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By F. S. Norcross

Manganese has long been considered one of the United States' most important strategic raw materials. Its indispensabil-ity in steel manufacture makes it vital to the nation's industrial life. Coupled with this indispensability is the fact that domestic producers have not been able as yet to supply more than a small part of the nation's manganese needs; consequently the United States has had to depend upon such distant foreign sources as the U.S.S.R., British India, the African Gold Coast and Brazil for the major portion of its ore. The great bulk of the mineral is consumed in the form of ferromanganese, an alloy that averages 80 per cent manganese and 20 per cent mainly iron and carbon. Manganese is used as a deoxidizer and desulphurizer in steel manufacture. By combination with the residual oxygen and sulphur of the bath, it helps to produce a clean, sound metal. Approximately 14 lb. of manganese, it is estimated, is used in making one ton of steel. For standard-grade ferromanganese, the ore should have a minimum of about 48 per cent Mn and preferably more. Beneficiation methods have not yet been developed for making the immense low-grade deposits in the United States salable at prevailing prices. Dependence upon foreign sources thrust the United States into serious difficulties during the World War. At the start of hostilities in 1914, the nation was obtaining about four-fifths of its ore from the Eastern Hemisphere. Domestic production had been negligible, amounting to only 3000 to 7000 tons a year. As the war continued, shipments from the East, endangered by sea attack and blockade, dwindled rapidly. Imports from Brazil mounted. In this grave emergency, the United States, starting almost from scratch and under the stimulus of high prices, succeeded by 1918 in producing a peak of 3II,000 tons, about 35 per cent of its consumption that year. Since the war, the United States has depended upon foreign sources for more than nine-tenths of its high-grade ore. During 1936, 1937 and 1938, imports for consumption averaged 736,000 tons a year. During the same period, domestic shipments averaged 21,000 tons a year. Of the imports, the U.S.S.R. accounted for an annual average of 280,000 tons, the Gold Coast 208,000 tons, India 74,000 tons, and Brazil 72,500 tons. But India and Brazil, which in 1936 ranked third and fourth in the list of importers, were displaced in 1937 and 1938 by a new and much nearer source—Cuba. From less than I per cent of United States imports in 1931, the island republic increased its shipments to more than 27 per cent in 1938. Cuba's average for this three-year period was 97,000 tons, and its total for 1938 was 131,000 tons. History The story of the economic development of manganese in Cuba dates back to the Spanish-American War days. John Green-way, then one of Theodore Roosevelt's

Jan 1, 1943

By S. D. Warriner

ONE of the most, if not the most, difficult of the problems associated with the mining and distri-bution of anthracite is to get clearly into the minds of the consumers and of the editorial and reporto-rial writers in the public press the relationship between the cost of production, the price at the mine and the price that the consumer pays for his coal, delivered in the cellar. One sees in his morning paper a statement to the .effect that out of the $12 or $13 per ton that his dealer charges him, the miner gets only $2 or even less, and he asks himself or the paper asks for him, "Who gets the difference?" Not infrequently the amount that the miner gets is given for run-of-mine bituminous coal while the price quoted is that of prepared anthra-cite, egg, stove, or chestnut, as the case may be, delivered to the bin of the consumer; and the difference stands out with all the more prominence; and it sticks in his memory with a persistency which no manner of explanation is able to efface. A recently published official report for the year. 1921 of one of the State Bureaus stated the total production of anthracite in net tons of 2000 lb., and included not only the output recovered by washeries from old culm banks and by dredges from creek and river channels, but also the colliery consumption;, i.e., the coal used by the companies in the operation of the collieries. This resulted in a total production of 90,509,075 net tons for which the labor cost was stated at $283,961,300, or $3.13 per net ton, equivalent to $3.50 per gross ton. This figure of $3.50 was immediately seized upon as representing the labor cost per gross ton of fresh-mined commercial coal. It is almost a hopeless task to try to correct such errors of statement in the first place, and, in the second place, to correct the misapprehen-sions that arise from them. As a matter of fact, the report was misleading in regard to the labor cost of the entire production shipped, as the coal used for colliery consumption should be deducted. Correctly stated, the report should have shown, calculated in terms of gross tons of 2240 lb., the legal weight in Pennsylvania, as follows: Gross production 80,607,359 tons Less colliery fuel 8,757,137 tons Commercial production 71,850,222 tons Total labor bill $283,961,300.00 Labor cost per ton...: 8 3.952 The foregoing figures" of tonnage are obtained from the State Department of Mines. Even these include the quantity recovered from calm, banks by washeries, and consequently the $3.95 arrived at as the average labor cost is somewhat less than that actually involved in the mining of fresh-mined coal. Unfortunately, the figures of washery production and the cost of producing it are not available.

