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By Van Dusen M

The involvement of concerned parties in all aspects of the Lihir Project from an early stage has promoted good relations between all groups. Activities involving landowners, the Lihir community, the New Ireland Provincial Government (NIPG) and the prospective developer include the Lihir Liaison Committee, Lihir Working Group, Environmental Planning Committee, Provincial Mining Task Force and the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association (LMALA). With modifications, the Lihir Liaison model may be of use in promoting good relationships among parties in other mineral developments.

Jan 1, 1991

By Richard W. Smith

Why are we losing our liberties? (1) . . . because our local chambers of commerce come to the National Chamber's annual meeting, vote for a policy on federal economy, and then go to Capitol Hill and ask for a federal project for their area. (2) ... because our mining men ask for a subsidy to mine submarginal deposits that can't be economically mined in a free economy. (3) . . . because 18,000 men and organizations all over the country recently wired or wrote a Congressional committee asking that the Army Engineers be exempt from the President's power to reorganize the Executive Branch of the government under the recommendations of the Hoover Commission.

Jan 1, 1949

By Michael Robert Hodson

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do no necessarily reflect those of CRU. The Extent of Government Involvement In 1982 national governments in the Non-Socialist world owned at least some equity share in an estimated 49 percent of the bauxite mining capacity located in their own countries.* By comparison, as Figure 1 shows, in the same year governments owned at least part of an estimated 33 per cent of primary aluminium smelting capacity. In other industries, national, or state governments in 1982 held at least part ownership of mining capacity in 42 per cent in the copper industry, 34 per cent in the tin industry, 23 per cent of the zinc industry, 15 per cent of the lead industry and 11 per cent in the nickel industry. Thus while within the aluminium industry attention has focussed on the share of government ownership in the primary aluminium sector, national government involvement through ownership is larger in the bauxite sector. Moreover, ownership by government is more widespread in the mining of bauxite than in the mining of all other principal non-ferrous base metals. Yet while the equity participation of governments in the bauxite sector is widespread, it is but one of many forms of government involvement. In addition to direct ownership or equity participation domestic government involvement has taken the form of legislation to protect the environment, controls on the level of production, insistence on the export of ore, pressure to maintain levels of employment, controls on the type of fuel used, foreign exchange *Capacity which is owned in whole or in part is included within the state sector, but capacity in one country which is owned by a wholly or partly owned government company in another company is not included in the state sector; e.g. the capacity of the Trombetas mine is included in the state sector but the capacity of Delphi bauxite would not be included.

Jan 1, 1984

"Lax, misguided, and dangerous" is Rep. James Santini's description of the official US position on strategic nonfuel minerals. Santini (D-NV), chairman of the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee, criticized the Interior Department for "its long record of benign neglect" regarding the domestic minerals crisis. Santini made his remarks at a news conference at the American Mining Congress convention in San Francisco, where he released his subcommittee report "US Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications." The report-said to be the first major congressional study of the minerals issue by a committee of jurisdiction is the result of a two-year inquiry. The investigation was undertaken, according to the chairman, "because no person or agency in the executive branch of government fully grasps the critical importance of nonfuel minerals to the nation's economy, defense, and quality of life." The report also urges a larger role for the Department of Defense, which has "stood passively by for many years as a consuming by-stander," according to the report. President Carter's incomplete Non-fuel Minerals Policy Review also drew the committee's ire; Santini calls it "a tragic waste that cost tax-payers $3.5 million and the loss of some 13,000 person-days." The subcommittee examined the following issues for its report: • The US minerals industry's inability to meet national raw material needs under a "hodgepodge of contradictory, restrictive, and irrational" federal regulations; • Dependency on foreign sources of strategic minerals in times of "increasing resource nationalism" and "Soviet mineral expansionism;" • National security needs for foreign mineral resources that do not have effective substitutes; • The US government's approach to national minerals policy "amid a growing realization that such a policy does not exist." The subcommittee report includes an analysis of public and private studies on nonfuel minerals and discusses a series of policy problem areas that negatively affect domestic production. Capital formation disincentives, tax policies, antitrust enforcement, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, technical problems, and restricted access to federally-controlled public lands contribute to what Santini calls a "tragic irony." "The irony is that we are a nation vastly rich in mineral resources yet our own government chooses to stifle development of these critical raw materials and thereby increase offshore reliance. The tragedy is that we also are ensuring US vulnerability to severe economic dislocations and a weakening of our national security." In just six years, from 1973-1978, the US trade deficit in nonfuel minerals rose from $2 billion per year to $8 billion, according to the report. The country imports more than 50% of 23 critical minerals, including 100% of its manganese, chromium, cobalt and platinum. The US is promoting its dependence on foreign mineral sources at the very time the security of many of those sources is becoming less certain, the report notes. Santini said the subcommittee investigation revealed a vulnerability that may be more serious and pervasive than that of foreign oil. The US may be able to develop alternate energy resources, but there are no effective substitutes for many nonfuel minerals. The report also discloses that US stockpiles of critical and strategic minerals are of inadequate supply and quality. Holdings of some vital minerals are far below present objectives, and for some there are no holdings at all, according to Santini. To resolve the current crisis, the report makes the following recommendations: • Complete immediately President Carter's Interagency Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review; • Implement (throught the Interior Department) the 1970 Mining and Minerals Policy Act; • Create an Office of Energy and Minerals with the same stature, power, and oversight responsibilities as the Council on Environmental Quality; • Ease federal restrictions on mineral exploration and development on public lands and implement a complete review of public land use policies; •Fund for and fulfill US nonfuel minerals stockpiling objectives; •Increase federal funding for non-

