Search Documents

By J. Elmer Thomas

If 1929 witnessed a growing realization on the part of the oil industry that supply must be balanced against demand, 1930 proved conclusively that excessive inventories constitute a price depressant even with balanced conditions. Increased attention was certainly paid to economic considerations last year, and the achievement of holding daily crude production, with a constantly mounting potential, to levels 500,000 bbl. below the output of the summer before, deserves special mention. The ill-advised accumulation, however, of gasoline stocks, at least 10,000,000 bbl. larger than necessary, nullified the restraint exercised by the producers and finally necessitated drastic downward price revisions. An event of special significance was the appointment by the Federal Oil Conservation Board, last March, of a temporary Committee on Petroleum Economics that attempted a forecast of demand, an estimate of supply, and an allocation of the latter between the principal producing states. Thus for the first time was an economic program for an entire basic industry drafted by an independent body under the auspices of the Federal Government. The report was widely discussed and generally approved, but its schedules were not adopted by the refining division nor by oil producers in the State of Texas until too late to contribute to the industry's prosperity during 1930. If the restraint of November had been exercised in May a profitable year might have been the result: The gasoline price war in California during June, however, illustrated the point that even with a fairly sound statistical position insistent pressure to expand normal marketing outlets must result in losses to all concerned. The balanced program so painfully attained by producers must be maintained by refiners and distributors to be completely effective. Again in November the Federal Oil Conservation Board, acting on the request of the directors of the American Petroleum Institute, called its Committee on Petroleum Economics back into existence to prepare a new estimate for the next six months. An economic program adopted in advance of the winter period of accumulating inventories may aid this large and essential industry toward the profits to which it is entitled

Jan 1, 1931

By H. J. Struth

The benefits of proration of oil production were perhaps more concretely realized in 1932 than at any time since the oil industry adopted nation-wide production control. Reduced output of crude petroleum, which brought the daily average of the United States down to approximately 2,000,000 bbl. from a peak in 1931 of more than 2,600,000, had a telling effect on the trend of oil prices. Mid-Continent crude was advanced in price from 776, for 36-gravity oil, to $1.04 a barrel. California crude, of 26-gravity at Signal Hill, moved forward from 736 to 976 a barrel. Pennsylvania crude, the only exception to the upward trend, rose in price from $1.82 per barrel to $2.02, only to react to $1.72. This was due to local conditions which necessitated an adjustment to overcome competition from other areas of the United States. East Texas continued to exert a far-reaching influence on the crude and gasoline market during 1932. Despite the fact that oil prices were advanced in most fields, large quantities of oil were produced in East Texas in violation of state proration orders, and sold in the market at prices considerably below official postings. This created competitive conditions in the gasoline market that were felt by all refining centers of the United States. The quantity of gasoline produced from cheap East Texas crude was not large, but the volume was sufficient to influence prices in practically all sections of the country. Thus, while the industry's' economic situation showed visible improvement statistically, the unreported and unseen statistics originating in East Texas proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the economic betterment that was otherwise apparently justified. Somewhat surprising to many was the fact that gasoline consumption was maintained within 10 per cent of the preceding year. Domestic consumption showed only a net decline under 1931 of about 8.5 per cent; exports dropped in volume to the extent of about 23 per cent. As a matter of fact, domestic gasoline consumption was only about 1.4 per cent less than it was in the predepression year of 1929. Exports, however,

Jan 1, 1933

By H. J. Wasson, L. W. Mayer

The existing large stocks of raw materials have induced misgivings in the minds of many as to near-view prospects for a return to higher commodity price levels. Until stocks are materially reduced—and this operation will probably extend over a protracted period—a buyers' market will continue. Meanwhile the matter of production cost becomes more and more a factor of consequence to industrial management, finance and the investing public. With many commodities a general level of costs exists with which the public has been made familiar. Certain conditions surround these industries which, at the outset, determine whether there is a basis for sound commercial results. In other words, it can generally be determined in advance whether or not the cost of production is sufficiently below the normal average price to return a reasonable profit over the years. With all domestic agricultural products there are available exhaustive Government studies in the field of production costs. Such figures as the average cost of wheat, cotton, sugar, etc., are reiterated constantly. There are many products of foreign origin such as coffee, rubber, raw silk, etc., the production costs of which are to most of us matters of deep mystery. Forest products also are so diversified that few but specialists know what a thousand feet of lumber really cost at the mill, especially where remotely located. However, with respect to products of mines, production cost information has been widely disseminated. The literature is replete with such data. Here we find that without any special help from outside agencies the industry itself has given publicity to a large variety of cost figures. For example, we know, or know where we can ascertain, the cost of producing a pound of copper from Chile, Arizona or the Lake Superior district. In many cases we can secure from the company reports a vast amount of detail leading up to the cost per ton of ore and the cost per unit of the metal yield. These records are of great assistance to the mining industry as a means of estimating on new exploitations. This industry has been production-cost-minded almost from the beginning.