Jan 7, 1922

By Phillip Crowson

INTRODUCTION This discusses some of the economic risks and uncertainties which face any company investing in new mineral ventures. These differ mainly in degree rather than kind from other large capital intensive projects, except that economic risks are compounded with technical risks. Mines face a wide variety of physical risks, and in addition the ore reserves may not prove as ample, nor as amenable to treatment as the feasibility studies indicate. On the economic front, mineral projects are subject to risks of fluctuating prices and sales volumes, no matter where they are located, or how they are financed. Typically, they are heavy users of capital compared with their owners' internally generated funds. Long term debt of various types is still the favoured form of finance. A project's currencies and cost often differ from each other and from those of the parent company. Facing up to the various risks associated with fluctuating and uncertain revenues, interest rates and exchange rates are amongst the hardest tasks for natural resource companies. ATTITUDES TO THE MINING INDUSTRY Some have questioned whether the game itself is now worth playing. They have argued that the mining industry's mediocre rewards in the past decade have been insufficient, compared with the risks involved. They can see no prospect of dramatic improvement in the next decade. Demand is highly cyclical and tends to grow less rapidly than economic activity, as a whole. Barriers to entry are low in most mineral markets, but impediments to exit can be substantial. Exit is especially problematic in those minerals where there are large state shareholdings and/or where less developed countries are major producers. The consequence is claimed to be an endemic tendency to excess capacity, and prices barely adequate to cover marginal cash costs. Many of the petroleum companies that moved into mining with such high expectations in the late 1970s have retreated, often bearing the scars of heavy losses. Individual shareholders, taken collectively, place low valuations on their investments in mining companies. The price/earnings ratios of the major mineral producing companies are low compared with their historical averages and with those of other industries. PRICE: EARNINGS RATIOS (October 1988) [UK Industrials 12.0 RTZ 8.4 Cons Gold 12.2 US Industrials 13 - 13.4 Alcan Alcoa Amax Asarco Cyprus Minerals Freeport Copper Inco Inspiration Magma Copper Newmont Mining Nord Resources Phelps Dodge Reynolds Metal Canada TSE 300 10.6 Cominco 8.7 Falconbridge 5.3 Noranda 7.0 Rio Algom 7.2 Teck Corporation 17.] NOTE: Mining companies' p/e based on prospective 1988 earnings, from Kleinwort Benson Securities' weekly Mining World, October 1988. Until 1987, it was argued that share prices correctly reflected the companies' poor earnings potential. Subsequently, the argument has been that earnings have been unnaturally boosted by cyclically high metal prices. The stock market valuations, therefore, correctly reflect future earnings, or at least expected earnings. This seems to be a case of Heads, I win; Tails, you lose. The underlying analysis of metal markets appears

Jan 1, 1990

By C. D. Ramsden

During the war years of 1941 to 1945, maintenance of mine locomotives and other mine equipment took the form of rebuilding rather than of renewing. Purchase of new parts became increasingly difficult and mine operators found it necessary to maintain equipment by salvaging old parts. Mine-locomotive wheels, although not representing a high cost per pound of material, contain a considerable amount of steel and without rebuilding would have to be scrapped long before even a moderate percentage of the steel in the wheel is actually consumed. Many mine operators have been rebuilding locomotive wheels for several years with automatic open are-welding equipment. In 1927, the Pittsburgh Coal Co. started such a program, using a single Westinghouse automatic welding head. Since that time, many refinements have been added, until in 1944 the setup was operating very efficiently. A desire to increase wheel life and to hold down rising costs led the company in 1944 to investigate the possibilities of the under-flux are-welding process for wheel rebuilding, although at that time, little or no work had been done on multiple pass or "build-up" welding with the underflux arc. Work with this process had been confined largely to welding together flat plates in a "down hand" position. Possibilities for savings were intensified by the fact that the company has 300 locomotives in operation, using actively or as spares 1200 sets of wheels. During 1942 and 1943, about 500 sets of wheels were sent each year to the company's maintenance shop at Library, Pa., for rebuilding. Based on having 800 sets in service (many of the company's heavy locomotives have three sets of trucks), the average life of a set of wheels was approximately 19 months. Anything that could be done to increase wheel life promised sizable annual savings. Open Arc Welding With the open arc process, a set of wheels could be rebuilt for about 40 pet of the cost' of new wheels. Underflux arc welding gave promise of greatly increased welding speeds, more homogeneous, dense deposits and the chance for use of a wider range in welding-wire compositions. Against this was ranged the higher cost of materials and the cost of developing the process from the theory to a practical reality. Since 1927, when a single open arc head was placed in operation, fixed welding procedures had been gradually developed, a positioner for handling a set of wheels was built, and a second head was placed in operation in order to weld two wheels simultaneously. The fixture, or positioner, which was built to position and turn the wheels under the two welding heads, included a motor drive, controlled by a rheostat, which rotated the wheels through a double set of speed reducers and a removable jaw coupling attached to one end of the axle of the wheel truck.

Jan 1, 1947

By C. D. Ramsden

During the war years of 1941 to 1945, maintenance of mine locomotives and other mine equipment took the form of rebuilding rather than of renewing. Purchase of new parts became increasingly difficult and mine operators found it necessary to maintain equipment by salvaging old parts. Mine-locomotive wheels, although not representing a high cost per pound of material, contain a considerable amount of steel and without rebuilding would have to be scrapped long before even a moderate percentage of the steel in the wheel is actually consumed. Many mine operators have been rebuilding locomotive wheels for several years with automatic open are-welding equipment. In 1927, the Pittsburgh Coal Co. started such a program, using a single Westinghouse automatic welding head. Since that time, many refinements have been added, until in 1944 the setup was operating very efficiently. A desire to increase wheel life and to hold down rising costs led the company in 1944 to investigate the possibilities of the under-flux are-welding process for wheel rebuilding, although at that time, little or no work had been done on multiple pass or "build-up" welding with the underflux arc. Work with this process had been confined largely to welding together flat plates in a "down hand" position. Possibilities for savings were intensified by the fact that the company has 300 locomotives in operation, using actively or as spares 1200 sets of wheels. During 1942 and 1943, about 500 sets of wheels were sent each year to the company's maintenance shop at Library, Pa., for rebuilding. Based on having 800 sets in service (many of the company's heavy locomotives have three sets of trucks), the average life of a set of wheels was approximately 19 months. Anything that could be done to increase wheel life promised sizable annual savings. Open Arc Welding With the open arc process, a set of wheels could be rebuilt for about 40 pet of the cost' of new wheels. Underflux arc welding gave promise of greatly increased welding speeds, more homogeneous, dense deposits and the chance for use of a wider range in welding-wire compositions. Against this was ranged the higher cost of materials and the cost of developing the process from the theory to a practical reality. Since 1927, when a single open arc head was placed in operation, fixed welding procedures had been gradually developed, a positioner for handling a set of wheels was built, and a second head was placed in operation in order to weld two wheels simultaneously. The fixture, or positioner, which was built to position and turn the wheels under the two welding heads, included a motor drive, controlled by a rheostat, which rotated the wheels through a double set of speed reducers and a removable jaw coupling attached to one end of the axle of the wheel truck.