Jan 11, 1980

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

The potash industry in Saskatchewan has recently been the focus of much new legislation at the provincial level and, along with other mining industries in Canada, also subject to changes in tax legislation at the federal level. As a result, the industry presently operates under (a) provincial production controls, a prorationing scheme; (b) a new provincial reserve tax on potash only and; (c) a new federal income tax applicable to all mineral industries. The prorating scheme dates back to 1970 and emerged as public policy because of the excess supply situation faced by the international potash industry towards the end of the sixties. This caused special problems for new mines in Saskatchewan and the provincial government decided to intervene. The new tax legislation at provincial and federal levels, both introduced within the last four years, reflects a belief that insufficient revenues accrue to the public sector from natural resources. All mining industries in Canada, including the potash industry, have had their tax positions completely reversed during these four years. Traditionally the mining sector in Canada has been a recipient of substantial tax incentives and has enjoyed low tax rates. This has changed and the mining sector is now one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the economy. In addition, the mining sector has moved from a situation where its rapid development was favoured by governments to a situation where this is no longer the case.

Jan 1, 1976

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration f or potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and-the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief preliminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliff side near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to `secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By David E. Jones, Dean K. Hunt, C. Y. Chen

INTRODUCTION Of all the numerous geological hazards that threaten the well-being of urban areas in the United States, probably none is so widespread, persistent, and diversified as surface subsidence (HRB-Singer, Inc., 1977). Simply defined, subsidence is the vertical displacement or sinking of the ground surface caused by either natural phenomena or man's activities. The downward movement, however, can be accompanied by horizontal movement, strain, tilt and even by a locally upward movement. Damage to structures and the environment can result from any of these movements. Extracting subsurface materials, fluids and solids, accounts for most man-induced subsidence in the United States. Among all the mining-related subsidences, the collapse of voids created by underground coal mining has been the major cause in inflicting surface damage (Comptroller General of the United States, 1979). Subsidence from coal mining may occur within a few weeks or be delayed for years, depending upon the mineral layer's depth below the surface, the overlying rock strata's characteristics, the extent and methods of mining that were employed, and the time deterioration of pillar and mine structure. Unless underground resources are not mined or control measures are implemented to prevent or minimize damage, some degree of surface subsidence and its accompanied deleterious effects are often inevitable. The ways to control the subsidence and minimize surface damage may include: 1. Precautionary measures built into new structures or surface features. 2. Preventive works applied to existing structures or surface features. 3. Mine design incorporating special underground layouts. 4. Any combination of the above measures. Upon the enactment of Public Law 95-87, the Secretary of the Interior, through the recently created Office of Surface Mining (OSM), was authorized to promulgate rules to regulate mining reclamation including subsidence control. Proposed on September 18, 1978, these rules were finalized, following public comment and hearings, on March 13, 1979, as part of the permanent regulatory program for the regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations which include the surface effects of underground mining. On January 28, 1981, Secretary Watt of the Department of the Interior issued an order to re- quire all agencies to identify with recommendations all regulations which are believed to be excessive, burdensome or