Jan 1, 1931

By David Donoghue

Efforts made in the year 1930 and in previous years restricted production in most of the fields of Texas to a point that was satisfactory, at the beginning of 1931, to the majority of producers and buyers. In the Panhandle, North Texas and West Central Texas districts, a few operators with refinery affiliations or contracts either ignored, or by virtue of injunction suits, did not comply with the Railroad Commission's orders, and there was some oil sold at less than posted prices, which, with the Oklahoma City difficulties, caused the first general price reduction. More could have been done perhaps to help the situation on the Gulf Coast and in the Laredo district, but natural advantages are not readily surrendered. East Texas Proration troubles in 1930 were insignificant when compared with those of 1931. In January, 1931, efforts were begun to convince the producers and citizens of East Texas of the necessity of curtailment. Opposition quickly developed and meetings were held in the towns of the region and proration denounced vigorously. Notwithstanding a strenuous campaign for additional legislation waged by many producers, the regular session of the State Legislature refused to strengthen the conservation laws and passed only the Marginal Well Bill, designed to prevent the Commission from prorating small wells. The Railroad Commission held a heated hearing on East Texas in the latter part of March. During April the Commission issued three orders based on the Yates plan for the proration of the East Texas field. Each succeeding order raised the allowable for the field. In June the opposition held more mass meetings at which a plan based on acreage was endorsed. Apparently on the theory that any plan was better than none, the Commission issued an order on July 2 embodying some of the features of the proposed plan, limiting production to 250,000 bbl. per day, and dividing the producing area into 20-acre units participating equally in the outlet. Owing to the bringing in of many wells and the many violators of the Commission's orders, production increased to such an extent that prices went as low as 5c per barrel.

Jan 1, 1932

By Armando M. Lago

Secular and cyclical patterns of postwar sources and uses of funds of the mineral sector are analyzed. A simultaneous equation behavior model of sources and uses of funds is developed for both mining firms and integrated producers, and these models were put through the task of predicting the financial and expenditure be-havior of mineral corporations in response to mergers and changes in investment tax credits and depletion allowances. Finally, the quantitative analysis methodology is applied to the analysis of optimum capital structure of mining corporations. The postwar changes that have occurred in the expenditure and financial behavior of mineral corporations are reviewed, particularly the relative importance of factors that affect the industry's supply and demand for funds. This quantitative statistical investigation of factors affecting sources and uses of funds of mineral corporations is achieved through the formulation of a simultaneous equation model of sources and uses of funds. After a description of the study sample, the postwar cyclical and secular financial behavior of mineral corporations is analyzed in detail. An econometric model of mineral corporate financial behavior is formulated. This model is then estimated and reviewed. Policy issues regarding depletion allowances, investment tax credits, and industrial organization of the mineral sector are discussed. Finally, the optimum financial structure of mining firms is discussed and the effect of corporate financial structure on the mining corporations' average cost of capital is analyzed.

Jan 1, 1971

By Howard N. Eavenson

One who has been trained in belief in the law of supply and demand and its effect upon prices finds it difficult to adjust himself to the minute regulations imposed by the New Deal, and also to the bewildering changes of government policy as expressed within a short period of time between the antitrust laws and the N.R.A., and later by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. A survey of the coal industry since the World War, both in this country and Great Britain, however, shows that regulation of some sort is needed if any stabilization is to be achieved and if the wage structure and economic welfare of the many communities dependent solely upon coal are to be maintained. Let us look at what has happened to the industry since 1920, which can be considered as the end of the period affected by the war influence. This discussion will be confined solely to bituminous coal, although many of the general conditions are equally applicable to anthracite, the position of which now is at least as bad as that of the softer variety. Since 1920—to the end of 1934—the production of coal has decreased from 568.7 million to 358.4 million tons, or 37 per cent; the number of mines from 14,766 to 6,258, or 58 per cent; the average annual production per mine has changed from 38,512 to 57,425 tons, or 50 per cent. The number of large mines has increased considerably, and the number of men employed has decreased from 639,547 to 458,011, a reduction of 28 per cent, while the average output per employee has changed from 4.0 to 4.4 tons, or an increase of 10 per cent. The average price per ton of coal at the mine has varied from $3.75 to $1.75. During that time wages decreased largely until 1933 and since that time have increased, until now the rates paid are considerably above those in other occupations, although the actual yearly earnings are low, because of part-time work. From 1920 to the signing of the Jacksonville wage agreement in 1924, about two-thirds of the men were union members and practically all of the nonunion mines were south of the Ohio River; with the fixing of the high wage scale of that agreement, which soon proved to be an uneconomic one, many of the mines found that they could not retain their business, so gradually changed to nonunion. By 1928 the proportion