Jan 1, 1947

By T. Reed Scollon

Coal reserves of the Rocky Mountain area are vast and are more than adequate to meet significantly increasing demands in the immediate future. Practically all of the increase in coal demand for the next decade or so will be in the electric power utility sector. All ranks of coal are available in the area, and from a technological viewpoint, all are suitable for electric power generation. Location of economically recoverable coal deposits, location of generating plants with respect to power demand areas and sources of cooling water, and availability and price of other fuels are the major factors which, individually or in combination, will determine the ultimate selection of Western coal deposits to be developed for electric power generation. The low sulfur content of most western coals and the non-urban location of many power plants should tend to minimize problems of air pollution. If projections for nuclear power prove correct, increases in demand for Rocky Mountain area coals beyond about 1980 will depend primarily on the extent of commercial development of synthetic fuel processes. Current research activities on the conversion of coal to liquid and gaseous fuels are promising. Most western coals range in rank from lignite through high-volatile bituminous coals and are particularly amenable to conversion. Vast reserves of Rocky Mountain coals have long lain dormant primarily because of their remoteness from major market areas. Recently, however, innovations in coal transportation and electric power transmission methods, combined with unprecedented demands for electric power in the West, have resulted in large-scale development of some of these coals. In the past few years, announcements of coal mine openings and transportation plans in the Southwest have been filled with superlatives: The Navajo mine in northwest New Mexico is expected to be the largest mine in the country in the near future. The largest single coal agreement ever made provides for coal shipment from northeast Arizona to Nevada via the largest and longest coal-slurry pipeline ever used. An 1100-mile haul of coking coal from northern New Mexico to California by unit train began last year. It is the purpose of this report to evaluate the coal resources of the Rocky Mountain area, and to project their potential utilization. In projecting energy demand levels on a national basis, the Bureau of Mines has developed some rather complex techniques to cope with uncertainties. Using these same techniques, an estimate has been made of consumption of Mountain area coal in 1980. No attempt was made to estimate coal consumption beyond 1980, but new market potentials are discussed briefly. The present and potential coal-producing fields of the Rocky Mountain area are in six states comprising the Mountain Region - Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Since approximately 19% of the coal produced in these fields is shipped to the Pacific Region (Washington, Oregon, Cali-

Jan 1, 1969

By Walter Miller

A surprising development during the year was the continued high demand for petroleum products and the high level of crude oil charges to the stills. Generally speaking, the petroleum industry during 1946 succeeded in producing a greater quantity of crude oil and petroleum products than in any of the war years, and considerably exceeded the production of any prewar year. Daily crude still charges averaged between 4,700,000 and 4,800,000 bbl per day for 1946 and about equaled the 1945 record, although most pessimistic 1945 guesses, predictions, or fears ranged, for 1946, from only 3,900,000 to 4,400,000 bbl per day. In spite of the high crude charge to the stills, total stock of crude oil was higher at the end of the year by some 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 bbl. A similar story holds regarding stocks of the principal refined products. Gasoline on hand at year's end was two to three million barrels lower, and was considered low for the expected demand during the coming high consuming season, while stocks of light and heavy fuel oils, although some higher than a year previous, hardly reached a comfortable level. The trend in gasoline of high octane number, which has resulted in a marked rise in. the antiknock quality by the end of 1945 (five or six numbers higher than during the war and one number higher than the prewar quality of civilian motor gasoline of 1941) was abruptly arrested by an acute shortage of metallic lead for manufacturing tetraethyl lead. Government action in the form of lead price control, rationing, and the setting of octane ceiling specifications to conform to the reduced ethyl lead compound available were enforced until abrogated at the end of the year. It will be interesting to see how rapidly the octane levels will resume the rising trend, as more metallic lead slowly becomes available for making greater quantities of ethyl lead compound. As octane quality rises over present levels the disadvantage of the refiner without catalytic cracking equipment will increase. Gasoline made by catalytic cracking, without addition of ethyl lead, approximates 77 octane by the official ASTM Motor Method test, compared with 66 for gasoline generally similar in volatility made by the older thermal cracking operation. Catalytic gasoline shows an even greater improvement in the Research octane number, the comparison being roughly 86 Research versus 71 Research octane for the thermal cracked product. This higher differential in Research octane is credited by many, although not universally so, as contributing to better road performance, and consequently resulting in a more desirable product marketwise. In some parts of the country a premium of roughly one fourth cent per gallon is now being paid for gasoline with higher Research octane made possible by including catalytic cracked product in the final blends. If such price differentials in favor of catalytic gaso-