counterproductive. Also on February 17, 1981. President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12291 requiring all Federal agencies to conduct a regulatory review to make a determination that each promulgation of a regulation is clearly within the authority delegated by law and consistent with Congressional intent (Federal Register, 1981). As a result, OSM initiated the regulatory reform to revise the permanent regulatory program. Following a brief discussion of the technical aspects and the effects of subsidence on man and his environment, this paper presents a historical overview of how rules and regulations are used to govern the subsidence related problems. The development of the regulation of subsidence under Public Law 95-87, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA or the Act) are also discussed, including the new regulations being developed under the regulatory reform program. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS Am EFFECTS OF FINE SUBSIDENCE An extensive historical review of mining subsidence is given by Zwartendyk (1971) and Shadbolt (1978). Comprehensive technical presentations have been given by Henry (1956), King and Whetton (1957), Hall and Orchard (1963). Muller, et al. (1968). Grard (1969), Voight and Pariseau (1970). Kapp and Williams (1972), Cummins and Given (1973), Brauner (1973) , and NCB (1975). A theory of surface subsidence due to underground mining was perhaps first fundamentally stated by a French engineer, Toillez, in 1838, and formulated by a Belgian engineer, Gonot, in 1839 (Goldreich, 1913, cited by Zwartendyk, 1971). Since that time,

Jan 1, 1982

By Rajesh K. Mishra

The person in charge of Environmental Affairs in a small business has many higher priority projects (such as making money to meet the employee? payroll etc.) than filling out and filing the regulatory forms. It is but. natural to think that these affairs can be managed? by playing ignorant until audited by the regulatory -state and federal agencies. Truth is to. the contrary; generally, it is too late by then. The fines and legal costs even for failing to file the regulatory forms could deliver a serious blow to the financial well-being of a small business. Forms and reports under SARA Title III are not hard to complete., but they are time consuming. In this paper we will discuss the information and data compilation procedures, simplification of some legal terminology into simple technical language, and tips that help in filling out the forms?. Some actual case 'histories of EPA fines will also be reviewed.

Jan 1, 1992

By Thomas V. Falkie

In bygone days, the mineral engineer spent most of his/her time on the technical aspects of designing, building, and managing mineral operations. In the last few decades, mostly since the 1960s, increasing amounts of engineering man power and time are spent dealing with federal, state, and local government agencies, laws, and regulations. It is not possible to plan, design, build, or operate mines, mills, smelters, or even office buildings without detailed consideration of government regulations and permitting requirements dealing with environment, worker health and safety, etc. The four chapters of this section provide an overview of the social, legal, political, environmental, and health and safety aspects of mineral enterprise. The section sets the stage for the working engineer/geologist in industry, government, consulting, or academe and points the direction for more detailed study in each of these areas.

Jan 1, 2008

By A. Eftimie, M. Stanley

The World Bank Group (WBG) believes that extractive industries can make significant contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction, providing that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues are properly managed. The WBG recognizes that stakeholders have legitimate concerns about the impact of extractive industries, and management proposals are built around the central theme that investments and policy advice in the extractive industries should lead to poverty reduction. To help governments create appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks, this paper focuses on the linkages between overarching policies and laws and the management / governance of extractive industries at the local communities. It encourages the use of new instruments designed to help ensure that local communities benefit from extractive industries.