Jan 1, 1936

By Howard N. Eavenson

One who has been trained in belief in the law of supply and demand and its effect upon prices finds it difficult to adjust himself to the minute regulations imposed by the New Deal, and also to the bewildering changes of government policy as expressed within a short period of time between the antitrust laws and the N.R.A., and later by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. A survey of the coal industry since the World War, both in this country and Great Britain, however, shows that regulation of some sort is needed if any stabilization is to be achieved and if the wage structure and economic welfare of the many communities dependent solely upon coal are to be maintained. Let us look at what has happened to the industry since 1920, which can be considered as the end of the period affected by the war influence. This discussion will be confined solely to bituminous coal, although many of the general conditions are equally applicable to anthracite, the position of which now is at least as bad as that of the softer variety. Since 1920—to the end of 1934—the production of coal has decreased from 568.7 million to 358.4 million tons, or 37 per cent; the number of mines from 14,766 to 6,258, or 58 per cent; the average annual production per mine has changed from 38,512 to 57,425 tons, or 50 per cent. The number of large mines has increased considerably, and the number of men employed has decreased from 639,547 to 458,011, a reduction of 28 per cent, while the average output per employee has changed from 4.0 to 4.4 tons, or an increase of 10 per cent. The average price per ton of coal at the mine has varied from $3.75 to $1.75. During that time wages decreased largely until 1933 and since that time have increased, until now the rates paid are considerably above those in other occupations, although the actual yearly earnings are low, because of part-time work. From 1920 to the signing of the Jacksonville wage agreement in 1924, about two-thirds of the men were union members and practically all of the nonunion mines were south of the Ohio River; with the fixing of the high wage scale of that agreement, which soon proved to be an uneconomic one, many of the mines found that they could not retain their business, so gradually changed to nonunion. By 1928 the proportion

Jan 1, 1936

By DeVerle P. Harris

Risk for most mineral investments is greater than that of average business ventures, because the physical and economic characteristics of the mineral deposit are never known with certainty. Inasmuch as the merits of a potential mineral investment cannot be fully appraised without consideration of the impact to the investor of the possible unfavorable events associated with the adoption of the project, methods of risk analysis are important in project evaluation and investment selection. The conceptual framework for risk analysis and the means by which some of the recommended practices might be implemented are examined. In addition to the normal business risk due to market forces, the physical and economic characteristics of the mineral deposit are never known with certainty, for only partial or indirect information is available, such as data from drill cores or surface and underground workings. Consequently, risk for most mineral investments is greater than that of average business ventures. Inasmuch as the merits of a potential mineral investment cannot be fully appraised without consideration of the impact to the investor of the possible unfavorable events associated with adoption of the project, methods of risk analysis are important in project evaluation and investment selection. This paper examines the conceptual framework for risk analysis and means by which might be implemented some of the recommended procedures. Utility Theory A discourse on risk and its impact upon investment selection quite often leads the reader into the concept of utility theory, for utility theory is a device constructed by economists to measure the satisfaction an individuai receives from a good; in the case of investment analysis, that good is the outcome of an investment. It briefly is reviewed here to describe the reaction of the individual to risk and as a stepping stone to other techniques more suited to risk analysis at the level of the firm. Utility theory proposes that an investor possess a utility map (curve), such as indicated in Fig. 1, which indicates the value in utiles of potential monetary rewards to an individual with some specific endowment of resources. Points on this map are obtained from the following relationship:

Jan 1, 1971

By E. B. Swanson

Frequent reference has been made to the increased domestic gasoline demand recorded for 1931. This increase was in the neighborhood of 7,000,000 bbl. Although smaller relatively than that to which the oil industry had become accustomed by virtue of the experience of preceding years, the increase was of substantial amount, particularly at a time when any increase at all could be regarded with eminent satisfaction. Less has been said, however, of the 18,000,000 bbl. decline in gasoline shipments to territories and foreign countries. When the loss of business outside the United States is combined with the domestic increase, there results a net loss of some 11,000,000 bbl. in total gasoline demand. The gain of 2 per cent in domestic sales gives way to a loss of 2.5 per cent in total domestic and foreign sales. The United States actually has been losing ground in the international gasoline market since 1924, when shipments from this country equaled 72 per cent of the gasoline shipments from the leading gasoline-producing countries of the world. A loss in relative standing was recorded with each succeeding year. As long, however, as gasoline shipments showed an actual increase, the loss in relative standing was of little concern. Foreign producing centers annually supplied an increasing share of the foreign gasoline markets, but, until the past year, the demand abroad continued to increase at a pace which could accommodate all of the increased output of foreign plants and yet require increasing quantities from the United States. It was not until 1931 that the various factors were combined so as to produce an actual and substantial decrease in the foreign demand for United States gasoline. Consumption in foreign countries generally declined, while the output of foreign refineries and the foreign manufacture of substitute fuels continued to increase. From our own viewpoint, this meant a loss of some 18,000,000 bbl. of gasoline business in foreign countries, one-half of it probably due to the lowering in foreign demand and the other half to the increased output of foreign refineries and the increased utilization of substitute fuels.