Jan 1, 1947

By Walter Miller

A surprising development during the year was the continued high demand for petroleum products and the high level of crude oil charges to the stills. Generally speaking, the petroleum industry during 1946 succeeded in producing a greater quantity of crude oil and petroleum products than in any of the war years, and considerably exceeded the production of any prewar year. Daily crude still charges averaged between 4,700,000 and 4,800,000 bbl per day for 1946 and about equaled the 1945 record, although most pessimistic 1945 guesses, predictions, or fears ranged, for 1946, from only 3,900,000 to 4,400,000 bbl per day. In spite of the high crude charge to the stills, total stock of crude oil was higher at the end of the year by some 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 bbl. A similar story holds regarding stocks of the principal refined products. Gasoline on hand at year's end was two to three million barrels lower, and was considered low for the expected demand during the coming high consuming season, while stocks of light and heavy fuel oils, although some higher than a year previous, hardly reached a comfortable level. The trend in gasoline of high octane number, which has resulted in a marked rise in. the antiknock quality by the end of 1945 (five or six numbers higher than during the war and one number higher than the prewar quality of civilian motor gasoline of 1941) was abruptly arrested by an acute shortage of metallic lead for manufacturing tetraethyl lead. Government action in the form of lead price control, rationing, and the setting of octane ceiling specifications to conform to the reduced ethyl lead compound available were enforced until abrogated at the end of the year. It will be interesting to see how rapidly the octane levels will resume the rising trend, as more metallic lead slowly becomes available for making greater quantities of ethyl lead compound. As octane quality rises over present levels the disadvantage of the refiner without catalytic cracking equipment will increase. Gasoline made by catalytic cracking, without addition of ethyl lead, approximates 77 octane by the official ASTM Motor Method test, compared with 66 for gasoline generally similar in volatility made by the older thermal cracking operation. Catalytic gasoline shows an even greater improvement in the Research octane number, the comparison being roughly 86 Research versus 71 Research octane for the thermal cracked product. This higher differential in Research octane is credited by many, although not universally so, as contributing to better road performance, and consequently resulting in a more desirable product marketwise. In some parts of the country a premium of roughly one fourth cent per gallon is now being paid for gasoline with higher Research octane made possible by including catalytic cracked product in the final blends. If such price differentials in favor of catalytic gaso-

Jan 1, 1947

By Walter Miller

During the second year of America's active ia in the war the inain objectives of the petroleum-refining industry were again to provide the four most important product needs for war: 100-octane aviation gasoline, toluene for T.N.T. production, high-quality lubricating oils for the needs of aviation and the armed forces, and petroleum chemicals for synthetic rubber manufacture. All other materials supplied by the petroleum industry took an inferior priority ranking, depending on the degree of essentiality. To accomplish the above objectives the industry initiated and carried on a building program during 1942 and 1943 which will put those two years down in petroleum-refining history as the greatest construction years of all time, a record which will hold for decades to come. Led by an estimated total of $ 900,000,000 going into 100-octane and contributory plant investment, it is easy to picture a total of two billion dollars and more going into additional refining-industry plant investment during 1942 and 1943, most of it privately paid for, but a substantial part covered by R.F.C. Government money financing. Some of the new plants will not be completed until 1944, but a large proportion of the program was finished and put into operation, adding substantially to the output of the four principal products during 1943- lne most important and spectacuiar activity of the refining industry is of course the 100-octane gasoline program necessitated by the fact that nearly 90 per cent of the requirements of the United Nations is being furnished by the United States. Recent P.A.W. figures mention $goo,-ooo,ooo as the cost of the construction looking to increasing the output of this all-important munition. Thirty-four major plants have been completed, 11 of them during the last quarter of the year. Thirty-eight more will be completed and put into operation during the first four or five months of 1944. Twenty-two additional plants authorized during 1943 are already well under way and scheduled for production late in 1944. Early in 1942 the aim was to treble the capacity for making 100-octane gasoline then existing; later, plans were to make it five times as great, to match the increased warplane building program; and toward the end of the year the sights had been set at a still higher but unannounced target, representing six to seven times the early 1942 figure. Comparative figures issued at the end of 1943 enable one to guess a program by the middle of 1944 of eight to nine times the former production, with an ultimate production in 1944 of eleven or more times the early 1942 output. It became obvious in 1943 that building of new units would be materially slowed because of delay in getting construction materials and that they would reach operation at considerably later dates than

Jan 1, 1944

By Theron Wasson

The oil and gas fields of Michigan that have been under development since 1925 are in an area that extends across the middle of the lower peninsula from northeast to southwest, a distance of about 200 miles, and with a width of about 80 miles. In 19 years 70 fields have been discovered. Most of these are relatively small when compared with other oil-producing areas. This is borne out by the fact that since the first wells were drilled these fields have produced a total of only 204,000,000 bbl. However, Michigan is still maintaining its production, for during the past five years the annual production has remained fairly constant at approximately 20,000,000 bbl. Production for 1943, as reported by the Bureau of Mines, was 20,682,000 barrels. Roughly, one third oi Michigan's production in 1943 came from the Reed City field, which was discovered in 1941. During the year, 237 oil wells were completed in Michigan in 1943. The decrease of 56 from the 1942 total is probably due to the continuance of Government regulations requiring a 40-acre spacing pattern over most of the state. Fig. I shows the principal oil and gas fields of Michigan, and the columnar section, Fig. 2, shows the principal producing horizons in relation to the section drilled. The data of Table I and Table 2 have been carefully checked with previous reports to eliminate errors. Six new producing areas were discovered during 1943 and five areas discovered in 1942 were developed during the year. Both the new discoveries and the 1942 discoveries that were developed appear to be small and relatively unimportant. Goodwell Field.—The best discovery of the year is the Goodwell field, T. 14 N., R. 11 W., Goodwell township, Newaygo County. This small structure was located by core testing done by The Pure Oil Co. in 1942 and early 1943. The first producing well, C. R. Harris No. I, was completed on July 5, 1943, ill the Traverse limestone at a total depth of 2742 ft., with ail estimated potential of 1100 bbl. per day. By the end of the year, 18 wells had been completed in this field and approximately 281,000 bbl. of oil produced. The field operated under proration of 262 bbl. per day per well from Oct. I to Dec. I; 150 bbl. per day per well after that date. Woodville Field.—The small Woodville pool, T. 15 N., R. 11 W., 3 miles north of the Goodwell field, was discovered by core testing by the Ohio Oil Co. The discovery well was completed on May 5, 1943, flowing 650 bbl. of fluid, including 18 per cent salt water the first 18 hr., from the Traverse limestone at a depth of 2810 to 2815 ft. Seven wells had been completed by the end of the year and 67,000 bbl. of oil had been produced. Development is now practically at a standstill because further drilling does not aDDear economically iustified.