Jan 1, 2005

By Reno Sales

THE present-day application of geological knowledge to mine opera-tions owes much to Survey activities. Early publications covering developed deposits at Comstock and Eureka in Nevada, and Leadville in Colorado, aroused great interest in mine geology among mine owners and operators. In later years personal contacts between Survey geologists, notably Lindgren, Spurr, Emmons, Weed, and Ransome, to name only a few, and mine managers, mine superintendents and mine foremen, brought directly home the importance of geological mapping and study in connection with mine operations. However, the Survey had recognized from the beginning that it was not practicable, either from the viewpoint of cost or policy, to supply direct help to the miner. The situation was met by many large mining companies through the organization of geological departments to deal with problems of geology which concerned not alone the every-day mine operation but also the life expectancy of the ore deposit. The mine owner therefore looked to the mine geologist to apply the "laws of ore deposition" in estimating the future of his mine. The examination of outside properties also became a duty of the company geologist where replacements were needed or where expansion of operations was contem-plated. And finally, out of this situation there developed the inde-pendent consulting geologist, specializing in geological examinations of prospects, mines, and mining districts, whose duties included the highly important but often difficult task of appraising ore reserves and ore possibilities. Thus, while it may be considered by many that the work of the mine geologist overlaps that of the Survey geologist, their respective fields of endeavor are not in conflict. The appearance of the mine geologist has lessened in no manner the need of intensive field and research work by the Geological Survey and related organizations.

Jan 1, 1934

Keeping the sediment on the mine site and out of the water course is essential from the regulatory, environmental and sustainability perspectives. Regulation of this aspect of mining is embedded in environmental legislation and government receiving water quality standards, and government control has apparently been considered to be the most appropriate method to define mine site discharge standards and the environmental implications of sediment in downstream watercourses. A literature search for guidelines for the site specific design and operation of sediment ponds treating mine site runoff to remove total suspended solids, turbidity and flocculant-induced toxicity, revealed little information on the mining industry?s and government?s roles in defining the ?how to achieve? related to sediment pond design. Is there a need or reason for an industry-driven leadership to clearly define the ?how to? keep the sediment on the mine site and out of the water course? Currently, this issue is addressed in Canada by a federal mining regulation for metal mines which specifies discharge quality for sediment. This paper focuses on the method used in British Columbia, Canada, to regulate and provide a scientific methodology to control the discharge of sediment from mine sites. Management plans relative to this topic are discussed and are considered to have value from the exploration, construction, operation and the onset of closure phases. In addition, the balance and linkage between the erosion control management plan and the sediment pond management plan are discussed in terms of how they may be designed to complement each other to lower the risk of exceeding discharge and receiving water quality standards. If there were an industry-driven standard, or guidance document relative to addressing sediment release, it would benefit mining companies by eliminating the repetitive analysis of this topic for each new mine, mine expansion, and mine modification; also, government may often replace certain aspects of permitting with a regulation, if there is a government/industry established standard defining Best Achievable Technology (e.g. the Canadian Metal Mining Effluent Regulations).

Aug 1, 2013

By DONALD H. McLAUGHLlN

Few factors have had more influence in maintaining the strength and stability of the United States than our persistent habit of providing .checks and balances to the dynamic powers of free enterprise on the one hand and to the controls and guidance exercised by the State on the other. .Indeed, it is this same concern for matching forces against each other that has given our republic its ability -to preserve a democratic basis of life for its citizens, and yet maintain a ,government that is able to protect the rights of all and to resist and minimize the danger of excessive concentration of authority. Our current efforts to clarify the nation's mineral policies and to define more clearly the role that the governmental agencies should play in conjunction with the functions of private -enterprise again reveal the desirability and advantages of maintaining our traditional controls. At times, the equilibrium has been temporarily disturbed by too great enthusiasm for one or the other of these basic concepts. Sooner or later, however, the balance has been restored by the healthy opposition that is always created by excesses of one sort. At the current stage in our history, the swing toward undue enlargement of the powers of the State seems to have gone dangerously far and we would be untrue 'to our traditional behavior if the group that must demonstrate the virtues of free enterprise did not rally to its support with the utmost earnestness.