Jan 1, 1932

By A. Weiss, W. A. Coster

The search for ore is characterized by a great variety of uncertainties, each of which can be resolved by obtaining information at a cost. Three exploration stages may be distinguished in which information can be obtained, based on inherently different cost structure: 1) the reconnaissance or scanning stage, 2) the examination or screening stage and 3) the project stage. This exploration sequence would roughly coincide with replies to questions as to: where, how, why and how much. As complete information in each stage is too costly to acquire, we must assess the probability that adequate information will be furnished by a limited amount of effort and attempt to maximize the expected value of ore to be found for a given exploration expenditure. Several problems are discussed relative to the mathematical formulation and possible computer procedures for determining the optimum allocation of a total exploration effort. Based on the available literature possible solutions to this problem are indicated. When scanning through published literature on mineral exploration, it seems at first that there is little room for substantial and systematic improvements in the efficiency with which the problem of discovery of new ore deposits is presently being handled by large organizations active in exploration. It appears equally difficult to offer something relevantly new which could generate a break-through in exploration thinking and cause a marked improvement in the ratio of successful undertakings to the total exploration projects started. On the other hand, a number of experts in recent years have urged that the problems in prospecting be analyzed in a more skillful and sophisticated manner than in the past. Their thesis is based mainly on the premise that the cost of finding mineral deposits will increase with increasing technical difficulties. In present large-scale exploration ventures, especially in those regions where outcrops and immediately visible geologic evidence are scarce, older methods of prospecting are increasingly being replaced by more indirect and systematic geophysical and geochemical methods with more emphasis on correct statistical design of exploration patterns. It is perhaps the oil industry which has made the greatest strides in developing statistically, well justified patterns in its search for oil; possibly because oil seepages, as indicators of the presence of oil, left off at an earlier point in time than did outcrops as indicators of base metals. Among the pioneers in the field of statistics and operations research, as applied to mineral exploration, the excellent works of Allais, Slichter, Koop-man, Mickey, de Guhnin, Krumbein, Griffith, Sichel, Krige, de Wijs, and Matheron may be mentioned. It should, however, be pointed out that three subjects of basic importance to the allocation of exploration efforts have so far received only scant attention in published literature, even by the aforementioned authors. In the first place, a more precise definition of the object of the search, i.e., a minimum-size orebody, seems to be outstanding. Secondly, a decision model is not a widely-discussed subject. Thirdly, no concentrated attempt so far seems to have been made to establish probabilities of the occurrence of economic deposits on a regional scale and to arrive at a slightly more accurate knowledge of the probability laws governing the deposition of ore. It is not the purpose of this paper to create new order in the complexity of uncertainties in which our decision processes in exploration necessarily have to be conducted. Rather, we intend to highlight some of the outstanding, hitherto unmapped territory, where diligent compilation and a utilization of present and historic data may statistically improve our chances of success. We hope that the contribution of this paper will lie in bringing allocation problems into better focus and in increasing the mineral industry's realization of the magnitude of the factors involved. THE MINIMUM-SIZE OREBODY The concept of target specifications for what constitute a minimum-size orebody in exploration is a rather variable one and depends to some extent on

Jan 1, 1963

By Leonard Logan

The petroleum industry is not peculiar in that it has a problem of stabilization. Economic conditions, not only in the United States but throughout the entire world, are unstable. However, the petroleum industry together with coal mining and agriculture has experienced a longer period of depression than most of the others. It is significant to note that industries engaged in the production of basic raw materials, the primary industries, have not enjoyed as much prosperity since the war as the secondary industries, or those engaged in the fabricating of raw materials and their distribution. The problems of the primary industries are not all the same. Overproduction has existed for several years in agriculture but its causes are not the same as those that have brought about overproduction in the petroleum industry. Unlike agriculture, the institution of property rights and the migratory nature of oil are responsible for the oil man's troubles. Our laws permit the owner of the oil and gas rights, with certain exceptions, to drill when and where he pleases. Since oil is migratory, the adjacent property owner must go and do likewise—drill. This condition spread over a wide area soon brings to the surface more petroleum than can be readily absorbed by the market, creating a condition of overproduction. It is significant to note at this place that when overproduction occurs the complete units in the industry suffer least. A complete unit is taken here to mean a corporation engaged in all the phases of the industry through production, transportation, refining and marketing. In the present depression the complete units in the industry are not in as bad financial condition as those engaged in single phases of the industry. The same thing can be said of the zinc industry, the lumber industry, and the other industries where there are organizations engaged in all the steps through the production of raw materials to the marketing of the finished product. The reason for this is that the complete units are in better position to coordinate all the factors that would work for a stabilized condition than are the units that are engaged in a single branch of the industry.