Jan 1, 1944

By Theron Wasson

The oil and gas fields of Michigan that have been under development since 1925 are in an area that extends across the middle of the lower peninsula from northeast to southwest, a distance of about 200 miles, and with a width of about 80 miles. In 19 years 70 fields have been discovered. Most of these are relatively small when compared with other oil-producing areas. This is borne out by the fact that since the first wells were drilled these fields have produced a total of only 204,000,000 bbl. However, Michigan is still maintaining its production, for during the past five years the annual production has remained fairly constant at approximately 20,000,000 bbl. Production for 1943, as reported by the Bureau of Mines, was 20,682,000 barrels. Roughly, one third oi Michigan's production in 1943 came from the Reed City field, which was discovered in 1941. During the year, 237 oil wells were completed in Michigan in 1943. The decrease of 56 from the 1942 total is probably due to the continuance of Government regulations requiring a 40-acre spacing pattern over most of the state. Fig. I shows the principal oil and gas fields of Michigan, and the columnar section, Fig. 2, shows the principal producing horizons in relation to the section drilled. The data of Table I and Table 2 have been carefully checked with previous reports to eliminate errors. Six new producing areas were discovered during 1943 and five areas discovered in 1942 were developed during the year. Both the new discoveries and the 1942 discoveries that were developed appear to be small and relatively unimportant. Goodwell Field.—The best discovery of the year is the Goodwell field, T. 14 N., R. 11 W., Goodwell township, Newaygo County. This small structure was located by core testing done by The Pure Oil Co. in 1942 and early 1943. The first producing well, C. R. Harris No. I, was completed on July 5, 1943, ill the Traverse limestone at a total depth of 2742 ft., with ail estimated potential of 1100 bbl. per day. By the end of the year, 18 wells had been completed in this field and approximately 281,000 bbl. of oil produced. The field operated under proration of 262 bbl. per day per well from Oct. I to Dec. I; 150 bbl. per day per well after that date. Woodville Field.—The small Woodville pool, T. 15 N., R. 11 W., 3 miles north of the Goodwell field, was discovered by core testing by the Ohio Oil Co. The discovery well was completed on May 5, 1943, flowing 650 bbl. of fluid, including 18 per cent salt water the first 18 hr., from the Traverse limestone at a depth of 2810 to 2815 ft. Seven wells had been completed by the end of the year and 67,000 bbl. of oil had been produced. Development is now practically at a standstill because further drilling does not aDDear economically iustified.

Jan 1, 1944

By Walter Miller

During the second year of America's active ia in the war the inain objectives of the petroleum-refining industry were again to provide the four most important product needs for war: 100-octane aviation gasoline, toluene for T.N.T. production, high-quality lubricating oils for the needs of aviation and the armed forces, and petroleum chemicals for synthetic rubber manufacture. All other materials supplied by the petroleum industry took an inferior priority ranking, depending on the degree of essentiality. To accomplish the above objectives the industry initiated and carried on a building program during 1942 and 1943 which will put those two years down in petroleum-refining history as the greatest construction years of all time, a record which will hold for decades to come. Led by an estimated total of $ 900,000,000 going into 100-octane and contributory plant investment, it is easy to picture a total of two billion dollars and more going into additional refining-industry plant investment during 1942 and 1943, most of it privately paid for, but a substantial part covered by R.F.C. Government money financing. Some of the new plants will not be completed until 1944, but a large proportion of the program was finished and put into operation, adding substantially to the output of the four principal products during 1943- lne most important and spectacuiar activity of the refining industry is of course the 100-octane gasoline program necessitated by the fact that nearly 90 per cent of the requirements of the United Nations is being furnished by the United States. Recent P.A.W. figures mention $goo,-ooo,ooo as the cost of the construction looking to increasing the output of this all-important munition. Thirty-four major plants have been completed, 11 of them during the last quarter of the year. Thirty-eight more will be completed and put into operation during the first four or five months of 1944. Twenty-two additional plants authorized during 1943 are already well under way and scheduled for production late in 1944. Early in 1942 the aim was to treble the capacity for making 100-octane gasoline then existing; later, plans were to make it five times as great, to match the increased warplane building program; and toward the end of the year the sights had been set at a still higher but unannounced target, representing six to seven times the early 1942 figure. Comparative figures issued at the end of 1943 enable one to guess a program by the middle of 1944 of eight to nine times the former production, with an ultimate production in 1944 of eleven or more times the early 1942 output. It became obvious in 1943 that building of new units would be materially slowed because of delay in getting construction materials and that they would reach operation at considerably later dates than

Jan 1, 1944

By Norman Weiss

The need for more efficient utilization of labor in the metal-mining industry has been the subject of several recent editorials in the mining press, and one attractive possibility for such improvement lies in the designing of future milling plants particularly with economy of manpower in mind. We are accustomed to think of mill design as the selection and coordinated arrangement of process equipment, but if labor is to be efficiently utilized it must be given early consideration in planning the new mill. There are three good reasons for economizing in labor: (I) to reduce costs, not only in the form of wages but also in housing, hospital, welfare, and other obligations that a company accepts when a new man is added to the payroll; (2) to prepare for recurrent periods of manpower shortage, during which a well-designed plant can manage to get along with skeleton crews; (3) because a milling plant that must depend upon an inordinately large labor force for its operation and maintenance is certain to be inefficient in other respects, for many of the shortcomings in design that make necessary the excessive use of labor are generally not corrected merely by having too many men. A simple example of this is a poorly designed ore-feeding system : if this is inadequate to the extent that one man must be constantly unclogging feed chutes, it may help the situation to put two men or three at this task instead of one, but the feed rate will still be inconstant. First of the factors that affect labor saving is the location of the mill. This is often determined by transportation costs alone, and as a result the mill may be placed close to the mine regardless of the nature of the terrain. The designer must then adapt his layout to the conditions, favorable or not. This happens often at small properties, where capital investment may seem more important than operating expense. In most instances, however, a mill site carefully selected for the advantages it gives the designer in laying out the plant is the most economical in the long run, even if it involves a slight increase in cost of ore haulage. Given some freedom of choice, the design engineer may be able to find just the piece of ground that provides the proper gradient for the needs of the flowsheet, permits installation of essential yards and trackage, and perhaps supplies an excellent site for a tailing dam. Further justification for having placed the mill not too close to the mine sometimes emerges only years later as an opportunity to treat ores from other properties. When it is known from the beginning that the new mill will serve a number of scattered mines, a free choice of mill site is naturally stimulated. The most important single factor in limiting the labor requirements of a mill is its materials-handling system for bring-