Jan 1, 1949

The administration came on as a strong supporter of the mining industry in April of 1982 when President Reagan delivered his long-awaited minerals policy statement. He promised to reduce America's minerals vulnerability, and called for spending billions on meeting stockpile goals for strategic minerals, opening up federal lands for mineral exploration, elimination of barriers to deep sea mining, and regulatory relief. He defended the favorable tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act as a stimulus to private research and development that would ensure the availability of materials essential to the nation's economy and national defense. But the administration just didn't seem to get anywhere. Congress, environmentalists, and even foreign governments fought White House-proposed legislation on all fronts, delivering the ultimate coup in forcing Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford's resignation and the subsequent EPA staff house cleaning in early 1983. Anti-Reaganites scored victory after victory against Reagan's efforts to stimulate the minerals industry. Congress was stalemated on so many mining-related issues that not much was done either for or against the industry. And the US was not to get its way on the issue of sea mining either. Most of Reagan's mineral policy objectives failed to be met. Three months after the National Materials and Minerals Program Plan was presented and the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment was made its coordinator, the head of the Cabinet Council James Watt blamed lack of progress in reviving the mining industry and creating a better strategic stockpile on the weak economy and the House of Representatives, which repeatedly thwarted efforts to open wilderness lands to mining. Congress The 97th Congress spent much of its time saying no in 1982-to the Reagan administration's deep cuts in energy and environment programs, to major changes in clean air and water laws, to oil and gas leasing in wilderness, and to killing the Department of Energy. Most of 1982 (and 1981) was spent in heated budget disputes. Some things that did not happen: • The administration and industry failed to get changes in controls of hazardous air pollutants and sulfur dioxide emissions that are implicated in the phenomenon known as acid rain. Industry had wanted to relax requirements for new industries building in clean air regions where the air act demands prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality, and to relax requirements tightening up the regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The air battle is expected to continue on five major fronts-acid rain, hazardous air pollutants, PSD, automobile pollution, and nonattainment. • Regulatory reform legislation to overhaul the way government carries out the law died a slow death last year. Business groups and the administration said federal agencies should be required to consider cost-effective measures of reaching regulatory objectives of protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Opponents, including environmentalists, feared such action would delay, weaken, or scuttle important regulations. • Congress turned thumbs down several times on proposals for oil and gas leasing in wilderness but could not agree on any new wilderness recommendations (see The Wilderness Battle). • Congress refused to open the door to the Reagan administration's plan to raise up to $4 billion a year from sales of federal lands. The administration identified surplus and excess federal lands, mostly obsolete buildings or isolated tracts of land, that could be sold by the General Services Administration (GSA) to help out the federal budget deficit. Congress took no action. Some things that did happen: • Congress extended the Defense Production Act (DPA) for six months through March 1983 without changing the 32-year-old law. That came after it failed to resolve sharp differences over proposals for critical minerals programs. Differences concerned both the amount of funds and the scope of programs that would be authorized under the DPA's Title III. Some proponents pressed for $5 billion in funding for loan guarantees or purchase commitments to spur domestic production of minerals such as cobalt. Other members of Congress wanted smaller amounts of funding, and the Reagan administration, until about November, had opposed any use of federal funds for strategic mineral programs. These measures were certain to come up again before the DPA extension expired in March. • House supporters of the Critical Materials Act of 1982 were unable to come up with the twothirds majority needed to pass the bill, so it died on the House floor in December. The bill proposed that a council be established with responsibility for coordinating federal materials research and development. The administration opposed the council creation contending that the Cabinet Council

Jan 5, 1983

By F. W. Lee

Historical-From the beginning of time, all ingenuity of mankind has been concentrated upon the methods of finding gold and unusual deposits in the earth. An illustration (Fig. 1) from the old treatise by Agricola, "De Re Metallica," published in 1580, will serve to show the im-plicit faith of that generation in divining methods. However, it was not until 1920 that real progress was made in prospecting by using the latest advances of the physical sciences. The public interest was stimulated by the successes of these methods on the part of commercial oper-ators, and governmental agencies received many requests for information concerning their relia-bility. There were also, in the late 1920's.high- pressure mine-promotion schemes which used geophysical methods in a very questionable manner, symbolized in Figure 2 as of 1928 by an elec-trified forked stick. Authoritative information concerning such practices for public protection was needed to curb such notorious undertakings. Dr. Scott Turner, then Director of the United States Bureau of Mines, thoroughly understood the situation and was first in the governmental de-partments to recognize the possible value of a study of modern prospecting methods. The Bureau of Mines began this investigation by employing Drs. A. S. Eve and D. A. Keys of McGill University for short periods in the summer in 1927. Their first publication [see 1 of "References" at end of paper] served to illustrate the fundamental scientific principles which underlie geophysical prospecting. This was followed by a second publication [21 giving the results of field-tests. In the light of the rapid improvements during the intervening ten years, these two papers take a historical position. Later a full-time position under Civil Service was planned by the Bureau of Mines for con-tinuous investigations and research concerning geophysics and its applications to prospecting. It was Turner's idea that. since the oil-industry had been making very rapid progress with good results, if mineral mining could also benefit to the same degree, it would be of great help to that industry.