Jan 1, 1931

By Albert J. McIntosh

In discussing the petroleum products situation the first thing that comes to mind is "what is happening to gasoline." Is the consumption increasing? How is the export market? What about imports? Are stocks on hand too high? Have we produced too much? This paper will attempt to answer these questions. Consumption of gasoline (motor fuel) in the United States in spite of the depression and the chaotic conditions of many industries has increased during 1931 about 2 per cent over 1930. This favorable factor was offset by a severe contraction in exports, which fell off about 30 per cent from 1930. This drop in exports was so large that very little more export business was done than in 1926 or 1927. Taking all demand combined, there was a decrease from the peak year of 1930 of nearly 11,000,000 bbl., amounting to slightly over 2 per cent. The units of the industry, though, should have expected some decrease and governed themselves accordingly. Let us see what they did. They reduced imports over 3,000,000 bbl., which helped. Production was cut 3,000,000 bbl., but this was not enough, so that stocks increased 1,800,000 bbl. whereas during the previous year stocks were reduced 2,500,000 bbl. It is apparent, therefore, that something was done to keep the industry in balance in regard to gasoline, but not enough. If the year had ended on Sept. 30, we could have said that production had been cut 19,000,000 bbl. and stocks had been reduced from the previous year, but the excessive production during the last three months of the year changed everything. It is a strange thing and worthy of note that the price of gasoline fell to its lowest levels when apparently the greatest improvement was being made, and that during the last quarter of the year prices started to improve, when, in spite of an improvement in total demand which approximated 1930, an excessive production caused an uneconomic condition to set in. Stocks on hand on Dec. 31 were unquestionably too high, possibly 10,000,000 bbl. more than was needed for a strong condition to obtain. It seems almost unbelievable that the industry would continue to produce

Jan 1, 1932

By W. A. Riggs

In a single year the total transportation cost equals nearly 30 pct of the value of mineral commodities, the largest single cost from the deposit to consumer. The magnitude of this economic factor calls for more complete understanding of cost and operational problems between producer and carrier than now exists. Details are given of the costs of providing transportation as well as freight rates for selling transportation. In 1958, transportation of mineral commodities in the United States required 600 billion ton-miles to move 1 3/4 billion tons of products of mines comprising solid fuels, crude oil, industrial minerals and rocks, and ores. Possibly 17 pct was handled by more than one mode of transport, since combinations of several modes of transport may, at times, achieve better service/cost results than any single mode. Total transportation cost of nearly $5 billion equaled roughly 30 pct of the value of the mineral commodities, the largest single cost from the mineral deposit to the consumer. The tremendous magnitude of this transportation undertaking demands much more complete understanding than now exists between mineral producers and carriers about the economic and operational problems of each other. A substantial portion of the daily work of the writer is spent in trying to act as a combination interpreter and catalyst between potential shippers and carriers, hoping to direct both to points of mutual understanding and advantage. For the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to ask mining people to accept some terminology and to try to appreciate the mental approach of the freight rate making people of the carriers. This paper will consider costs of providing transportation as well as freight rates for selling transportation—although these are fields of limited certainty. There are no accurate statistical breakdowns for all modes of transport and types of carriers indicating commodities, volume of traffic, distances, costs, and rates. Much information is available for railroads, and some for the regulated portions of air, motor, pipeline, and water transportation. Unregulated carriers, handling about half of the transportation of products of mines, are not required to report, and very little is known of their activities. Figures used herein are national in scope, unless otherwise indicated, and have generally been derived from Interstate Commerce Commission reports and files. Tonnage figures have been reduced to net tons of 2000 lb. The very generalized comparison of average mileage freight rate levels for various modes of transport provided by Fig. 1 affords advantageous perspective for the entire field of transportation costs. Dashed guide lines show cents per ton-mile, and dotted guide lines show percentage of first class railroad freight rate. While costs of other than railroad transportation more nearly follow constant cents per ton-mile functions, costs of railroad transportation show characteristic taper, or decrease in cents per-ton mile with increasing length of haul. This fundamental difference in cost is due largely to the fact that railroads and pipelines provide their own fully taxed roadway facilities while highway, waterway, and air carriers use government-provided tax-free roadway at no cost other than fuel, license, and certain excise taxes. Thus railroad and pipeline transportation might be said to carry heavy threshold costs in addition to those transportation costs which are directly variable with ton miles of transportation produced. The original basis of railroad freight rate structures lies in the classification of all articles of commerce into railroad class ralings ranging from 7 to 40 pct of first class (100 pct) rate level, dependent on value, hazard, loading characteristics, service requirements, and whether carload or less than carload. Classification tables and mileage-based (but arbitrarily grouped), rate scales are published as tariffs subject to approval by regulatory bodies. Used together, these determine class rates in cents per 100 lb between points in the U. S. Where local commercial or operating conditions render it advantageous for carriers to depart from