Jan 1, 1947

By James W. Halley

"Fine-grained" steels have been standard products for many years. This paper describes an investigation of the effects of some of the more common grain-growth inhibitors used to produce these steels. The properties, response to heat-treatment, and the deoxidation practice necessary to produce "fine-grained" steels have been the subjects of numerous papers. It has been shown that a substantial quantity of aluminum is necessary to produce this type of steel, and it has been indicated that titanium and zirconium produce a similar result. For some time there was a lively argument between those who felt that aluminum refined the grain and those who felt that aluminum oxide was the effective agent. This argument subsided with an apparent victory for those promoting aluminum oxide. Most of the work on grain size has divided steels into two broad classifications based upon McQuaid and Ehn's original carburizing test at 1700°F or some similar test at this temperature. If the steel coarsened at this temperature, it was coarse grained, while if it did not it was he grained. Quantitative data concerning how much a certain amount of aluminum raised the coarsening temperature and affected the properties, all other factors being constant, are very meager. Similar information regarding titanium and zirconium is practically nonexistent. The published information on aluminum yields some quantitative information. Epstein, Nead and Washburn' gave the first quantitative information on the amount of aluminum necessary to prevent grain growth at 1700°F. They showed that the addition of a pound to a pound and a half of aluminum per ton (0.05 to 0.075 per cent) would assure steel that would not coarsen during a McQuaid-Ehn test at 1700°F. Herty, McBride and Houghg reported that a steel containing 0.020 per cent acid-soluble aluminum coarsened between 1742° and 1832°F., while steels containing 0.016 per cent and 0.017 per cent acid-soluble aluminum coarsened between 1652° and 1742°F. compared with similar aluminum-free steels that started to coarsen at 1580°F. Herty3 also showed a marked improvebent in low-temperature notched impact resistance with increasing acid-soluble aluminum up to 0.030 per cent. McQuaid4 compared the coarsening of steels containing 0.011 to 0.204 per cent total aluminum and found a maximum coarsening temperature at 0.098 per cent aluminum. He had no samples between 0.015 and 0.098 per cent aluminum. Houdrement6 found a marked decrease in coarsening temperature with aluminum contents above 0.50 per cent. Kinzel, Crafts and Egan6 found that aluminum and zirconium improved the low-temperature impact resistance of a low-alloy steel, while titanium was detrimental. Sims7 shows that sulphur increases the coarsening temperature and that the maximum coarsening temperature is between 0.04 and 0.06 per cent added aluminum. The fact that the coarsening temperature passes through a maximum with increasing aluminum content appears to be well established. The aluminum content that

Jan 1, 1947

By Norman Weiss

The need for more efficient utilization of labor in the metal-mining industry has been the subject of several recent editorials in the mining press, and one attractive possibility for such improvement lies in the designing of future milling plants particularly with economy of manpower in mind. We are accustomed to think of mill design as the selection and coordinated arrangement of process equipment, but if labor is to be efficiently utilized it must be given early consideration in planning the new mill. There are three good reasons for economizing in labor: (I) to reduce costs, not only in the form of wages but also in housing, hospital, welfare, and other obligations that a company accepts when a new man is added to the payroll; (2) to prepare for recurrent periods of manpower shortage, during which a well-designed plant can manage to get along with skeleton crews; (3) because a milling plant that must depend upon an inordinately large labor force for its operation and maintenance is certain to be inefficient in other respects, for many of the shortcomings in design that make necessary the excessive use of labor are generally not corrected merely by having too many men. A simple example of this is a poorly designed ore-feeding system : if this is inadequate to the extent that one man must be constantly unclogging feed chutes, it may help the situation to put two men or three at this task instead of one, but the feed rate will still be inconstant. First of the factors that affect labor saving is the location of the mill. This is often determined by transportation costs alone, and as a result the mill may be placed close to the mine regardless of the nature of the terrain. The designer must then adapt his layout to the conditions, favorable or not. This happens often at small properties, where capital investment may seem more important than operating expense. In most instances, however, a mill site carefully selected for the advantages it gives the designer in laying out the plant is the most economical in the long run, even if it involves a slight increase in cost of ore haulage. Given some freedom of choice, the design engineer may be able to find just the piece of ground that provides the proper gradient for the needs of the flowsheet, permits installation of essential yards and trackage, and perhaps supplies an excellent site for a tailing dam. Further justification for having placed the mill not too close to the mine sometimes emerges only years later as an opportunity to treat ores from other properties. When it is known from the beginning that the new mill will serve a number of scattered mines, a free choice of mill site is naturally stimulated. The most important single factor in limiting the labor requirements of a mill is its materials-handling system for bring-

