council

Jan 5, 1983

By William Colby

INCREASING governmental control of human activities seems inevitable. Within the present generation railroad rates and the public sale of water, gas and electricity have been subjected to rigid regulation. The field of control is slowly but surely being enlarged, and it is the object of this paper to outline in brief space this tendency toward increased governmental regulation, as far as mineral resources are concerned. Our, dual form of government complicates the problem. We must deal not only with the powers of the Federal Government, but also with those of the individual States. In order to approach this question intelligently we must have some conception of the powers and jurisdiction of the States and the United States, respectively, over mineral lands and mineral production. Starting with the Federal Government we find it never owned any public domain within the States that formed a part of the thirteen original colonies and, for historical reasons, the same is true of Tennessee and Texas. The Mid-Western States were erected out of the public domain which was acquired by the United States through cession from the original States or by purchase from foreign nations. Congress early in the last century adopted a policy of leasing public lands containing lead deposits in a portion of this Mid-Western territory, but later abandoned that policy and disposed of such public, lands, mineral and non-mineral, outright so that they long since have practically all passed into private ownership and become subject to the general jurisdiction of the respective State governments. In the great public domain lying west of the Mississippi River, and in portions of some of the Southern States, the Federal Government adopted a new mineral land policy following the discovery of gold in California. (Acts of Congress of 1866, 1870, and 1872.) The mineral lands within these States, instead of being disposed of on the game basis as agricultural lands, as occurred in the Mid-Western States, were segregated from agricultural lands and sold under special laws intended to encourage mining, giving the miner the free right to locate and work these mineral lands without paying any royalty to the Federal Government. A miner could also obtain at slight expense a complete

Jan 1, 1930

By Angus D. Campbell

Introduction Gowganda forms part of the general Cobalt area. Its rocks and ores are very similar to those of the other parts of the area. While its total production of silver is only 4 per cent of that of the famous Cobalt silver camp, its 1928 shipments contained 42 1/2 per cent as much silver as those of Cobalt for that year. During twenty years of production, 15,000,000 ounces of silver have been shipped from Gowganda. Of this, over 8,000,000 ounces have been shipped in the past five years. The area has thus made for several years a substantial contribution to the wealth of Ontario. Its future depends to a great extent on the priee of silver, which is now, unfortunately, at a record low price. This paper is a discussion of how the Gowganda ore-shoots occur, together with some notes on the milling of the ores at the Castle-Trethewey Mines. The first part is written in the hope of stimulating further study of the silver occurrences, which may lead to further discoveries. The second part, besides being a matter of record, may be of some use to operators of small mills. The drawings in the several Figures illustrating the text are by W. D. Stroud, mine superintendent of the Castle-Trethewey Mines, the benefit of whose opinions I have had in compiling these notes.

Jan 1, 1930

By H. S. Marshall

Optimum Colliery is an opencast strip mine producing 18Mt of bituminous coal per annum for the export and inland markets as well as for domestic power generation at the Hendrina PowerStation. Coal is exposed by four 60m3 and four 11m3 walkingdraglines and transported from the open cuts to the processing plants by twelve 130 ton coal haulers. Overburden and interburden areas are drilled by nine 250mm-diameter rotary drill rigs. Until 1997 all surveying tasks were conducted by electronictotal stations requiring accurate control points from which line-of-sight XYZ readings could be taken. In 1997 a GPS system was introduced which consisted of a fixed base station and two rovers. The rovers were able to perform most of the survey tasks assigned to total stations. In addition, two overburden drills were equipped with blasthole drill navigation systems, which includes the drill monitoring and material (strata) recognitions system. The rest of the drilling fleet will also be equipped with GPS systems. Blasthole positions are designed in the office based on survey and geological/geophysical information and transmitted via radio link to an industrial PC on the drills. Together with GPS positional data, both the planned and actual drill positions are displayed on an LCD screen. This eliminates the need for surveyed hole positions to be staked before drilling, and for actual hole positions to be surveyed after drilling. As holes are drilled, performance and rock property data transmitted back to the office. Future applications will include GPS monitoring of dragline positions and pad elevations. GPS receivers on the draglines will utilize the existing base station to calculate and transmit XYZ co-ordinates. Another application will be locating of boreholes in the field prior to the pumping of specified explosive charges into the blastholes. Charging instructions for each blasthole will be loaded into the computer on the explosives truck which will be equipped with a GPS system for hole identification.

Jan 1, 1998

U.S. Borax’s mine in California’s Mojave Desert is the source of nearly half the world’s supply of refined borates. These minerals are used in hundreds of products, including essential plant nutrients that increase crop yield and quality, and safe building products that protect homes from insects and the elements. Borax’s workforce is also safe. In fact, it is among the safest in the nation. In 2003, the company was recognized by the U.S. Mine, Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for achieving the best safety record among large U.S. mining operations. It was also recognized by its parent company, Rio Tinto, for achieving the best record among its nearly 80 worldwide mining operations. Borax’s safety performance is five times better than the national average. And its workforce recently achieved more than two million hours without a lost-time injury.

Jan 1, 2004

Geologists in some underground gold mines collect grab samples from broken ore piles or trucks as a method of grade control. It is often known as muck sampling. Generally, the goal of grab sampling is to try and reconcile the mined grade at the ore source to the predicted grade and/or predict the mill feed grade. The mass of the sample collected is limited by health and safety issues, as well as by the capacity of the laboratory to process the samples within a given time frame. In general terms, grab sampling is known to be problematic because samplers tend to oversample the fines, and/or pick out high-grade fragments; surface sampling of piles does not test material within the pile; muck piles in development drives/faces are likely to be zoned due to the blasting sequence; high or low-grade material may preferentially segregate in the pile during mucking; the five per cent mass reject size of the material in muck piles is very large from underground blasting; some correlation usually exists whereby the larger fragments are enriched or depleted in the critical component of value; and the average error made in estimating the true stockpile grade is likely to be high. The method is prone to chronic fundamental sampling, grouping and segregation, delimitation, and extraction errors. Substantial warnings must be given about the use of grab sampling for grade control in gold mines. The method may appear to work sometimes, which can be attributed to a fine gold particle sizing and more disseminated distribution. As with all sampling methods, its appropriateness must be determined by ore characterization and heterogeneity testing to ensure the method suits the ore type.

Jan 1, 2010