Jan 1, 1961

By C. W. Merrill

The price records of seven representative mineral commodities for the 68-year period 1890 through 1957 have been compiled and analyzed for significant trends. When these records are reduced to real prices in terms of dollars of constant purchasing power or to the purchasing power of industrial wages at average rates, a substantial overall fall in prices is revealed. This downtrend contradicts the widely held concept that heavy drafts on a mineral resource must lead to scarcity, reflected in rising prices. Three metals (aluminum, copper, and pig iron), two fuels (bituminous coal and petroleum), and two nonmetals (sulfur and cement) have been chosen because of their pre-eminence in their respective categories, their significance in an industrial economy, and the ready availability of their price records. It might be added that these seven commodities were selected before any price figures were compiled; none was selected or rejected to substantiate any preconceived notions as to price trends. The overall importance of the seven is demonstrated by the fact that, taken together, they composed over three-fourths of the value of all minerals produced in the U. S. in 1957. The first step in the analysis was to reduce the price records to a basis for significant comparisons. Two such comparisons have been made: 1) The quantities of each of the commodities that could have been purchased for an average hour's wage in each year, and 2) the unit price of each commodity through the years in terms of deflated dollars. These data are set forth in the accompanying table and two charts. The quantities of the mineral commodity purchasable with the average wage for one hour's work in all manufacturing industries through 1926 were based on annual average prices and on average annual wage rates determined by Paul H. Douglas and published in his "Real Wages in the United States, 1890-1926." The series was extended through 1957 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor. Calculations based on these data show that the average worker could have purchased 1.28 lb of copper with his hourly wage in 1890, whereas his hourly wage would have purchased 8.11 lb in 1957, an increase of 633 pct in the 68-year period. An average hour's wage would have bought 10.85 gal of petroleum in 1890, compared with 33.04 gal in 1957. Even more spectacular is the increase in sulfur, of which 25.25 lb could have been purchased with the 1904 average hourly wage; 223.08 lb were purchasable with the wage in 1957—an increase of 883 pct. Comparable price data for sulfur are not available for years earlier than 1904. For every commodity, the calculations show an improvement in the wage earner's purchasing power in 1957 compared with the early years. Measuring purchasing power in terms of wages does not give an entirely fair picture of the availability of a commodity in an economy. When the efficiency of an economy changes and the balance shifts among such elements as raw-material production, manufacturing, and service trade, the economic significance of an hour's work changes. Partly to meet such criticism, but mostly to present another interesting measure of the response of minerals to changing market conditions, a second set of calculations has been made to deflate unit prices for the seven commodities into terms of 1954 dollars. To accomplish this adjustment to a common 1954 parity, the Gross National Product Price Deflator, developed by the Office of Business Economics, U. S. Department of Commerce, was used. Although the results of these calculations are not as striking as those based on labor's increasing purchasing power, nevertheless the declines outweigh the rises in the prices of the mineral commodities. In terms of these deflated prices, aluminum and sulfur are much cheaper today than in the early years; copper was substantially cheaper in 1957 than in 1890; pig iron and petroleum are little changed; and only bituminous coal and cement have increased substantially. Strangely, the two mineral commodities with the strongest reserve positions are the two to exhibit rising real prices. Now this apparent overall downtrend in prices has taken place during a period of almost fantastic increase in the demand for mineral products. The value of minerals consumed in the world during the period greatly exceeds all mineral consumption up to 1890. A stage has been reached in the U.S. in which 95 pct of the energy used is of mineral origin and in which machines, structures, roadways, communication facilities, and most other elements in the industrial economy are primarily of mineral origin. Even agricultural fertility is maintained, in large measure, by mineral fertilizers. A series published in Minerals Yearbook shows that the value of U. S. mineral products has risen from $615 million in 1890 to $18,000 million in 1957, a 29-fold increase. Even in deflated dollars, the increase has been eightfold, while population has expanded less than threefold. Not only are demands of the industrial nations— the U. S., countries of Western Europe, and Japan— increasing at rapid rates, but those countries with agrarian economies are calling themselves underdeveloped and clamoring to industrialize. The ever-expanding mineral requirements in the U. S. and throughout the world show no abatement. Mineral reserves frequently have been described as wasting assets. Much concern has been shown for future users, who have been pictured as finding themselves on a plundered planet. Conservationists have viewed the future with alarm and have demanded legislation and regulations to reduce the drain on mineral reserves.