Jan 1, 1947

By W. C. Muehlhof, L. D. Lamont

THROUGHOUT the anthracite industry's history, the problem of handling and dis¬posing of refuse material has been one of major importance. In the early days of the industry's activities, only the large sizes of anthracite were satisfactory for market requirements and the smaller sizes were deposited as refuse. As time went by, more efficient coal-burning equipment was developed and a market demand was created for the finer sizes of coal. This demand made it possible to recover market¬able coal from banks deposited as refuse in the earlier days of mining. The same condition holds good today and we can see a definite trend toward the objective of utilizing the No. 4 and No. 5 buckwheat sizes. Under present conditions, we know that a limited market exists for No. 4 and 5 buckwheat; we know that the finer sizes of anthracite can be burned as pulverized fuel; we know that these fine sizes can be processed and sold as bri¬quettes, and we also know that the heat content of these fine sizes of coal is compar¬able with that of the sizes now merchan¬dized. Therefore, it should be the objective of the industry to conserve these fine sizes of coal in such manner that if and when processing facilities are developed, and market demands exist, the material can be salvaged and made available to meet these demands. From the standpoint of economical future reclamation, the ideal method of disposing of refuse containing the finer sizes of coal is to deposit it in banks separate and apart from other breaker refuse. By this procedure, the minimum amount of material will be processed in future salvage operations to recover the No. 4 and No. 5 buckwheat sizes. Many collieries in the anthracite region are operated under leases that have a specific term. These lease agreements provide that, upon expiration of the lease by term, exhaustion or otherwise, the ownership of the refuse material reverts to the lessor. Therefore, a question was raised in the minds of these operators: Why should I assume the expense of such pro¬cedure when I have no assurance that I will benefit by the future processing and sale of these fine sizes? Under present conditions, the answer to this question is not one of choice but of necessity, as restrictions imposed by legislation make it mandatory on operators of preparation plants to take necessary steps to properly treat silt-laden waters before permitting them to enter the streams. By reason of these restrictions, the disposal of fine sizes becomes a secondary_ rather than a primary operating con sideration, and the procedure for disposing of this refuse becomes a matter of choice governed principally by topographical and geographical conditions. METHODS OF HANDLING REFUSE There are three principal methods of handling and disposing of fine-size refuse; namely :

Jan 1, 1946

By James W. Halley

"Fine-grained" steels have been standard products for many years. This paper describes an investigation of the effects of some of the more common grain-growth inhibitors used to produce these steels. The properties, response to heat-treatment, and the deoxidation practice necessary to produce "fine-grained" steels have been the subjects of numerous papers. It has been shown that a substantial quantity of aluminum is necessary to produce this type of steel, and it has been indicated that titanium and zirconium produce a similar result. For some time there was a lively argument between those who felt that aluminum refined the grain and those who felt that aluminum oxide was the effective agent. This argument subsided with an apparent victory for those promoting aluminum oxide. Most of the work on grain size has divided steels into two broad classifications based upon McQuaid and Ehn's original carburizing test at 1700°F or some similar test at this temperature. If the steel coarsened at this temperature, it was coarse grained, while if it did not it was he grained. Quantitative data concerning how much a certain amount of aluminum raised the coarsening temperature and affected the properties, all other factors being constant, are very meager. Similar information regarding titanium and zirconium is practically nonexistent. The published information on aluminum yields some quantitative information. Epstein, Nead and Washburn' gave the first quantitative information on the amount of aluminum necessary to prevent grain growth at 1700°F. They showed that the addition of a pound to a pound and a half of aluminum per ton (0.05 to 0.075 per cent) would assure steel that would not coarsen during a McQuaid-Ehn test at 1700°F. Herty, McBride and Houghg reported that a steel containing 0.020 per cent acid-soluble aluminum coarsened between 1742° and 1832°F., while steels containing 0.016 per cent and 0.017 per cent acid-soluble aluminum coarsened between 1652° and 1742°F. compared with similar aluminum-free steels that started to coarsen at 1580°F. Herty3 also showed a marked improvebent in low-temperature notched impact resistance with increasing acid-soluble aluminum up to 0.030 per cent. McQuaid4 compared the coarsening of steels containing 0.011 to 0.204 per cent total aluminum and found a maximum coarsening temperature at 0.098 per cent aluminum. He had no samples between 0.015 and 0.098 per cent aluminum. Houdrement6 found a marked decrease in coarsening temperature with aluminum contents above 0.50 per cent. Kinzel, Crafts and Egan6 found that aluminum and zirconium improved the low-temperature impact resistance of a low-alloy steel, while titanium was detrimental. Sims7 shows that sulphur increases the coarsening temperature and that the maximum coarsening temperature is between 0.04 and 0.06 per cent added aluminum. The fact that the coarsening temperature passes through a maximum with increasing aluminum content appears to be well established. The aluminum content that

Jan 1, 1947

By Raymond S. Weimer

OF the several characteristics of a coal that influence its suitability for use in a given piece of burning equipment, the clinkering and slagging characteristics of the ash of the coal are highly important. They determine the maximum rate at which the coal may be burned on a stoker or in pulverized form without difficulty from damage to metal parts, from erosion of refractory walls, or from stoppage of gas passages by accumulation on the tubes. They also determine the minimum rate at which a slag-tap furnace may be operated without difficulty in removal of the ash in fluid form. NEED FOR A BETTER CRITERION In common with other producers and users of coal, the Northern Illinois Coal Corporation has long used the available methods for the measurement of the clinkering characteristics of coal ash, chemical composition and fusion temperature of the ash, as criteria for the selection of coal that would suit the particular requirements of its customers. These two available criteria have greatly helped in the problem of selection but it is unnecessary to dwell upon the fact that they are not completely adequate for the purpose. The composition of the ash and its clinkering tendency vary widely over the company's mining area. In a certain period, some years ago, an unusual amount of severe clinkering of the ash of coal shipped made extremely acute the need for a better criterion of the clinkering that might be expected. It was also desirable that the criterion result from a reasonably rapid method, so that the clinkering characteristics of the coal would be known before shipment. Complaints on the severe clinkering of the ash came from only a fraction of the output of the mine but the occurrence of the clinkering seemed quite unpredictable. Attempts to relate the chemical composition of the ash and the fusion temperatures to the clinkering were unsuccessful. Coal from the area of the mine in which the fusion temperature of the ash was the lowest gave the least trouble from clinkering. Chemical analysis of the ash from that section giving the most trouble showed high contents of iron and low contents of silica, but frequently these were not greatly different from those of coals that gave little trouble from clinker. Aside from the clinkering difficulty, the coal was quite satisfactory. The ash content was normal and high rates of burning could be obtained, but again and again such severe clinkering would occur that the furnace would be shut down because of the accumulation of clinker. Examination of the clinker from the customers' plants showed that the clinkers that adhered to the grates and fouled the fuel beds were hard, flat, dense, and usually dark in color. Coal that was satisfactory gave clinkers that were softer, bulky rather than flat, of low density, and usually lighter in color.