Jan 1, 1940

By J. H. Swartz

During 1938 and 1939, an extensive series of geophysical surveys, employing both resistivity and magnetic methods, have been carried on in the Hawaiian Islands by the Section of Geophysics of the United States Geological Survey in cooperation with the Division of Ground-Water of the Survey and the Division of Hydrography of the Territorial Government (see Fig. 1). During this time, surveys have been conducted on the islands of Oahu, Molokai, and Maui. Two distinct types of ground-water occurrence are being investigated: (1) The basal fresh-water lens floating on underlying salt water in obedience to the Ghyben-Herzberg principle (Fig. 2); and (2) perched ground-water (Fig. 3).

Jan 1, 1940

By William Colby

INCREASING governmental control of human activities seems inevitable. Within the present generation railroad rates and the public sale of water, gas and electricity have been subjected to rigid regulation. The field of control is slowly but surely being enlarged, and it is the object of this paper to outline in brief space this tendency toward increased governmental regulation, as far as mineral resources are concerned. Our, dual form of government complicates the problem. We must deal not only with the powers of the Federal Government, but also with those of the individual States. In order to approach this question intelligently we must have some conception of the powers and jurisdiction of the States and the United States, respectively, over mineral lands and mineral production. Starting with the Federal Government we find it never owned any public domain within the States that formed a part of the thirteen original colonies and, for historical reasons, the same is true of Tennessee and Texas. The Mid-Western States were erected out of the public domain which was acquired by the United States through cession from the original States or by purchase from foreign nations. Congress early in the last century adopted a policy of leasing public lands containing lead deposits in a portion of this Mid-Western territory, but later abandoned that policy and disposed of such public, lands, mineral and non-mineral, outright so that they long since have practically all passed into private ownership and become subject to the general jurisdiction of the respective State governments. In the great public domain lying west of the Mississippi River, and in portions of some of the Southern States, the Federal Government adopted a new mineral land policy following the discovery of gold in California. (Acts of Congress of 1866, 1870, and 1872.) The mineral lands within these States, instead of being disposed of on the game basis as agricultural lands, as occurred in the Mid-Western States, were segregated from agricultural lands and sold under special laws intended to encourage mining, giving the miner the free right to locate and work these mineral lands without paying any royalty to the Federal Government. A miner could also obtain at slight expense a complete

Jan 1, 1930

By Paul C. Schmall, Kevin Clarke, Paul J. Lewis, John M. Stanbury

"The $200M rehabilitation of the more than 100-year-old Gowanus Flushing Tunnel and pumping station located on the Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn, NY required deep excavations in an extremely congested urban environment. The environment posed significant challenges, including: support of excavation for protection of existing structures, excavation through man-made fill while eliminating groundwater inflow due to potentially contaminated groundwater chemistry; discharge and disposal impacts; and potential settlement of surrounding structures. This paper will present the design and construction challenges associated with the construction of a new combined sewer overflow (CSO) chamberwhich included a jet grout bottom seal, to mitigate groundwater inflow during excavation. The foundation for the finished structure also included a unique system incorporating the jet grout bottom seal elements with deep jet grout columns (piles) acting as the foundation system for the final structure. Design and construction challenges included highly variable soil conditions such as man-made fill, obstructions from previous construction, presence of an organic stratum, and conflicts with existing timber foundation piles. The jet grout bottom seal was constructed in loose sands with the deeper jet grout foundation elements extending to bear on a dense sand stratum. Challenges associated with the bottom seal included grid spacing and construction sequencing. Wet in wet sequencing was used to mitigate potential windows in the bottom seal further complicated by shadowing from existing timber foundation piles.Introduction And BackgroundModernization of the Gowanus Tunnel Pumping System required deep excavations in the extremely congested urban environment of Brooklyn, NY. The project location is shown on Fig. 1 and 2. The focus of this paper is to present the design and construction challenges associated with the support of excavation, control of groundwater, and ultimate foundation support for the combined sewer overflow (CSO) bypass chamber extension. The project site was tightly constrained by adjacent, active roadways and underground utilities, as well as residential and industrial structures. Therefore, excavation support was required to limit ground movement and maintain the integrity of the surrounding facilities. Excavation depths to as much as 16 ft below ground level, 8 ft below groundwater, required that seepage and groundwater be controlled so as to minimize pumping and disposal of groundwater and maintain the surrounding groundwater levels to avoid potential settlement of adjacent roadways, utilities, and structures. In addition, the subsurface conditions required that the proposed CSO bypass chamber extension be supported on a deep foundation to avoid differential and total settlements that may be detrimental to the existing and expanded structure. A plan view of the existing CSO bypass chamber and the proposed extension is shown on Fig. 3."