Jan 1, 1960

By Francis Cameron

Gloomy predictions that domestic mineral reserves are approaching exhaustion are unwarranted and may be harmful, this author contends. Specific mineral forecasting errors in the Paley Report are cited to support this contention, and steps that can be taken to insure a progressive mineral industry capable of keeping pace with the major raw material needs of the nation through advancing technology are suggested. Mining is both exciting and rewarding —although at times somewhat frustrating— and we all can have real pride in our industry, in its people, and in its accomplishments. It is, however, with concern that I have noted a deterioration in this Country in what might be called mining's stature and in the growth of a belief in many quarters that our mineral reserves are rapidly approaching exhaustion. In other words, there is a popular image that we are fast becoming a "have not" nation in many respects and that the domestic mining industry can no longer be considered, in the vernacular of Wall Street to offer much in the way of "growth potential." I do not subscribe to this hypothesis, nor do I be-li4ve that the record of the mining industry bears this out. However, let me add that we can, in time, talk ourselves into this frame of mind and we can hasten the day when this very well might come about by unnecessary and unwise legislation or regulation. My remarks today are basically designed to give my reasons for refuting this negative philosophy and to review our record. With your help, I know we can improve our image, and the public's recognition of our industry's peculiar problems. The progress of our civilization over the centuries has been fundamentally based upon proper use of raw materials, both agricultural and mineral, and upon energy, human or otherwise. As the standard of living has progressed century by century, the demands for mineral raw materials have increased in an irregular, but steadily rising progression. Fortunately, those minerals on which we depend most, i.e., iron, coal, petroleum, copper, aluminum, lead, and zinc have been neither too difficult to find nor to process into useful form. Iron, the most useful of all metals, is present in various amounts in most rock types and soils. Gold, seemingly the most generally desired (but certainly not the most useful of all metals), occurs in sea water in a far greater total tonnage than has been won from all of the world's known gold mines. If the latter is true, then why do we not see large installations treating sea water for the recovery of its gold content? The answer, of course, is that even the French, who seem, from their recent actions, to value gold above all else, have not devised a way of doing this at a profit. Theoretically, it is possible, but not with today's technology at a cost which would justify the effort. Man has exploited only those mineral concentrations which accidents of nature have placed within his so far limited means of finding and utilizing. What we geologists and engineers refer to as an orebody is nothing more than a concentration of minerals, exploitable with available knowledge, that will yield a value greater than the value attached to the energy and capital required to produce it. What is "ore" and what is not "ore" is, in the end, a matter of economics. The economic problem stems from the physical and chemical character of mineral deposits. The good Lord stacked the cards heavily in favor of rising costs by limiting the amount of the higher grade ores easily available. As the best and most accessible ores are depleted, it becomes necessary to work harder and with greater ingenuity to produce more from less accessible and lower grade resources. The quantity of mineral raw materials we can have in the future will be determined largely by what we can afford to pay for them in terms of human effort, capital outlay and production energies. We will always have the problem of cost with us and our only real means of keeping ahead of rising costs is by continually improving our technical abilities. We, in this country at least, no longer have open to us large and unexplored virgin wildernesses in which a pick-and-shovel prospector might uncover an untouched mineral bonanza. The rest of the world also has few conventional frontiers left in which the explorer-prospector is free to roam. We do, however, have enormous land areas unexplored, and untouched po-

Jan 1, 1969

By William C. Cassun

The important role of pit slope design in the overall economics of open-pit mining ventures has long been recognized and well documented.1 2 Any economic analysis of a pit slope design must reflect the trade-off between the benefits and the increased risk of slope failure inherent in steeper slope angles. The conventional practice in pit slope design is based on the factor of safety analysis.' The approach uses average values to arrive at a deterministic solution to slope stability. Past analyses based on this approach generally have had several drawbacks: 1. The risk from slope failure could not be quantified. 2. Only relatively simple pit wall geometries were considered. 3. The analyses were performed solely for the benefits of steeper slopes, seldom discussing the potential costs of slope failures. 4. Analyses were seldom considered in a year-by-year mine planning context. Recognizing that average values do not reflect the uncertainty in geomechanical parameters, a probabilistic philosophy to slope design has evolved. 4,5 However, this approach had not been fully developed to include complex slope geometries and mine planning consideration. In order to develop an integrated, pit slope design procedure, a research project was initiated at the University of Arizona during 1973 in conjunction with the Canada Center for Mineral and Energy Teleology. This research resulted in the development of a probabilistic design procedure. The remainder of this paper gives an overview of the probabilistic design procedure and a discussion of the requirements for the benefit-cost analysis of a pit slope design. Finally, the results of a case study undertaken at an operating mine are given.