Jan 1, 1944

By Walter Miller

Crude oil stocks were some 10,000,000 bbl higher on June I, 1947, than at any time during 1946 but the extremely heavy refinery runs the last half of 1947 cut crude inventories to approximately the 1946 closing level of 225,000,000 bbl. Many refiners were seriously short of crude oil during the year. This shortage was reflected in numerous advances in the posted price of crude, justified in part as an incentive for more production but more generally due to competitive bidding. Some purchasers of crude, endeavoring to keep their plants running, resorted to the payment, either directly or indirectly, of premiums above the posted price. Another common practice employed by some suppliers of crude oil was to demand refined products in exchange or trade for their raw material. The refined products picture has darkened in spite of record throughputs. Stocks of gasoline and light and heavy fuel oils were uncomfortably low at the beginning of the year and were in general still lower at the close. The rationing of some products, principally gasoline, to dealers and stations? initiated during the year, gained momentum as stocks continued to diminish. The emphasis placed by the manufacturers of oil-burning equipment on the convenience and economy of heating with oil, together with the tight situation in coal, has developed a tremendous demand for burning oils. Consumption of liquefied petroleum gas for domestic and household fuel had more than doubled in 1946 over 1943, and the demand seems to be limited only by the ability of the equipment builders to furnish necessary storage. transportation, and burning equipment. The supply situation is likely to become more acute in 1948. Demand for petroleum products is being pushed to new heights not only by the unprecedented domestic market but by a sudden and drastic upswing in estimates of military and governmental requirements. Additionally, oil exports are running far below the volume requested, amounting to less than forty percent in a recent quarter, and export licenses are reportedly being approved on the basis of urgent need *only. AX recent White House release sees little likelihood that estimated requirements of the sixteen nations participating in the proposed Marshall Plan can be met in full over its projected life—1948 to 1951. Present demand dictates maintenance of refinery operations at the highest possible level and the Bureau of Mines has forecast daily average crude runs in 1948 of 5,265,000 bbl. The Economics Advisory Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission recently estimated the 1948 demand for petroleum products at nearly 6 pct above 1947. They further estimate daily average crude runs of 5,375,000 bbl in 1948, some 2 pct higher than forecast by the Bureau of Mines. Projected demand exceeds supply to the extent that Capitol Hill is reportedly investigating ways of enabling oil companies to act in concert without danger of antitrust prosecution, such as elimination of crosshauls, pooling of products, and lowering of octane.

Jan 1, 1948

By Walter Miller

Crude oil stocks were some 10,000,000 bbl higher on June I, 1947, than at any time during 1946 but the extremely heavy refinery runs the last half of 1947 cut crude inventories to approximately the 1946 closing level of 225,000,000 bbl. Many refiners were seriously short of crude oil during the year. This shortage was reflected in numerous advances in the posted price of crude, justified in part as an incentive for more production but more generally due to competitive bidding. Some purchasers of crude, endeavoring to keep their plants running, resorted to the payment, either directly or indirectly, of premiums above the posted price. Another common practice employed by some suppliers of crude oil was to demand refined products in exchange or trade for their raw material. The refined products picture has darkened in spite of record throughputs. Stocks of gasoline and light and heavy fuel oils were uncomfortably low at the beginning of the year and were in general still lower at the close. The rationing of some products, principally gasoline, to dealers and stations? initiated during the year, gained momentum as stocks continued to diminish. The emphasis placed by the manufacturers of oil-burning equipment on the convenience and economy of heating with oil, together with the tight situation in coal, has developed a tremendous demand for burning oils. Consumption of liquefied petroleum gas for domestic and household fuel had more than doubled in 1946 over 1943, and the demand seems to be limited only by the ability of the equipment builders to furnish necessary storage. transportation, and burning equipment. The supply situation is likely to become more acute in 1948. Demand for petroleum products is being pushed to new heights not only by the unprecedented domestic market but by a sudden and drastic upswing in estimates of military and governmental requirements. Additionally, oil exports are running far below the volume requested, amounting to less than forty percent in a recent quarter, and export licenses are reportedly being approved on the basis of urgent need *only. AX recent White House release sees little likelihood that estimated requirements of the sixteen nations participating in the proposed Marshall Plan can be met in full over its projected life—1948 to 1951. Present demand dictates maintenance of refinery operations at the highest possible level and the Bureau of Mines has forecast daily average crude runs in 1948 of 5,265,000 bbl. The Economics Advisory Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission recently estimated the 1948 demand for petroleum products at nearly 6 pct above 1947. They further estimate daily average crude runs of 5,375,000 bbl in 1948, some 2 pct higher than forecast by the Bureau of Mines. Projected demand exceeds supply to the extent that Capitol Hill is reportedly investigating ways of enabling oil companies to act in concert without danger of antitrust prosecution, such as elimination of crosshauls, pooling of products, and lowering of octane.

Jan 1, 1948