Jan 1, 2016

By E. S. Moore

"The Centre of the silver-producing section of the Gowganda area lies about 55 miles northwest of Cobalt, and the village of Gowganda is 71 miles by road from New Liskeard. The geological similarities of the Gowganda and Cobalt areas led prospectors westward from the rich Cobalt field, first to Elk Lake and then on to Gowganda, where mineralization was found in 1907. A year later many showings were found, and rich hand-picked ore was shipped. Most of the ore has come, however, from two mines, both of which are still operating; the Miller Lake-O'Brien, which was purchased by Siscoe Metals of Ontario Ltd. in 1945, and the Castle-Trethewey. The annual production of these two mines runs over one and one-half million ounces of silver and considerable cobalt. The total production of the camp has reached about 32,000,000 ounces of silver and a large amount of cobalt, the total not recorded.General GeologyThe general geology of Gowganda is in many respects much like that of Cobalt. There are areas of Keewatin basic and acid Javas mixed with tuffs and basic intrusions. These rocks are deformed and partly altered to schists, and have been intruded by some Haileyburian basic and ultra-basic rocks and by Algoman granite. These were followed by a large number of porphyritic Matachewan quartz diabase dykes. After a period of extensive erosion the Huronian sediments were deposited on a pene-planed surface over all the older rocks; these sediments include large quantities of conglomerate (partly tillite), quartzite, and greywacke. The Keweenawan rocks include the Nipissing quartz diabase sill, later quartz diabase dykes, and one long olivine diabase dyke, the latest Precambrian rock. The area has been extensively glaciated.Structural FeaturesThere has been little folding in the area since the Algoman batholiths were intruded, and the Huronian sediments lie nearly flat, with dips of 10, 15, or rarely 25 degrees. The Matachewan dykes show a remarkably uniform, nearly north strike, indicative of east-west tension when they were intruded. On the other hand, the dykes later than the sill strike nearly east, tangentially to the northeasterly and northwesterly strikes of the Miller Lake basin."

Jan 1, 1949

By Angus D. Campbell

Introduction Gowganda forms part of the general Cobalt area. Its rocks and ores are very similar to those of the other parts of the area. While its total production of silver is only 4 per cent of that of the famous Cobalt silver camp, its 1928 shipments contained 42 1/2 per cent as much silver as those of Cobalt for that year. During twenty years of production, 15,000,000 ounces of silver have been shipped from Gowganda. Of this, over 8,000,000 ounces have been shipped in the past five years. The area has thus made for several years a substantial contribution to the wealth of Ontario. Its future depends to a great extent on the priee of silver, which is now, unfortunately, at a record low price. This paper is a discussion of how the Gowganda ore-shoots occur, together with some notes on the milling of the ores at the Castle-Trethewey Mines. The first part is written in the hope of stimulating further study of the silver occurrences, which may lead to further discoveries. The second part, besides being a matter of record, may be of some use to operators of small mills. The drawings in the several Figures illustrating the text are by W. D. Stroud, mine superintendent of the Castle-Trethewey Mines, the benefit of whose opinions I have had in compiling these notes.

Jan 1, 1930