Jan 1, 1977

By S. Zekovic

"The paper gives an overview of the economics condition and strategic business challanges of the mining&metallurgy sector and their possible impact on the future development of the Bor basin of copper in Serbian part of Danube Region. Economics and strategic challanges in the mining& metallurgy complex are emphasized by world economic and financial crisis. An analysis of strategic challanges is undertaken by application of a comprehensive development framework approach. Paper indicates that an economics and evaluation of possible impacts of constraints and challenges for the development of Bor basin shows that it must be included in corporative decision, local and regional plans.INTRODUCTIONRisks are characteristic of every strategic development and business decision-making, so their successful management should be a part of the development strategy of the corporation, especially longterm. Due to the growing uncertainty in the general socio-economic environment, “risk management”, risk insurance, risk control, risk culture, risk optimization are frequently talked about. Among the key risks at a corporate level are the financial risks and risks of the regulative framework, especially in the field of environment and land use. In both cases, it is a question of external risks, which the companies need to relativize and successfully manage. Some companies pay more attention to production risks and search for better solutions in that domain which is not enough (Ernst&Young, 2008). Strategic business risks appear mostly on the macro-economic level, from where they should be” transferred” onto the level of sector economics and action level in corporations. Risk management include transferring the risk to other parts, avoiding the risk, preventing hazard, reducing the negative effect or probability of the risk, accepting some or all of the consequences of a particular risk.The research has included perspective and the general market trend and market positioning of the production and copper processing complex in the world; the impact of the requirements and strategic goals of the EU Directive and Kyoto Protocol on the institutional and other adjustments important for business in this sector; the impact assessment of the regulations important for business in the mining and metals sector, and case study of economics and challenges for the development of mining and metallurgy sector in the Bor basin of copper in Serbian part of Danube region. The analysis has included the identification and assessment of the global challenges on the future development of the copper complex in the miningsmelting basin Bor. Presented results in the paper are part of the research project “Sustainable spatial development of the Danube area in Serbia"" (No. 036036), financed by Ministry of Education and science of Republic Serbia."

Jan 1, 2012

By Donald M. Duncan

An acceptable source of concrete aggregate is available in Kansas City in a continuous, medium bedded, slightly dipping limestone unit. Removal is accomplished in shallow depth, 12 feet to 17 feet high, room and pillar mines. The accepted empirical design spaces 20 foot pillars 60 feet on center. A portion of the 20 foot unit is left in place for roof support. Rock and soil cover is variable to 100± feet maximum. Long-term stability of these mines is affected by numerous factors, including the above mine-rock profile, ground water conditions and mining practice. Crusher-run aggregate sells at the mine for $2.20 per ton, yielding a gross income of $2.00 to $2.80 per square foot of mine. Use of mine space for real estate development requires a new perspective in mine development. Mining practices to obtain long term stabile structures can become an over-riding factor as compared with minimum production costs and maximum extraction ratios. Poorly mined areas are unusuable for secondary purposes. Development cost for lease space in less desirable mines is substantially greater than those planned for a secondary use. Real estate development in mine space involves unique engineering problems. Properly engineered developments offer singular advantages. Warehouse lease space sells for $.50 to $1.00 per square foot per year; fully developed office areas may double these values.

Jan 1, 1968

By Alexander Karim

This paper reviews the growth pattern in bauxite and alumina production, and primary aluminum smelting through 1980. Because the alumina and primary metal are intermediate products of the major integrated aluminum companies, it is not possible to determine their production costs. The costs indicated in this paper are order of magnitude costs based on published figures and the market price of these products. The conclusions in this paper indicate the general pattern of growth in the aluminum industry and are not meant to be a substitute for the feasibility and economic studies that are needed for individual bauxite mining, alumina refining and aluminum smelting projects.

Jan 1, 1968

By Michael Arriagada, Ivan Arriagada

"As mines return to shafts to economically exploit deeper reserves, two methods mine owners use to minimize short term costs are: sinking shafts in phases and refurbishing old, existing shafts. While there may appear to be benefits to utilizing existing infrastructure, often this is not the case, resulting in missed deadlines and added costs. Similarly, if proper long term planning is not executed when sinking a shaft in phases, additional costs and downtime will be accrued. This paper will take an in depth look at both of these options with an eye towards optimizing costs, minimizing downtime, and facilitating construction. INTRODUCTION With the onset of mechanized mining and large capacity trucks, many mines turned away from shafts and began to use ramps to haul ore to surface. However, continual exploitation of mineral reserves located closer to surface, combined with the subsequent unearthing of additional resources at greater depths, forced mines to go deeper and deeper to extend the life and keep the operation running. In shallow mines, hauling ore by truck was an economical option. However, as mines get deeper, driving ramps takes additional time, and hauling over longer and longer distances becomes less economic, both in terms of cost and time. For this reason Mexico, in particular, has seen a jump in the number of shafts which have been put into production, as well as having a number of shafts in different stages of development and still more in the conceptual stages. Many of the shaft projects in Mexico are being designed in phases, with the hoist and equipment purchased capable of reaching the ultimate planned depth of the shaft, but with sinking operations stopping short at an intermediate depth. A loading pocket is then installed to start exploiting mineral at this depth sooner, with subsequent phases planned for a later date using either a rock pentice or bulkhead to separate the sinking operations from the active shaft above. Currently, we are directly involved in two such projects which are actively being deepened, as well as having seen various others already reach completion. If done properly with the long-term plan in mind, sinking in phases can be a very viable option, allowing for faster production while fully utilizing the equipment at various depths. However, there are many issues which can arise when sinking a shaft in phases that if not properly examined and planned for from the outset, have the potential to eliminate the gains hoped for when it was decided to sink in this manner."

Jan 1, 2019